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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LAND VALUE TAXATION IN AN URBAN AREA  
WITH LARGE LOT ZONING: AN URBAN COMPUTABLE GENERAL 
EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 
 
By 
Ki-Whan Choi 
 
August 2006 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. David L. Sjoquist 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
LVT (Land Value Tax), unlike other taxes, causes no distortions in economic 
decision-making and therefore does not compromise the efficiency of a market economy. 
While there have been various challenges to this conclusion, it seems that the neutrality 
of LVT has been proven in the literature. Although it has been established conceptually 
that LVT is non-distortive, it is important to empirically test the effects of LVT reform in 
diverse aspects.  
Unlike other studies, this dissertation examines the economic, spatial, and welfare 
effects of LVT reform in a second-best situation employing an urban (and spatial) CGE 
(Computable General Equilibrium) model. In addition, it examines the distributional 
effects among different income groups and the short-term aspects of LVT as well. The 
  
xi 
 
 
feature that the present dissertation incorporates as the second-best situation includes 
LLZ (Large Lot Zoning). The computation and the assumptions about parameters for the 
current CGE model are made based on demographic, physical, and economic features of 
the Atlanta urban area in Georgia.  
The results suggest the following: (1) LVT reform is economically feasible, (2) 
the tax on land rent stabilizes prices and contracts the CBD (Central Business District) 
and urban boundary in the economy where the CBD and urban area are endogenously 
determined, while the tax on land rent is purely neutral in the economy where the CBD 
and urban area are fixed, (3) LVT reform increases the money-metric welfare of residents 
by about 20% of the tax revenue in the economy where residents are landowners, while 
LVT reform increases the money-metric welfare of residents by about 45% of the tax 
revenue in the economy where the lands are owned by absentee, (4) LVT reform more 
increases the money-metric welfare of the less-income groups that own the smaller land 
area, which is contrary to the case of LLZ, (5) LLZ and property tax can cause the sprawl 
of an urban area, but at a very low elasticity of substitution between land and the other 
factors (0.1), even switching from the land tax to the property tax (or graded property tax) 
can contract the urban area, (6) LLZ, in the long-term during which housing capital and 
urban boundary are not fixed and in the economy where residents are landowners, can 
improve the welfare of households, while LLZ worsens the welfare of households both in 
the economy where the lands are owned by absentee and in the short-term during which 
housing capital is immobile in any economy, (7) When we consider that housing capital 
is immobile, the increase in the money-metric welfare due to LVT reform becomes weak, 
compared to the case with perfectly mobile housing capital. 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of land value taxation (LVT) has a long history. Many classical and 
neoclassical economists advocated the heavy taxation of rent or land values (or the 
increments in land values), including Adam Smith, James Mill, John Stuart Mills, H.H. 
Gossen, Alfred Marshall, Leon Walras, John R. Commons, H.G. Brown, A.C. Pigou, and 
Harold Hotelling.1  These economists recognized that, in theory, LVT, unlike other taxes, 
causes no distortions in economic decision-making and therefore does not lower the 
efficiency of a market economy. While there have been various challenges to this 
conclusion,2 it seems that the neutrality of LVT has been proven.  
There are two types of studies of LVT. One tries to prove the neutrality of LVT, 
and the other shows the empirical significance of the effects of switching from a 
distortionary tax system to a LVT reform. While there are many studies about LVT, there 
are relatively few that have been done within urban contexts, and very few studies that 
have used urban computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Unlike non-urban 
models or non-CGE models, urban CGE models allow us to include many interesting or 
                                                 
1. Kris A. Feder,"Issues in the Theory of Land Value Taxation." Ph.D. Dissertation, Temple University, 
1993. 
 
2 Ibid. Or look at Helen F.Ladd, ed. Local Government Tax and Land Use Policies in the United States: 
Understanding the Links. (Cambridge(MA): Edward Elgar in association with Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, 1998). Chapter 2. 
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complex features such as large lot zoning (LLZ), commuting costs of residents, multiple 
income groups, etc. These features add realism to model.  
Land use regulations such as LLZ distort decisions in land and housing markets, 
which affects the size of urban area and all other variables, and that the LLZ has been 
considered an issue to explore by economists. The practice of LLZ is very common in 
U.S. cities, so it is of interest to explore how LLZ alters the effects of LVT reform in the 
present dissertation as well. The adoption of multiple income groups allows us to 
examine the distributional effects among different income groups of LVT reform. There 
are few studies that consider the distributional effects of LVT reform. In addition, this 
paper examines the effects of LVT reform in an urban area with immobile housing capital 
and only partially mobile housing capital as well. Most urban models assume that 
housing capital is perfectly mobile. The current dissertation shows that the effects of LVT 
reform with a perfectly mobile housing capital differ from those when housing capital is 
not perfectly mobile. 
In addition, almost all urban models have assumed that an absentee landlord owns 
the whole land area in an economy. However, unlike other urban models, the current 
study assumes that the residents own land, which is the more realistic assumption. For the 
welfare analyses, this paper compares the results assuming resident-land-ownership with 
those assuming absentee-land-ownership. The computation and the assumptions about 
parameters for the current CGE model are made based largely on demographic, physical, 
and economic features of the Atlanta, Georgia urban area 
There are well-known advantages to adopting a CGE model in this type of 
research. These include: (1) numerical representations of economic theory and intuition, 
3  
 
 
 
(2) ability to address a broad range of policy issues, (3) ability to track the distributional 
consequences of policy choices across factors and locations. There are also disadvantages 
to the use of CGE models, particularly their complexity and heavy data demands.  
The main questions addressed in the dissertation are as follows: 
1. How does LVT (or any degree of graded property tax) reform affect the 
economic efficiency and welfare of residents in an urban area with and without LLZ? 
2. How does LVT (or any degree of graded property tax) reform affect the urban 
spatial structure such as the size of urban area and CBD size, and other spatial variables 
such as population density, land rent, and housing service price under the settings 
described above? 
3. Assuming that there are three income groups (high income households, middle 
income households, low income households) in the urban economy, how does LVT (any 
degree of graded property tax) reform affect the residence location, the welfare, and other 
spatial variables of each income group? 
4. Considering that housing capital are immobile or only partially mobile, how do 
the answers to questions 1 and 2 change? 
There are many interesting findings from the study, including: (1) LVT reform is 
economically feasible, (2) the tax on land rent stabilizes prices and contracts the CBD 
(Central Business District) and urban boundary in the economy where the CBD and 
urban area are endogenously determined, while the tax on land rent is purely neutral in 
the economy where the CBD and urban area are fixed, (3) LVT reform increases the 
money-metric welfare of residents by about 20% of the tax revenue in the economy 
where residents are landowners, while LVT reform increases the money-metric welfare 
4  
 
 
 
of residents by about 45% of the tax revenue in the economy where the lands are owned 
by absentee, (4) LVT reform more increases the money-metric welfare of the less-income 
groups that own the smaller land area, which is contrary to the case of LLZ, (5) LLZ and 
property tax can cause the sprawl of an urban area, but at a very low elasticity of 
substitution between land and the other factors (0.1), even switching from the land tax to 
the property tax (or graded property tax) can contract the urban area, (6) LLZ, in the 
long-term during which housing capital and urban boundary are not fixed and in the 
economy where residents are landowners, can improve the welfare of households, while 
LLZ worsens the welfare of households both in the economy where the lands are owned 
by absentee and in the short-term during which housing capital is immobile in any 
economy, (7) When we consider that housing capital is immobile, the increase in the 
money-metric welfare due to LVT reform becomes weak, compared to the case with 
perfectly mobile housing capital. 
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literatures on both LVT and urban CGE models that consider LVT. Chapter 3 describes 
the basic model, presents the model formulation, and discusses the data and calibration. 
Chapter 4 reports the results for the basic model under various counterfacture 
assumptions. Chapter 5 describes the model with three income groups and a short run 
version of the model having housing capital adjustments and immobility, and reports 
results for the extensions. Chapter 6 discusses the welfare effects of LVT and conducts 
sensitivity analyses. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The literature review has two major parts: a review of the issues associated with 
land value tax (LVT), and a review of the urban computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models that study LVT. We also review the literature on non-urban CGE models that 
study LVT in order to show the empirical results about the effects of LVT reform.  
It is important to first introduce the issues of LVT and related studies, since the 
current dissertation places a major focus on LVT. The literature that deals with the 
neutrality and efficiency of LVT will be reviewed, exploring in particular how the 
neutrality of LVT has been theoretically established. Since the current dissertation adopts 
an urban CGE model for the study of LVT, the existing urban CGE models that study 
LVT will be carefully reviewed. 
Major Issues of LVT and Selected Literature Review  
There are two major arguments used to support the adoption of LVT: (1) a tax on 
land value is neutral and efficient. There have been long debates on this issue. (2) LVT is 
fair in the sense that the landowner as an exclusive taxpayer is also the person who 
 6
 
 
 
 
 
derives the benefits and takes the rent from using land.3 Although most economists do 
not dispute that tax on land value is neutral, there have been several objections raised 
regarding the adoption of LVT. The objections include: LVT is not fair because it singles 
out landowners for taxation;4 Switching to LVT will have no notable effects on economic 
activity;5 LVT will not yield enough revenue to finance today’s government because the 
value of all taxable land might be too low; 6 LVT is not administratively feasible because 
it is not possible to empirically divide property value between land value and building 
value. 7 Additional interest centers on the effect of LVT on land speculation.8  The 
literature about LVT is vast, however I restrict my attention to the studies about the 
neutrality of LVT and spatial aspects of the effects of LVT.  
                                                 
3 Henry George, Progress and Poverty. (London: Kegan Paul Trench Trubner & Co. Ltd, 1923), and C. 
Loweli Harriss, "An Address on Land Taxation as an Evasion-Proof Revenue Source." In American 
Journal of Economics & Sociology, 53, 97: Blackwell Publishing Limited, 1994.etc.  
 
4 Murray N. Rothbard, "The Single Tax: Economic and Moral Implications and a Reply to Georgist 
Criticisms." In The Logic of Action One: Applications and Criticisms from the Austrian School. (London: 
Edward Elgar, 1997) 
 
5 Steven C. Bourassa, "Land Value Taxation and Housing Development: Effects of Property Tax Reform in 
Three Types of Cities." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 49 (1990): 101-111. 
 
6 Joseph A. DiMasi, "The Effects of Site Value Taxation in an Urban Area: A General Equilibrium 
Computational Approach." In National Tax Journal, 40, 577: National Tax Association, 1987. 
 
7 Alex Anas,  "Taxes on Buildings and Land in a Dynamic Model of Real Estate Markets." In The Property 
Tax, Land Use and Land Use Regulation, ed. Netzer Dick. (Cambrideg: Edward Elgar in association with 
Licoln Institute of Land Policy, 2003) and, 
E.S. Mills, ed. Land Value Taxation: Can It Will Work Today? (Cambridge(MA): Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, 1998) 
 
8 Harry G. Brown, "Land Speculation and Land-Value Taxation." The Journal of Political Economy 35, no. 
3 (1927): 390-402. 
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Literature That Studies the Neutrality of LVT  
The LVT has been proved to be neutral. But the proof depends upon properly 
defining LVT. According to Tideman (1982)9 and Georgists’ idea, the definition of LVT 
is a tax on the present value of all present and future rents of land. The valuation is the 
current, annual, perfect market rental value of the land alone, disregarding buildings and 
other improvements. Tideman (1999) again defines the value of land as the opportunity 
cost of leaving used land unused, to point out that the base of LVT must be independent 
of land use decision. A subsequent work, Arnott (2005),10 contributes to the clarification 
of the LVT base by distinguishing ‘raw site value’ from ‘residual site value’. Arnott 
wrote: 
    A pure land value tax — one which is imposed on the ‘intrinsic’ value of the 
land, independent of the developer’s decision concerning the timing and density of 
development — is neutral. … The essential difference between raw site value and 
residual site value taxation should now be apparent. Post-development raw site 
value is unaffected by the density of development, while in the neighborhood of the 
optimum post-development residual site value is increasing in the density of 
development. Thus, imposition of a raw site value tax has no effect on the 
development density condition, while imposition of a residual site value tax 
discourages density. (Arnott 2005, 36)  
 
Arnott (2005) has shown that in a first-best world LVT is efficient in that it does 
not affect the timing and level of development and the tax is fully capitalized in land 
price. Arnott considers a model which is an extension of Arnott and Lewis (1979),11 and 
                                                 
9 T. Nicolaus Tideman, "Taxing Land Is Better Than Neutral: Land Taxes, Land Speculation, and the 
Timing of Development." In Land Value Taxation: The Equitable and Efficient Source of Public Finance, 
ed. K.C. Wenzer. Armonk, New York: SHARPE, 1999. 
 
10 Richard J. Arnott,  "Neutral Property Taxation." In Journal of Public Economic Theory, 7, 27: Blackwell 
Publishing Limited, 2005. 
 
11 Richard J. Arnott, and  D. Lewis Frank, "The Transition of Land to Urban Use." Journal of Political 
Economy 87 (1979): 161-169. 
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starts by considering the landowner-developer’s problem in the absence of taxation. A 
landowner owns a unit of undeveloped land area, and must decide when to develop the 
land and at what density to build the structure. It is assumed that once built, the structure 
does not depreciate, and that the landowner makes his/her decision under perfect 
foresight. Arnott assumes for simplicity that land prior to development generates no rent. 
Here are the definitions of each variable he adopted. 
t  time (t = 0 today) 
T development time 
K development density (the capital-land ratio) 
Q(K) structure production function 
r(t) rent per unit of structure at time t 
p price per unit of capital 
n(t) site rent 
V(t) pre-development market value of (vacant) land 
P(t) post-development property value 
S(t) residual site value 
RS(t) raw site value 
The developer’s problem in the absence of taxation is  
∫∏ ∞ −− ⋅⋅−⋅⋅=
T
iTit
KT
eKpdteKQtrKT )()(),(max
,
                           (2.1) 
The first-order conditions are 
T  :   0))()(( =+⋅− ipKKQtr                                                  (2.2) 
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K  :   0))()(( )(' =⋅−⋅⋅∫∞ −−−
T
iTTti epdteKQtr                                    (2.3) 
Equation (2.2) means that, with K fixed, development time is chosen at the time 
point where the marginal benefit from postponing construction one period (the one-
period opportunity cost of construction funds) equals the marginal cost (the rent forgone). 
Equation (2.3) means that, with T fixed, capital should be added to the land up to the 
point where the increase in rental revenue due to an extra unit of capital, discounted to 
the development time, equals the cost of the unit capital.  
To see that tax on raw land value (or rent) is neutral, it is important to define 
several concepts. First, regarding land rent, prior to development, site rent equals the 
market rent on vacant land. Post-development site rents equals property rent minus 
amortized construction cost. Here, the rent prior to development and that of post-
development are not equal to each other. If the government levies a tax on this residual 
site rent or value, the developer will change development time (T) and density (K) so as 
to maximize profits (2.1) and satisfy the equations (2.2) and (2.3), which are to be 
adjusted with the tax. In other words, because of the tax, the marginal benefit from 
postponing construction one period (the one-period opportunity cost of construction 
funds) may be reduced when K is fixed, and the density of housing (K) may be reduced 
when T is fixed. 
Regarding (2.4), predevelopment site rent is the market rent on vacant land, which 
was assumed to be zero. Post-development site rent equals the property rent minus 
amortized construction cost. 
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⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
>⋅⋅−⋅
<=
TtKpiKQtr
Tt
tn
)()(
0
)(                                              (2.4) 
Regarding (2.5), predevelopment residual site value is the predevelopment market 
value of land. Post-development residual site value equals property value minus 
depreciated structure value in which the depreciation rate was assumed to be zero.  
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Regarding (2.6), pre-development raw site value is the market value of vacant 
land. Post-development raw site value is what the site would sell for were there no 
structure on it even though there in fact is. Thus, the site value by this definition does not 
change but is constant regardless of development, so the tax on raw site value is neutral 
because the tax payable is independent of the developer’s decisions.  
⎭⎬
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The neutrality and efficiency of LVT relies on the fact that the supply of land is 
fixed. Taxes on wages and profits distort behavior, leading to welfare losses. With land, 
however, the obligation to pay rent to the community ultimately falls exclusively on the 
owner, because the supply of land is fixed. The fixity of land supply and the resultant 
neutrality of LVT are guaranteed on the condition that a central government applies a 
uniform rate of tax on perfectly competitive market based land rents throughout the 
whole area of an economy with a fixed boundary.  
There are authors who claim that LVT is not neutral, but their claims are based on 
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an incorrect definition of LVT. Tideman (1999), for example, argues that some 
economists, including Shoup (1970),12 Skouras (1974),13 and Bentick (1982)14 have 
failed to define the base of LVT correctly, which has lead to wrong conclusions about the 
neutrality and efficiency of LVT. For example, Bentick (1982) claimed that taxes on the 
value of land distort land development decisions by advancing the time of development. 
According to Bentick, if the land tax depends on the current market value of the land and 
developers have to choose among mutually exclusive development projects with different 
time streams, the tax raises the carrying cost of the land and increases the attractiveness 
of current relative to future development. Tideman (1999) concluded that these authors 
have made logical errors regarding the definition of LVT base. If the value of land for tax 
purposes were based not on its chosen use but on its highest and best use, the LVT would 
not distort the timing of investment decisions. Feder (1993) in his Ph.D. dissertation also 
confirmed the neutrality of LVT clearly and similarly to that of Tideman (1999). Feder 
exposed that the Shoup (1970) model can’t be interpreted as a proof of non-neutrality of 
LVT because, according to Feder, Shoup failed to distinguish between full development 
value and after-tax development value and Shoup’s model was set up so that landowner 
can reduce his (or her) tax by controlling development timing.  
Ladd also added a good comment on this:  
                                                 
12 Donald C. Shoup, "The Optimal Timing of Urban Land Development." Papers of the Regional Science 
Association 25 (1970): 33-44. 
 
13 Athanassios Skouras, "The Non-Neutrality of Land Taxation." Public Finance 30 (1978): 113-134. 
 
14 Brian L. Bentick, "A Tax on Land Value May Not Be Neutral." In National Tax Journal, 35: National 
Tax Association, 1982. 
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    True believers in the neutrality of the LVT argue that a tax affecting the timing 
of the development decision should not be called a LVT, but rather should be 
referred to as a tax on the present value of planned net income. In practice, the 
neutrality of any specific tax on land values will depend on how the tax assessors 
determine the value for tax purposes. (Ladd 1998, Chapter 2, 27) 
 
 
Literature That Includes Study about the Urban or Spatial Aspects of LVT 
There are three notable papers that address the effects of LVT in a spatial setting. 
These include Brueckner (1986, 2003)15 and Colwell and Turnbull (2003)16. These 
papers are relevant since the present dissertation concerns the spatial effects of LVT. 
Brueckner (1986) analyzed the incidence effects of LVT, employing a simple 
model with housing, capital and land markets and conducting comparative-statics 
analyses not found in the previous studies of LVT. We can discuss this more efficiently 
by looking at the major algebraic expressions of his model. Following are the definitions 
of variables and parameters he adopted. 
H : Housing supply 
h : Housing supply per-acre-of-land 
p : Price of housing 
S : Improvements per acre 
r : Net land rent 
τ  : Tax rate on improvements 
                                                 
15 Jan K. Brueckner, "A Modern Analysis of the Effects of Site Value Taxation." In National Tax Journal, 
39, 49: National Tax Association, 1986. And Jan K. Brueckner, and Hyun-A Kim, "Urban Sprawl and the 
Property Tax." International Tax and Public Finance 10, 2003: 5-23. 
 
16 Peter F. Colwell, and Geoffrey K. Turnbull, "Frontage Tax and the Optimally Compact City" in The 
Property Tax, Land Use, and Land Use Regulation, ed. Netzer Dick. Cambridge(MA): Edward Elgar, in 
association with Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2003. 
 13
 
 
 
 
 
θ  : Tax rate on land rent 
i : Net rental price of capital 
N : Capital 
L : Land 
σ  : The elasticity of substitution between capital and land in housing 
production 
μ  : Land’s factor share 
Assuming that housing price (p) is fixed, the level of housing supply per acre of 
land is 
)()1,/(/),( ShLNHLLNH ≡≡                                               (2.7) 
Profit per acre for a housing producer operating in the tax zone is 
rSiShp ⋅+−⋅⋅+−⋅= )1()1()( θτπ                                         (2.8) 
The first order condition to maximize the profit is 
iShp ⋅+−⋅ )1()(' τ                                                           (2.9) 
Maximized profit per acre of land is 
0)1()1()( =⋅+−⋅⋅+−⋅ rSiShp θτ                                       (2.10) 
Brueckner conducted comparative statics to derive the effects of LVT. By totally 
differentiating (2.9) and (2.10), he suggests the following four equations: 
0'' <⋅=∂
∂
hp
iS
τ                                                             (2.11) 
0=∂
∂
θ
S                                                                    (2.12) 
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Equation (2.11) shows that an increase in τ  reduces improvements (housing) per 
acre, equation (2.12) shows the land tax has no impact on the density of structure, 
equation (2.13) shows the higher tax on structure depresses land rent, and equation (2.14) 
shows that the higher land tax lowers land rent and the higher land tax is fully capitalized, 
leaving r⋅+ )1( θ  unchanged. To reserve the tax revenue ( )( rSi ⋅+⋅⋅ θτ ) for equal yield 
analyses, the derivative (change) of revenue with respect to land tax must be zero. With 
this condition and by total differentiating revenue with respect to land tax rate, Brueckner 
suggests the following: 
)
)1(
)1(1( μτ
στθ
θ
τ
⋅+
⋅⋅+−⋅⋅
−=∂
∂
Si
r                                             (2.15) 
The sign of (2.15) is ambiguous, and so a revenue-preserving (or revenue-neutral) 
change in tax rate on structure due to a change in land tax rate may either decrease or 
increase. However, when σ  is a very small number, the sign of (2.15) is negative, while 
when σ  is sufficiently large, the sign of (2.15) is positive. Brueckner suggests that a 
negative sign would be more plausible. In addition, from equations (2.13), (2.14), and 
(2.15), we find the following relationship. 
0≤
≥
∂
∂⋅∂
∂+∂
∂= θ
τ
τθθ
rr
d
dr     0≤
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∂
∂
θ
τas                                       (2.16) 
Equation (2.16) implies that when the housing price is fixed, in the plausible case 
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( 0<∂
∂
θ
τ ) the higher land tax causes the higher land value under the revenue reserving 
condition.  
Until now, we have discussed the analyses for the case of exogenous housing 
price. But for the case of endogenous housing price, the housing market clearing 
condition is added to the system above. After deriving the same derivatives with this new 
system, Brueckner finds that when housing demand is not elastic, graduation toward land 
tax depresses land value in a revenue-preserving tax system. Finally, Brueckner 
concludes his paper by discussing short-run gains and losses by distance from the CBD in 
a metropolitan area. Here ‘short-run’ means that unlike ‘long-run’, the levels of ‘S’ and 
‘r’ are fixed at their equilibrium levels. His conclusion is that in the short-run, as a result 
of the land tax, the most intensively developed parcels (near the CBD) suffer windfall 
losses in the form of higher taxes, assuming that the area near the CBD has a relatively 
higher land value, while the least intensively developed parcels (far from the CBD) 
benefit from windfall gains. Since his model is a partial equilibrium model, some other 
important features such as labor-leisure choice and transportation costs that affect the 
gradient of land value in an urban area are not reflected.  
In another paper, Brueckner (2003) explored the connection between the property 
tax and urban sprawl, by considering the effect on urban size from switching from the 
property tax to a pure land tax in a simple spatial model. Following is the definition of 
some variables in his model.  
x : Distance from CBD (Central Business District) 
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p : Price of housing, the rental price per square foot of floor space 
S : Improvements per acre 
r : Urban land rent 
ar :  Agricultural land rent 
τ  : Land tax rate 
i : Net rental price of capital 
Most relevant to this dissertation is his finding that when agricultural land rent 
( ar ) is zero, the land tax does not affect urban size. Under the condition that developer’s 
profit (per acre of land) function with land tax is 
0)1()( =⋅+−⋅−⋅ rSishp τ                                            (2.17) 
The first order condition for choice of S is given by  
i
S
shp =∂
∂⋅ )(                                                          (2.18) 
Note that the profit in (2.17) is zero, since the model assumes perfect competition. 
According to (2.18), S is independent of land tax rate (τ ), and land rent ( r ) can 
be derived from (2.17) as follows. Solving (2.17) for r to get 
)1(
])([
τ+
⋅−⋅= Sishpr                                                 (2.19) 
Then, differentiating (2.19) yields 
)1( ττ +
−=∂
∂ rr                                                   (2.20) 
The equation (2.20) means that when land rent ( r ) is zero, its partial derivative 
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with respect to the land tax rate (τ ) is also zero. Hence, if agricultural land rent ( ar ) is 
assumed to be zero, the land tax does not affect urban size, because the land tax does not 
change urban land rent at the distance point where land rent ( r = 0) is equal to 
agricultural land rent  ( ar  = 0). However, when agricultural land rent ( ar ) is positive, the 
land tax does affect urban size.17  
Next, I briefly summarize the effect of the property tax on urban size. There are 
two opposing effects regarding the urban size effect of the property tax: the improvement 
effect, and the dwelling size effect. The improvement effect suggests that land is 
developed less intensively under property taxation. Less intensive land development 
means a larger land area per dwelling unit to accommodate a fixed population in an urban 
area; as a result, the property tax contributes to urban sprawl. On the other hand, the 
dwelling size effect suggests that a tax on both land and structure is partly shifted forward 
to households (consumers), leads to a higher price of housing floor space, and decreases 
dwelling size in response. Brueckner’s numerical examples and analyses using CES 
preference also suggest that at low (plausible) elasticity of substitution between housing 
and non-housing goods, the improvement effect dominates the dwelling size effect. 
Colwell and Turnbull (2003) examined the relationship between residential land 
use and city size, focusing on the roles of lot dimensions and total area of land developed 
in the market. They studied the consequences of differential taxes on lot dimensions and 
                                                 
17 Actually, in his paper, there is no discussion of the urban size effect of land tax in the case that 
agricultural land rent is positive. But I found that land tax could affect the size of urban area. Email 
discussions with Dr. Brueckner confirmed that when agricultural land rent is positive, the land tax reduces 
the size of urban area. Brueckner also mentioned that when land tax is imposed on differential land rent 
(urban land rent minus agricultural land rent), the neutrality of land tax with respect to urban size is 
maintained, even when agricultural land rent is positive.  
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their relationships with property and land taxes. Although they did not determine the 
effects of land tax (tax on ‘raw site value’) directly, one of their results indirectly 
suggests an effect of the tax on land in an urban feature. They distinguish ‘developable 
land’ from ‘raw land’. Developable land is land with infrastructure such as a water 
irrigation system, while raw land is land without any improvements. The supply of the 
developable land depends on lot dimension. The basic equations of their model are as 
follows: 
),,( qkyuu =                                                               (2.21) 
),( qkhh =                                                                 (2.22) 
DFFC ⋅⋅+⋅+= δβα                                                    (2.23) 
} { }{ pqrkymtsqkyumrpymrpkmrpq ++=≡ ..),,(maxarg),,();,,();,,(       (2.24) 
where 
m :  money income, 
p : price of land consumed, 
r : price of housing capital, 
k : housing capital applied to developable land in the form of structure, 
q : land consumption, 
u : utility of a household 
h : housing production 
y : non-housing consumption 
F : Frontage  
D : Depth 
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C : The cost of preparing a parcel of land for development 
δβα ,, : Parameters in the cost function C 
Equations (2.21) and (2.22) are standard and general type of equations for 
household utility and housing production. Equation (2.23) implies that the cost of 
preparing a parcel of land for development depends on frontage and area. Equation (2.24) 
implies that the demand for land, housing capital, and non-housing good are derived from 
the maximization of utility subject to budget constraint. They then draw the effects of 
various taxes including frontage tax, area tax, and tax on developable land conducting 
comparative statics analyses after total differentiating the above equations. One relevant 
result to the current dissertation is that shifting from a tax on developable land value to a 
tax on raw land value leads to a lower price of developable land, greater land 
consumption by households, and a larger urban area. I notice that since the tax on 
developable land value is not neutral and not efficient due to the involvement of 
improvements, the tax on raw land value should be still encouraged, as the tax on raw 
land value is neutral and efficient.  
 
Recent Studies to Show the Significance of the Effects of LVT 
I now turn to the literature that studies the economic efficiency and other 
economic effects of LVT using non-urban CGE models. The qualitative results of the 
studies are generally consistent with those of past theoretical studies.  
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Follain and Tamar (1986)18 measured the effects of a reduction of the Jamaican 
income tax in favor of either a LVT or a capital value tax (CVT) using a static national 
level CGE model. This appears to be the first paper using a CGE model to directly study 
the issues of LVT. The model consists of three production factors - land, capital, and 
labor- an intermediate good, housing, and a non-housing composite final good. 
Consumers demand final goods as well as supply primary factors. Follain and Tamar 
assume perfect competition in factor and product markets, as most CGE models do, and 
analyzed both open and closed economy cases. Some of the major findings include the 
following: (1) A switch to LVT from income tax reduces the current excess burden by 
36% of the tax revenue under the heaviest LVT,19 while the excess burden is increased by 
the same amount under the heaviest CVT. (2) Both the income tax rates and the LVT 
rates necessary to raise the same level of real revenue are lower in an open economy than 
in a closed economy because the movement from an income tax to a LVT increases the 
supply of capital and labor in an open economy. (3) Housing becomes less expensive 
relative to the composite non-housing good and stimulates production as the LVT 
increases, while a CVT hurts production.  
                                                 
18 James R. Follain, and Tamar Emi Miyake, "Land Versus Capital Value Taxation: A General Equilibrium 
Analysis." In National Tax Journal, 39, 451: National Tax Association, 1986. 
 
19 The heaviest LVT case means when the land portion of tax revenue occupies the 30% of all property tax 
revenue, while the heaviest CVT case means when the land portion of tax revenue occupies the 20 % of the 
whole revenue of property tax. 
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Nechyba (1998)20 developed a static one-sector CGE model to pursue the land tax 
issues within the entire U.S. He addresses the issues of land taxation in the context of a 
reform package that lowers taxes on capital in a small and open economy. His focus is on 
the impact of such tax reforms under various assumptions about the nature of land in 
production and the degree of heterogeneity of land across space. The production function 
consists of land and capital and has a CES functional form. Capital is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile while land is taken as perfectly immobile. His major findings include: 
(1) land taxes are more efficient than capital taxes (i.e., output is larger); (2) land values 
rise for many types of land under a reform policy aimed at replacing capital income taxes 
with taxes on land rents; (3) results depend critically on the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor; and (4) distributional consequences are not very clear and 
depend on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. His qualitative findings 
are consistent with most other studies.  
Nechyba (2001)21 extended his earlier work (Nechyba 1998) to encompass state 
level effects and interactions among states, by assuming that each state is a small and 
open economy. The paper simulated general equilibrium impact of revenue neutral tax 
reforms that raise tax on unimproved land rent and decreased tax on improvement. His 
major findings include: (1) the impact of such reforms varies widely across states that 
face different economic conditions and that rely on different sources of current tax 
                                                 
20 Thomas J. Nechyba, "Replacing Capital Taxes with Land Taxes: Efficiency and Distributional 
Implications with an Application to the United States Economy." In Land Value Taxation: Can It Will 
Work Today? ed. Netzer Dick. Cambridge(MA): Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1998. 
 
21 Thomas J. Nechyba, Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reforms. Duke University 
and NBER, 2001. 
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revenues; (2) under plausible yet conservative assumptions, reforms of tax systems 
toward greater taxation of land rent hold promise for substantial efficiency gains in the 
states, especially when states undertake such reforms unilaterally; (3) states that have 
relatively low initial output and make heavy use of taxes on capital are likely to benefit 
the most from tax reforms that increase the tax on land. One of the strengths of his study 
is that he assumes heterogeneity of land across the states (but not within a state). In other 
words, the model allows for different types of land to have different expected future 
rents.  
Tideman (2002)22 attempted to measure the excess burden of the current U.S. tax 
system using a dynamic national level CGE model. Their production function has three 
factors (land, labor, and capital) and a CES functional form. The household receives 
utility in a given period from three goods (private goods, public goods, and leisure). Their 
findings include: (1) significant increases in the efficiency of the U.S. economy could be 
attained by flattening the income tax and by shifting from land and capital taxes to a land 
tax; (2) in the short run, the greatest increase in after-tax wages is achieved by shifting 
taxes from wages to land while in the long run the greatest increase in wages is achieved 
by shifting taxes from capital to land; (3) even if conservative estimates of parameters are 
used, the potential gains are estimated at 6.6% of NDP (Net Domestic Product) per year 
and rise to 9.9% of NDP per year after 30 years.  
                                                 
22 T. Nicolaus Tideman,  "The Avoidable Excess Burden Pf Broad-Based U.S.Taxes." Public Finance 
Review 30, no. 5 (2002): 416-441. 
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Urban CGE Models That Deal with the Issues of LVT 
This section considers those papers that are most closely related to the approach 
taken in this dissertation. It shows not only the significance of the effects of LVT, but 
also presents the model descriptions in detail. The urban CGE models can reflect 
migration, transportation costs, zoning regulations, and housing characteristics, which 
add realism. There are three studies that we review: DiMasi (1987),23 Sullivan (1985, 
1984).24 Each paper is discussed separately, and the differences among their models are 
summarized. 
DiMasi (1987) generalized and extended the long-run analysis of Brueckner 
(1986) through the use of an urban spatial general equilibrium model with an endogenous 
amount of land in urban use. Because his model is the closest to the basic model used 
herein, it is reviewed in detail. Although the study was published in 1987, DiMasi’s 
model is still unique in the sense that his model is an urban spatial general equilibrium 
model that studies LVT. There have been many CGE models or simple urban general 
equilibrium models constructed, but only three spatial and urban CGE models that 
consider LVT. DiMasi uniquely tried to incorporate an urban space in his model to 
measure the effects of LVT reform.  
                                                 
23 Joseph A. DiMasi, "The Effects of Site Value Taxation in an Urban Area: A General Equilibrium 
Computational Approach." In National Tax Journal, 40, 577: National Tax Association, 1987. 
 
24 Arthur M. Sullivan, "The General Equilibrium Effects of the Industrial Property Tax: Incidence and 
Excess Burden." Regional Science and Urban Economics 14, no. 4 (1984): 547. And "The General-
Equilibrium Effects of the Residential Property Tax: Incidence and Excess Burden." Journal of Urban 
Economics 18, no. 2 (1985): 235. 
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Basically, DiMasi’s model is a mono-centric urban model of spatial location. The 
urban area in his model consists of a set of concentric rings, the first being relatively 
large and meant to encompass a CBD (Central Business District) and the rest being 
residential and of equal thickness. There are three sectors: industry, residence, and 
agriculture. The industrial sector produces a composite non-housing good while the 
residential sector produces housing services. The rent on agricultural land is exogenously 
given. The assumed economic activities include production, consumption, renting of 
lands, and taxation. The price of non-housing good is exogenously given with the 
assumption that the urban economy is small enough for the price to be set at a national 
market. The urban area contains a fixed population of identical households with identical 
preferences and labor skills. He adopted a non-nested CES (Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution) functional form for production and utility functions, and calibrated 
parameters using data from the Boston area.  
Table 1 presents information about tax rates on land and capital, tax bases, and 
differential land rent25 for both the base case and the optimal case. The latter is the case 
of a graded property tax system that generates a maximum welfare to households while 
raising the required tax revenue. We see that there is a difference between land in 
residential use and land in industrial use regarding effective tax rates in Boston. The 
difference is given from the benchmark (base case). We also see that compared with the 
base case, in the optimal case the wage increases, the tax on land increases, the tax on 
                                                 
25 Differential land rent means the difference between actual land rents in the urban area and what they 
would be if all land in urban use were rented to the agricultural sector.  
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capital decreases, the land tax base decreases, but the capital tax base increases. The 
graded property tax stimulates the demand for labor and results in an increased wage. In 
other words, to provide a maximum welfare to residents, the tax on land should increase 
considerably while the tax on capital should decrease. LVT is not feasible in DiMasi’s 
model, since it does not generate sufficient revenue to fully replace the existing property 
tax revenue. 
 
Table 1. Wage rate, tax rates, and some outcomes (DiMasi) 
 Base Case Optimal Case 
 Wage rate ($/hr) 7.18 7.21 
 Effective tax rate on land in residential use (%) 24.7 67.9 
 Effective tax rate on capital in residential use (%) 24.7 22.6 
 Effective tax rate on land in industrial use (%) 33.9 93.3 
 Effective tax rate on capital in industrial use (%) 33.9 31.1 
 Residential land tax base ($) 288,161,000 220,360,000 
 Residential capital tax base ($) 3,735,646,000 3,798,084,000 
 Industrial land tax base ($) 72,725,000 50,502,000 
 Industrial capital tax base ($) 2,005,493,000 2,062,411,000 
 Non-housing good industry bid land rent ($) 12,052 8,369 
 Differential land rent ($) 262,843,000 187,206,000 
 
His results (Table 2) imply that there are considerable incentive effects of 
switching to a site value tax. In other words, when a local government adopts the graded 
property tax system in which land is more heavily taxed than improvements, land and 
housing prices fall while the improvement per unit of land in housing and population 
density rises, and the boundary of city contracts due to the graduation of property tax. 
Thus, the welfare gain of residents for a metropolitan-wide move to the graded tax 
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system was found to be 6.6% of the tax revenue. For the measures of welfare changes, 
compensating and equivalent variation measures were adopted. He included the change in 
differential land rents created by moving from a general property tax system to the graded 
property tax system in the overall welfare measures, which according to DiMasi, 
generated a greater level of household welfare.26 In addition, the results show that the 
graded property tax suppresses urban expansion.  
 
Table 2. Comparisons between base case and optimal case (DiMasi) 
Ring 
Population Density 
(Households per acre 
of land) 
K/L rations for housing 
(Units of capital per 
acre of land) 
Housing service Prices 
(Dollars per unit of 
housing services per 
year 
Residential land Rent 
(Dollars per acre per 
year) 
  Base Optimal Base Optimal Base Optimal Base Optimal 
1 0 0 0 0 6523 6444 6794 5250 
2 20.9 21.48 586.97 612.27 6517 6439 6719 5193 
12 17.65 18.17 494.02 516.28 6404 6327 5339 4136 
22 14.72 15.19 410.94 430.38 6292 6215 4177 3245 
32 12.12 12.54 337.4 354.12 6180 6105 3210 2502 
42 9.83 10.19 272.64 287.04 6069 5995 2417 1891 
52 7.83 8.15 216.49 228.67 5959 5887 1777 1397 
62 6.1 6.38 168.34 178.5 5850 5778 1271 1004 
72 4.64 4.87 127.65 136 5742 5671 879 699 
82 3.43 3.62 93.93 100.63 5634 5565 584 468 
87 2.91   79.49   5581   467   
 
There are two papers similar to DiMasi’s in the structure of their models, although 
they do not directly explore the effects of LVT but indirectly capture the efficiency of 
LVT. Sullivan (1985) analyzed the incidence and excess burden of the residential 
                                                 
26 It seems that DiMasi considered the residents who own land in calculating welfare. However, according 
to our study, since LVT lowers land rent, which results in decrease in residents’ income, the simple 
addition of the differential land rent in the welfare calculation is not justified. 
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property tax in an urban CGE framework. Because a land tax is non-distortionary, 
Sullivan takes the approach of measuring incidence effects and excess burden when an 
urban economy switches from a pure LVT to the property tax. While DiMasi’s model 
assumes a relatively larger but closed metropolitan area where the number of households 
is fixed, Sullivan’s model assumes a small and open city in the sense that the number of 
households is not fixed but the welfare level is. Sullivan also analyzes the inter-city 
interactions under the alternative setting that there are three cities with the same structure 
in a closed region. In Sullivan’s model, a full labor market is considered so that both 
labor supply and demand are endogenously determined, while in DiMasi’s model labor 
supply is fixed. While DiMasi’s model has numerous but variable number of residential 
rings, Sullivan’s model has only one residential ring for a city. Another difference of 
Sullivan’s model is that it employs a Cobb-Douglas (CD) function in the household’s 
utility while DiMasi’s model employs a CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) utility 
function. The elasticity of substitution of CD functions is one, while the elasticity of 
substitution in the CES function can vary. Both CD and CES functions can be flexibly 
specified in the amount of returns to scale. However the studies reviewed here assume 
functions with the characteristics of constant returns to scale (CRTS) or the first degree of 
homogenous function. Altmann (1981)27 mentions that the model with CD functions 
produces greatly different results than the model with CES functions, even if there is no 
qualitative difference between the two cases.  
                                                 
27 James L. Altmann, "Analysis and Comparison of the Mills-Muth Urban Residential Land-Use Simulation 
Models." Journal of Urban Economics 9, no. 3 (1981): 365. 
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Major findings of Sullivan (1985) for the simple open city case in which the 
emigrants simply disappear into the rest of the world when there is an incentive to do so 
include:  (1) the property tax reduces the aggregate labor supply causing the city’s wages 
and population to decrease; (2) since the city is open and labor is fully mobile, 
landowners bear the entire burden of both property tax and land tax; (3) the property tax 
reduces the net return on land by an amount equal to 164.9% of total tax revenue, so 
landowners are worse off with the adoption of the property tax. On the other hand, the 
major findings for the case with three cities in a closed region include: (1) the other two 
cities that employ the non-distortionary land tax grow at the expense of the city that 
switched to the property tax; (2) housing prices increase everywhere, with the largest 
increase in the city that employs the property tax; the welfare loss of regional residents 
totals 100.1% of the city’s property tax revenue; (3) the net return of landowners in the 
city that employs the property tax decreases by 2.2%, while the net returns on landowners 
in the other cities that employ the land tax increase by 2.99%; (4) in the aggregate, the 
property tax generates an excess burden equal to 6.5% of the city’s property tax revenue.  
Sullivan (1984) is almost the same as the later article (Sullivan 1985) in model 
structure and research questions. The differences are: (1) Sullivan (1984) measures the 
incidence effects and excess burden of industrial property tax in which taxes are levied on 
capital and land in industrial sector only; (2) the production factors of the industrial sector 
include equipment capital in addition to structural capital, land, and labor; (3) taxes are 
levied on land and structural capital. However, the model does not properly reflect 
differences between the two types of capital with respect to durability and mobility 
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because the model is static and the characteristics of durability and mobility can be 
properly reflected in a dynamic setting. The results are consistent with his other work 
(Sullivan, 1985).  The urban CGE models described above clearly shows the efficiency 
effects of LVT reform in an urban area.  
The present study is different from the previous research in the following ways. 
First, it considers a model in which there exists a LLZ in some of the suburban areas, 
which may alter the effects of LVT. Second, by adopting three income groups (rich, 
middle, and poor) in the model, the distributional effects of LVT can be captured. Third, 
this paper assumes that the residents of the economy own a fixed amount of land and 
capital, while the studies above assume an absentee landowner. Fourth, it considers a 
model with immobile housing capital and only partially mobile housing capital, one of 
the short-term features. Table 3 summarizes the differences of the present model from the 
above models. Each item bears its own implication. For example, the resident 
landownership means that the rental income of a household is endogenously determined, 
while the absentee landownership means that there is no land rental income for 
households. The additions, changes, and extensions to the existing studies will enrich 
both the literature of the urban model and the literature of LVT. 
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Table 3. Comparisons of model specifications among studies 
  DiMasi (1987) Sullivan (1985) Sullivan (1984) The Current Dissertation 
Sectors 
Housing sector, 
Non-housing good
sector 
Housing sector, 
export good sector
Housing sector, Non-
Housing good sector 
Housing sector, Non-
housing good sector 
Land ownership Absentee Absentee Absentee Resident owns fixed amount of land 
Capital ownership Absentee Absentee Absentee Resident owns fixed amount of capital 
Production 
function type CES CES CES CES 
Utility function 
type CES C-D C-D Nested CES 
CBD size Fixed Variable Variable Variable 
Urban size, 
residential rings 
Variable, many 
residential rings, 
endogenous ring 
number 
Variable, one 
residential ring 
Variable, one 
residential ring 
Both fixed and variable
(2 cases), fixed number 
of residential rings, 
endogenous ring width 
Trade Not explicitly considered 
Not explicitly 
considered 
Not explicitly 
considered Explicitly considered 
Data and Model 
area 
Boston area, 
metropolitan area
Artificial data, small 
city area 
Artificial data, small 
city area 
Atlanta area, 
metropolitan area 
Labor-leisure 
choice 
Fixed amount of 
labor 
Labor-leisure choice 
is applied 
Labor-leisure choice 
is applied 
Labor-leisure choice is 
applied 
Income groups Single income group 
Single income 
group Single income group 
Single and Multiple 
income groups 
Mobility of 
housing capital Perfectly mobile Perfectly mobile Perfectly mobile 
Perfectly mobile, and 
Variable degrees of 
mobility 
Population level Fixed Not fixed Not fixed Fixed 
Other 
characteristics Property tax 
Residential property 
tax 
Industrial property 
tax, division of 
equipment capital and 
structural capital 
Large lot zoning, Land 
tax, Property tax 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE BASIC MODEL 
Chapter 3 describes the basic model that is developed, discusses issues directly 
related to the basic model and discusses data for benchmark, and formulates the model 
using specific functional forms. 
An Outline of the Economy to Be Modeled 
This subsection describes general features of the metropolitan economy to be 
modeled.  
The metropolitan area is located in a flat featureless plain, so that the land in any 
ring is assumed to be homogenous in quality. There are ten residential rings and one 
central business district (CBD) in the urban economy. The CBD is surrounded by much 
smaller rings where the households of the urban area live. It is assumed that within each 
ring, there would be no gradient of land rent. The boundary of the CBD and that of the 
urban area are endogenously determined. In other words, the boundary of CBD is 
determined at the distance point where the land rent of the 1st residential ring is equal to 
the land rent of the CBD, while the boundary of the urban area is determined at the 
distance point where the land rent of the last (i.e. 10th) residential ring is equal to an 
exogenously given agricultural land rent. When the boundary of the urban area expands, 
the thickness of each ring increases, and when the boundary of the urban area contracts, 
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the thickness of each ring becomes narrower.28 All residential rings are assumed to have 
an equal thickness.  
There are two explicit production sectors in the urban economy: housing sector, 
and composite non-housing good sector. There is also an agricultural sector. The 
agricultural sector is not explicitly modeled, and the land rent for the agricultural use is 
exogenously given. All non-housing good production occurs in the center of the CBD. 
The capital, one of the production factors, is supplied perfectly elastically to the urban 
area at a fixed price. Thus, capital can be either exported or imported, depending on the 
size of demand for capital relative to the amount of capital endowment of the urban 
residents. The non-housing good can be exported. Details about the housing sector and 
non-housing good sector are discussed in the next subsections.  
In this economy, the endowment of land and capital need not be equal to the 
demand of land and capital; this is not true for labor. That is because both capital and 
land are trade goods. Regarding the trade of land, the urban area may expand or contract 
due to economic policies, but the endowment of land is fixed, and so some land can be 
rented to (or from) the people outside the urban area. Although the endowment of land 
and capital might be equal to the demand for land and capital, the sum of the endowments 
for both land and capital (minus transport cost) must be equal to the sum of the demands 
of both land and capital plus export amount for non-housing good with respect to dollar 
value to meet the economy’s budget constraint (or close the model). It is assumed that net 
                                                 
28 DiMasi (1986) programmed the model differently to reflect the endogenous boundary of urban area. He 
made the number of rings variable so that when the urban area expands, the number of rings increases, 
while when the urban area contracts, the number of rings decreases. One the other hand, Sullivan (1985, 
1984) has one CBD and one residential area, and the width of each area becomes wider or narrower due to 
policy changes. There is no standard rule to program the feature. 
 
 33
 
 
 
 
 
 
import of factors (land or capital) is financed by net export of non-housing goods. Net 
exports of factors are assumed to prohibit, since factor endowments are parts of the 
household income and factors will be used primarily for satisfying the demands of 
residents. In other words, the model assumes that the urban economy is a net importer of 
factors in sum. The reason for this is that allowing imports of the non-housing good 
requires solving for the price of the non-housing good in a national market, which is 
outside the scope of the model. 
The urban area has a fixed number of households, and households costlessly 
choose places to live within the urban area. The assumption of the fixed number of 
households implies that the urban area is closed in a sense, although the urban area is 
open in the sense that there is a trade between the economy and the rest of the world. 
Since this dissertation analyzes the effect of a universal use of the land tax for the Atlanta 
urban area, not interactions among small cities such as changes in population location and 
total population level due to a tax policy, the closed urban area approach with respect to 
the number of households is appropriate.29 Every worker residing in a given ring is 
treated, for commuting purposes, as if he (or she) lives at the midpoint of the ring. In 
other words, within each ring, it is assumed that commuting distance from any point in a 
ring to the CBD is considered as the distance from the midpoint of the ring to the CBD. 
Each worker makes a round trip per day to the center of CBD. The transportation network 
is assumed to be radial and dense, so that all trips follow a linear pattern. In some rings of 
the suburban area a large lot zoning (LLZ) regulation is promulgated.  
                                                 
29 See Brueckner (2003), page 12. 
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Household 
It is assumed that a household consists of one worker. Each worker is assumed to 
supply a certain amount of labor by choosing between labor and leisure within a fixed 
available time. The total time of workers is allocated to leisure, work, and commuting. 
Each household (worker) owns a fixed amount of capital and land. Each household owns 
an equal amount of land in the CBD and in each residential ring. Thus, the disposable 
income for household (worker) consists of income from time endowment, rental income 
from land, and rental income from capital, and equally distributed tax revenue, net of 
commuting time and money costs. The amount of land and capital endowments for each 
household is set at a benchmark level (or little bit greater than the benchmark level) and 
remains fixed.   
Workers are assumed to maximize utility over housing services, a composite non-
housing good, and leisure. The choice problem facing a household residing in ring j is to 
maximize 
),,( jjH
j
N lxxU                                                              (3.1) 
Subject to the following budget and time constraints:30 
The budget constraint can be expressed with the following two cases. Case 1 
suggests that when the land endowment of household is greater than the actual land 
demand for residential and industrial purposes, the excessive land near urban boundary 
will be sold to farmers. On the other hand, case 2 simply suggests that when the land 
endowment is smaller than the actual demand, there is no extra land for selling. 
                                                 
30 Note that each household owns a fixed amount of land, which is averaged with all location and all 
population. So, each household’s land endowment is neutral to location. 
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Case 1: The endowment of land is greater than the urban area 
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Case 2: The endowment of land is smaller than the urban area. Note that 
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                    TJWl jjj =⋅Γ++                                                    (3.3) 
Here, j = 1, 2,3 ---. Note that ring 1 is CBD. 
j
Nx  Consumption of non-housing good by the household who resides in ring j 
j
Hx  Consumption of housing services by the household who resides in ring j 
jl  Amount of leisure enjoyed by the household’s worker 
NP  Price of a unit of the non-housing good 
j
HP  Price of a unit of housing services per year in ring j 
WP       Hourly wage rate 
j
Lr  Rental rate of land for ring j 
Ar  Agricultural land rent (exogenous)  
 36
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kr  Fixed rental rate of capital  
jW  Hours supplied by a worker  
c  The fixed roundtrip money cost per mile  
)(DY   Income net of transportation cost 
N
A         Land endowment per capita (fixed and averaged for all locations)    
jL  Total land demand in ring j 
K    Capital endowment per capita (fixed)   
Tax   Equally distributed tax revenue  
Γ    Round trip time for work per mile 
jD    Distance in miles from the midpoint of ring j to the city center 
T            Time endowment for leisure, work, and commuting  
N            Number of households 
For ease of exposition, we consider case 1 only in what follows. 
Preferences can be expressed in the indirect utility function that is derived by 
solving the maximization problem (3.1) that is subject to (3.2) and (3.3), as follows: 
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(3.4) 
Consumers choose the ring that maximizes jV . It must be true that in 
equilibrium, for all rings j =2,3---, VV j = .  Taxes on land and capital in the production 
sectors will affect the price of housing services and the wage rate. Taxes are imposed on 
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producers, not on renters, so tax variables do not enter the worker’s budget constraint 
directly.  The expression for the housing-rent gradient follows from the differentiation of 
(3.4) with respect to D, (note that superscript j is suppressed in the following equations): 
Note that the wage rate ( WP ) and land holding ( )( N
LA
r
N
Lr
j
j
A
j
j
j
L ∑∑ −
⋅+
⋅
) in the 
equation (3.4) do not vary with distance (D) by assumption. Hence, 
 
dYVdPVdPV0dV YHPNP HN ⋅+⋅+⋅==                    (3.5) 
)( dDcdDPVdPV0dV WyHPH ⋅−⋅Γ⋅−⋅+⋅==                  (3.6) 
 Then, we get the following, by inverting with respect to 
dD
dPH . 
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The gradient of housing service price with respect to distance depends on the 
signs and magnitudes of 
j
HP
Y
V
V
. The sign of 
j
HP
Y
V
V
 is negative according to Roy’s 
identity. Thus, the sign of the equation (3.7) is unambiguously negative. The negative 
sign of the gradient of housing price means that housing price decreases by distance from 
the CBD. 
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Housing Production Sector 
The producers of housing are profit maximizers. All markets in each ring, 
including factor and product markets, are taken to be perfectly competitive. Thus, 
equilibrium profit is zero. In addition, the production function has constant returns to 
scale (CRTS) technology. It is assumed that housing services in a ring are produced using 
capital and land in that ring. Thus, the aggregate quantity of housing services in ring j is 
given by the following production function:  
),( jjHjHjH LKSS =                                                (3.8) 
where    j =  2, 3, 4 , --- 
j
HS  Housing supply in ring j 
j
HK  Amount of capital used in the production of housing services in ring j 
H  Housing sector.  
Therefore, aggregate profits to producers of housing in ring j can be expressed as 
follows: 
 jjL
j
HK
j
H
j
H
j
H LrKrSP ⋅⋅+⋅⋅+−⋅=Π )1(-)(1 ωθ  =  0              (3.9) 
where   
j
HΠ  Economic profits of housing producers from operations in ring j 
jL  Land used for production in ring j 
θ  Tax on capital rental 
ω  Tax on land rent.  
Capital is assumed to be rented in a national market at fixed price and we assume 
that it can be transported at no cost within the urban area.  
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We can express a cost function for housing services as follows: 
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where  
j
HC  Cost of housing services in ring j 
j
HC
^
 Average housing production cost in ring j, and the second equality holds because 
the production function was assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale.   
The housing land rent ( jLr ) takes all profits, given the fixed price of capital, so 
that the profits of housing service sector are zero in a competitive equilibrium. The price 
of housing service in a ring must equal the average cost of producing housing in that ring. 
Hence, algebraically, 
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The bid-rent function for land in ring j can be obtained by inverting (3.10) with 
respect to jLr .  
 
Manufacture Sector (Composite Non-housing Good) 
It is assumed that some of the composite non-housing goods can be traded to the 
people outside the urban area. It is assumed that the export price is the same as the 
domestic price set in a competitive market. The aggregate quantity of the non-housing 
good from producers in the urban area can be defined as follows: 
),,( 1 NNNN WLKSS =                                             (3.12) 
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where  
NK  Amount of capital used in the production of the non-housing good  
1L   Amount of available land for non-housing good production within the CBD area 
used in the production of the non-housing good  
N Non-housing good sector 
NW   Amount of labor used in the production of the non-housing good.  
 
Therefore, profits in aggregate to producers of the non-housing good can be 
expressed as follows: 
NWLNKNNN WPLrKrSP ⋅⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅=Π  -)1(-)(1- 11ωθ          (3.13) 
where  
NΠ  Economic profits of non-housing good producers from operations in the 
CBD  
 
As for the non-housing good sector, since the land rent of the CBD ( 1Lr ) takes all 
the profits, given the perfectly competitively determined wage rate ( WP ) and the 
nationally determined capital rental ( Kr ), the price of non-housing good ( NP ) is just the 
average cost which can be derived from the equation (3.13). We can also derive the rental 
price for the CBD land ( 1Lr ) by inverting the average cost function.  
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Land Ownership and Land Markets  
It is assumed that the residents own the land of the urban area. However, whether 
the urban area expands or contracts, the amount of landholding for each household as an 
endowment is fixed. The fixed pattern of landownership is necessary, since otherwise it 
biases the evaluation of policies that increase the size of urban area. How to treat 
landownership is an important issue in urban economic models and might even change 
the direction of welfare change. For example, this dissertation finds that LVT reduces the 
size of the urban area and increases the welfare of residents. If we allow the amount of 
landholding for each household to vary with the size of urban area, we may produce the 
result that LVT would reduce the welfare of residents and that a distortionary property 
tax would improve the welfare.  
Generally, in analytical models, absentee landownership is adopted to avoid 
analytical difficulties. The absentee landownership means that all land areas are rented to 
users, so that the change of land rent does not affect the income of household, but affect 
the production costs of housing and non-housing goods. There are two representative 
studies that take different (but more realistic) approaches to landownership than absentee 
landownership. Pines and Sadka (1986)31 and Sasaki (1987)32 assume that urban 
                                                 
31 Pines, David, and Efraim Sadka. "Comparative Statics Analysis of a Fully Closed City." Journal of 
Urban Economics 20, no. 1 (1986): 1. 
 
32 Sasaki, Komei. "A Comparative Static Analysis of Urban Structure in the Setting of Endogenous 
Income." Journal of Urban Economics 22, no. 1 (1987): 53. 
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residents take land rent as a part of their income, so that the income of urban residents 
becomes endogenous,33 since the rental income from land is endogenous. 
Pines and Sadka (1986) assumes that an absentee landowner owns the whole 
urban land, but urban residents take all differential land rents34as a part of their income. 
This approach has the same implication as the approach that urban residents own the 
whole land within an urban area. As discussed above, this type of landownership 
treatment should be taken cautiously. For example, when an urban area expands from a 
benchmark level, the urban residents take the extra land due to the expansion as rental 
income by subtracting the amount of agricultural land rent only, while when a city 
contracts, the reduced amount of land due to the contraction are to be taken away from 
the residents and given back to non-residents. Agricultural land rent is assumed to be 
fixed, and so economic policies encouraging urban sprawl might increase the welfare of 
urban residents by providing more rental income from land to the urban residents.  
Sasaki (1987) avoids the problem mentioned above by taking a slight different 
approach, although he deals with the similar landownership issue to Pines and Sadka 
(1986). Sasaki assumes that urban residents own a fixed amount of land (A), and the 
income of urban residents is determined as follows. 
N
dttkytur
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⋅⋅+⋅⋅+= ∫ ππ                    (3.14) 
Where  
y  The income level of urban residents  
                                                 
33 Existing analytical urban studies that adopt absentee landownership assumes that the income of urban 
residents is exogenous. 
 
34 Differential land rent was defined as residential land rent minus agricultural land rent. 
 43
 
 
 
 
 
 
oy   Exogenous income given initially  
N  Population level  
t             Location (distance from CBD) 
b  Urban fringe  
r  Urban land rent  
u  Utility level 
k   Transportation cost per mile 
s  Agricultural land rent 
A   The amount of land that urban residents own 
From the equation (3.14), we recognize that the land endowment of urban 
residents covers not only the whole urban land, but also some agricultural land area. Note 
that the amount of landholding does not vary with urban size, and that the income of 
urban residents is determined endogenously in a fully closed model.  
This dissertation’s approach regarding landownership is consistent with Sasaki’s 
approach in the following senses: (1) the income of residents is endogenously 
determined; (2) the amount of landholding for each household is fixed. The difference 
from Sasaki’s approach is that this dissertation additionally includes endogenous wage 
income, rental income from capital holding, and income from export. 
Findings from Sasaki (1987) suggest that some comparative statics results from 
the urban model with resident landownership and endogenous income can be different 
from traditional findings from the urban model with absentee landownership and 
exogenous income. One of the examples is that the increase of commuting cost may 
increase the welfare of residents in the endogenous income setting due to the increase of 
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rental income from land, while in the exogenous income setting with absentee 
landownership, the increase of commuting cost unambiguously decreases the welfare of 
residents. 
There are three types of land use: use for the production of non-housing good, use 
for the production of housing service, and use for an agricultural sector. Landowners in 
each ring maximize their income by renting only to the highest bidder. To close the 
production side of the model, we assume that the rent offered for land anywhere in the 
ring by the agriculture sector is given exogenously, and that the agricultural sector is 
untaxed. A fixed bid rent for land by the agricultural sector will allow for the 
determination of the size of urban area without taking the agricultural market explicitly 
into account. On the other hand, the highest bid rent for land at the 1st ring by the housing 
sector will allow for the determination of CBD size. 
 
Foreign Sector 
Although the benchmark SAM (Social Accounting Matrix) in the next section is 
constructed without trade, it allows the possibility that some capital and/or land is rented 
from non-residents, in case that any deficit of those factors happens due to a tax policy. 
We have assumed that the net value of capital and land rented from non-residents is 
positive or zero, and further assume that firms finance the import of the resources (land 
and capital) by exporting the non-housing good to the non-residents. This condition can 
be expressed as follows.35 
                                                 
35 See Appendix 2 for the derivation of (3.15) 
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where  
Ex    The value of export of non-housing good  
jn     The number of households in ring j 
 
Large Lot Zoning (LLZ) 
Arnott and MacKinnon et al. (1977)36 mention in their conclusion that land use 
controls probably result in increases of housing prices in U.S. cities. Pasha (1994)37 and 
Sullivan (1996) explore the effects of a LLZ on the urban structure such as population 
density and the size of an urban area but under a no-tax and no-full-general-equilibrium 
model setting. Recently, Glaeser and Gyourko (2002)38 and Saks (2005)39 also found that 
zoning is a big cause of price increases of housing and one of the explanatory factors 
about why the supply of housing has been inelastic with respect to the price of housing. 
Given that LLZ is so common and has been an important factor to explain urban 
                                                 
36 Richard J. Arnott, and James G. MacKinnon, "The Effects of the Property Tax: A General Equilibrium 
Simulation." Journal of Urban Economics 4, no. 4 (1977): 389. 
 
37 Hafiz A. Pasha, "Suburban Minimum Lot Zoning and Spatial Equilibrium." Journal of Urban Economics 
40 (1996): 1-12. 
 
38 Edward L. Glaeser, and Joseph Gyourko. "Zoning's Steep Price." In Regulation, 25, 24: Cato Institute, 
2002. 
 
39 Raven E. Saks, "Job Creation and Housing Construction: Constraints on Employments Growth in 
Metropolitan Areas." In Dissertation Fellowship Symposium. Cambridge(MA), Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy, 2005. 
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phenomena, exploring the effects of LVT in the presence of LLZ is a meaningful 
extension.   
A binding LLZ is promulgated in some parts of the residential area by 
assumption. Due to the binding LLZ, housing producers lose their flexibility to use the 
various mixes of land and capital for the production of housing to maximize their profits. 
In particular, housing producers are forced to use at least a minimum input of land. 
Households who want to live in the rings with LLZ must consume the housing with the 
minimum lot size. The binding LLZ distorts decisions of housing producers to use the 
efficient combination of inputs (land and capital).  
To apply the binding LLZ to housing production, we need per-capita (household) 
housing production function. The per-household housing production function is obtained 
by dividing equation (3.8) by the number of households ( jn ) in a zoned ring. Then, 
because we assume that the housing production function has the characteristics of 
constant returns to scale, we get the following: 
),(),(1
j
j
j
j
H
H
jj
HHjj
j
H
n
L
n
KSLKS
nn
S =⋅=                               (3.16) 
So, for the rings having the LLZ, the following constraint is added to the first-
order conditions for maximizing the profit function for housing.  
j
j
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L ≥                                                           (3.17) 
If (3.17) is binding, then j
j
n
L
 is replaced by jL  in the production function. This 
will affect the land rent for housing ( jLr ) and other variables in the urban area.  
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Although this dissertation does not adopt the following approach, for reference, 
let us discuss a similar approach regarding land use constraint as follows. Instead of LLZ, 
some authors such as the Moss (1977, page 416)40 and Pogodzinski and Sass (1990, page 
302)41 discuss imposing a maximum capital density constraint. Although LLZ is not 
exactly the same as the maximum density constraint, those are in nature similar. Under 
this constraint, equation (3.8) is transformed into equation (3.18): 
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Then, a ceiling on the capital/land ratio is imposed on the profit function of 
housing as an additional constraint. 
C≤  j
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If (3.19) is binding, we get 
jj
H LK ⋅= C                                                    (3.20) 
Then, the equation (3.20) is substituted into the production function, and would 
affect the land rent for housing ( jLr ) and equilibrium conditions.  
 
Government 
The government can be thought of as a taxing authority. In the benchmark, the tax 
is the standard capital-land property tax in which land and improvement (capital) are 
                                                 
40 William G. Moss, "Large Lot Zoning, Property Taxes, and Metropolitan Area." Journal of Urban 
Economics 4, no. 4 (1977): 408. 
 
41 J. Michael Pogodzinski, and Tim R. Sass, "The Economic Theory of Zoning: A Critical Review." In 
Land Economics, 66, 294: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990. 
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taxed equally.  The alternative taxes considered are a pure LVT in which land is taxed 
while improvements are not and a graded property tax in which land is taxed at a higher 
rate than improvements. Hence, when the government switches from the capital property 
tax to a LVT or a graded property tax, we can check who gains and who loses because of 
the tax reform. This paper does not consider how the expenditure of tax revenues would 
affect the economy, so it assumes that tax revenues are distributed to all households 
equally.42  
 
On the Equilibrium of the Model 
This subsection briefly provides what conditions must be met to solve the model. 
The equilibrium land rent at location j equals the maximum of the bid-rents of the 
manufacture sector, housing sector, and agriculture. Thus, 
},,1{ AjNLL rrrr Max=                                                                (3.21) 
The land allocations are consistent with available supplies.  
11
SD LL =                                                                              (3.22) 
j
S
j
D LL =          for j =2,3,4 ---                                                                   (3.23) 
where  
r Rent 
L  Land  
A  Agricultural sector  
                                                 
42 In other words, the equal distribution of tax revenue makes the expenditure side neutral, so that we can 
capture the effects of tax policies only.  
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D  Demand 
S Supply 
Equation (3.22) means that in the CBD, the supply of land is equal to the demand 
for land for the production of non-housing good, while equation (3.23) means that in each 
and every residential ring, the supply of land is equal to the demand for land for the 
production of housing.  
In other expressions, for any vector of price p∇ , 
),,( )1(),1(),1(, 1 θωω +⋅+⋅+⋅=∇ KNjLjHNW rrrPP Pp , the demand and the 
supply of land in each ring must be equated.  
Having allocated all land to uses, we can now find supplies and demands of other 
factors conditional on the vector p∇ . The aggregate demand for housing in each ring 
must be equal to the supply in each ring in equilibrium. The sum of the number of 
households for all residential rings must equal the total fixed number of households in the 
urban area. The equilibrium condition of ‘zero excess demand’ for labor must also be 
satisfied, conditional on the vector p∇ .  
Importantly, regarding the equilibrium of residential location (expressed with ring 
and distance), in equilibrium, all households attain the same utility level in all rings, and 
the savings in housing cost of moving further from the CBD is exactly offset by the 
additional commuting costs that will be incurred. The boundary of the CBD is determined 
at the point where the land rent for the non-housing good sector is equal to that for 
housing sector at the 1st residential ring, while the city boundary is determined at the 
point where the land rent for housing sector is equal to the land rent for agriculture. 
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Formulation of the Basic Model 
According to the methodology explained in the appendix, the basic model is 
specified using algebra in a complementary format. Workers are assumed to maximize 
utility over housing service, non-housing good, and leisure. The utility of household is 
formulated using a nested function. First, the preference between leisure and the other 
two goods is a CES (Constant Elasticity Substitution) function. Second, as a subsystem, 
the preference between non-housing good and housing is also a CES function but with a 
different elasticity of substitution. The use of the (nested) CES function is common in 
CGE modeling, since they are relatively easy to handle and flexible to change parameters. 
However, the use of CES function requires us to know the value of the elasticity of 
substitution. Usually, such information is hard to get for a specific study, and so 
researchers often end up assuming a value for the parameter. By taking the nested 
function, it is possible to reflect the difference between the elasticity of substitution 
between housing and non-housing good and that between leisure and all other choices. 
For the housing and non-housing good production functions as well, the paper uses CES 
functions. 
Now, the algebraic formulation of the basic model is provided using specific 
functions. Following are the definitions of all parameters and variables in Table 4 and 
Table 5.  
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Table 4. Parameters for the basic model 
)( jLH  Total benchmark land area for housing in each ring α  Intensity of leisure preference over the other goods 
β  Intensity of capital use over land in housing sector 
CBDL  Total benchmark land area for CBD 
δ  Elasticity of substitution among factors in housing production function 
K  Total, fixed capital endowment  
λ  Elasticity of substitution among factors in non-housing good production function 
π  Intensity of land use in non-housing good sector 
Kr   Price of capital, fixed, capital is perfectly elastically supplied 
j Parameter to represent a residential ring (total 10 residential rings) 
σ  Elasticity of substitution between leisure and the other goods in utility function  
ξ  Elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing goods 
TPOP  Total, fixed population level  
TTIME Total time available for leisure, labor, and commuting per capita (fixed) 
μ  Scale parameter of non-housing good production function 
ψ  Scale parameter of housing production function 
ν  Intensity of housing preference over non-housing goods 
ω  Intensity of capital use over land and labor uses in non-housing goods sector 
 
Table 5. Variables for the basic model 
Ex Total value of export  
CBDL   Total area for CBD 
D(j) Distance from CBD in each ring 
H(j)  Housing (per capita) in each ring 
K  Total capital demand for all uses  
)( jK DH  Capital demand for housing production in each ring (per capita) 
LEIS(j)  Leisure demand in each ring (per capita) 
)( jLDH  Land demand for housing production in each ring (per capita) 
M(j) Income level net of commuting cost in each ring (per capita) 
N(j) Number of households in each ring 
NH(j) Total non-housing goods demand in each ring (per capita) 
ENH  Total export demand of non-housing good 
PH(j) Housing price in each ring 
)( jrL  Land rent for housing production in each ring 
LNr   Land rent of CBD 
PN Price of non-housing good 
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Table 5.  – coninued. 
PU(j)  Unit welfare price, minimum expenditure to enjoy unit level of utility in each ring 
TAX Total tax revenue raised in the economy  
)(cos jtM    Monetary commuting cost in each ring 
TKN Total capital demand for the production of non-housing goods 
tl   Tax rate on land rent 
TLN Total land demand for the production of non-housing goods 
ts    Tax rate on capital rental 
U(j) Utility level in each ring (per capita) 
USTR  Equilibrium utility level across all rings (per capita) 
W  Wage rate 
WL(j)  Labor demand for non-housing goods production (per capita) 
x  Half of the distance between the centers of two contiguous rings 
 
As a reminder, there are two production sectors (housing and non-housing good), 
one type of household, one CBD, and ten residential rings. Algebraically, the utility 
function of a representative in each ring can be expressed as follows 
)1()
1()1/(/)1(/)1()1( ))))()1()(()1()(( −
−−−−− ⋅−+⋅⋅−+⋅ σσσσξξξξξξσσ νναα jNHjHjLEIS  
 (3. 24) 
Housing production in each ring is performed using the following technology 
 
)1/(/)1(/)1( ))()1()(( −−− ⋅−+⋅⋅ δδδδδδ ββψ jLjK DHDH                          (3. 25) 
Non-housing goods are produced using the following technology 
)1(
)1()1()1(
))1(( ( −
−−− ⋅−−+⋅+⋅⋅ λλλλλλλλ πϖπωμ WSTLNTKN              (3.26) 
The equations (3.24), (3.25) and (3.26) along with budget constraints are used to 
derive the expenditure function, cost functions, and demand functions for output and 
input. Note that since the rental price of capital is fixed, no supply side function is needed.  
<Distance from each ring to CBD > 
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Assuming that the shape of the city is a circle, we can have the following distance 
from the CBD relationship. The distance from the CBD at each ring (j) is expressed as 
miles from the center of the CBD to the midpoint of each ring. 
)12()14.3()(
2/1 −⋅⋅+= jxLjD CBD                                (3.27) 
<Monetary commuting cost from each ring to CBD> 
As stated in the next section, in the Atlanta urban area, average monetary 
commuting cost per household is 73 cents per mile.43 The roundtrip monetary commuting 
cost can be expressed as follows.  
)(73.02)(cos jDjtM ××=                                              (3.28) 
<Residential area in each ring> 
22 ))((14.3))((14.3)( xjDxjDjA −×−+×=                     (3.29) 
<Zero Profit Inequalities> 
For all the inequalities below in this subsection, the left-hand-side represents unit 
cost (or unit expenditure), and the right-hand-side represents market price per unit. To 
derive the unit (minimum) cost function which is the function of only factor prices, we 
need to minimize the production cost function expressed as the sum of the products of 
each factor and its price, then derive factor demand functions from the first order 
conditions, and finally substitute the factor demand functions into the objective function. 
For welfare (utility), we derive an (minimum) expenditure function to satisfy unit utility 
level in the same way. Note that the CES utility function has characteristics of the first 
degree of homogeneity, and we can express the function as an intensive form, which 
                                                 
43 See Table 12. An average total monetary commuting cost per mile is 0.517 dollars and average 
household size is 2.65, and worker to population ratio is 0.536, thus 51.7 ×0.536 × 2.65 = 73.4 
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denotes unit value. In the unit cost function, there is no output variable in the functional 
form, since the unit cost represents the minimum average cost and is taken to be the price 
of output. The expenditure function has a similar form to an indirect utility function with 
the first degree of homogenous preference, so that it can be divided by utility and then be 
the function of commodity prices only. Finally, we get the following inequalities. The 
unit cost function for housing production is as follows 
)()))1()(()1())1(((1 )1(
1
)1()1( jPHtljrtsr LK ≥+⋅⋅−++⋅⋅⋅ −−− δδδδδ ββψ       (3.30) 
The unit cost function for non-housing good production is as follows 
PNW tlrtsr LNK ≥⋅−−++⋅⋅++⋅⋅⋅ −−−− )1(
1
)1()1()1( ))1())1(())1(((1 λλλλλλλ πϖπωμ
(3.31) 
The unit expenditure function for welfare is as follows. 
)()))1()(()1(( )1(
1
)1/()1()1()1()1( jPUPNjPHW ≥⋅−+⋅⋅−+⋅ −−−−−− σξσξξσσ νναα σ  
(3. 32) 
<Market Clearance Inequalities> 
For all the inequalities below in this subsection, the left-hand-side represents 
supply, and the right-hand-side represents demand. Taking a partial derivative of 
expenditure functions or cost functions with respect to each price derives demand 
functions. The supply-demand inequality for housing sector is as follows  
ξ
ξξξξσ νναν
)(
)1()())()1(()()(
)1/()(1)1(
jPH
)PNjPH(jPUj U jH
σ)( −−−− ⋅−+⋅⋅⋅−⋅⋅≥       (3. 33) 
The supply-demand inequality for non-housing good is as follows 
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(3.34) 
The supply-demand inequality for leisure is as follows 
σ
σα
W
jPUjU jLEIS ))(()()( ⋅⋅≥                                           (3.35) 
The capital demand for the production to satisfy per capita housing demand is as follows.  
δψβ
ψ ))1(
)(()()(
K
D
H rts
jPHjHD jK ⋅+
⋅⋅⋅=                                   (3. 36) 
The total capital demand for non-housing good production is as follows 
λμω
μ ))1((
)()(
K
j
rts
PN
jNHjN
 TKN ⋅+
⋅⋅⋅
⋅
=
∑
                             (3.37) 
Total capital demand for all production is as follows 
TKNjKjNK
j
D
H +⋅= ∑ )()(                                        (3. 38) 
The land demand for the production to satisfy per capita housing demand in each ring is 
as follows 
δβψ
ψ )jr tl) (
jPH(jHD  jL
L
D
H )(1
)()1()()( ⋅+
⋅−⋅⋅=                                (3.39) 
The land supply-demand inequality for housing production in each ring is as follows 
)()()( jLj N jA DH⋅≥                                            (3.40) 
The land demand for the production to satisfy total non-housing good demand is as 
follows 
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)()(
               (3.41) 
The labor demand for the production to satisfy total non-housing good demand is as 
follows 
λπϖμ
μ )W tl) (
PN(jNH  jWL ⋅+
⋅−−⋅⋅=
1
)1()()(                      (3. 42) 
Per capita utility is as follows 
)(
)()(
jPU
jMjU =                                                (3. 43) 
<Closed city condition with respect to the number of households > 
The condition for a closed city is as follows 
TPOP
j
jN =∑ )(                                                         (3.44) 
<Equal utility condition across rings > 
The condition to satisfy that all households must obtain an equal utility in 
equilibrium can expressed as follows 
USTRUUU =⋅⋅⋅=== )3()2()1(                              (3. 45) 
<Tax revenue raised in the economy> 
Tax revenue raised in the economy is as follows 
))()(()( ∑ ⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅=
j
jLtljrLtlrtsrKTAX HLCBDLNK                    (3.46) 
<Income Balance Equation>  
Per capita income in each ring is as follows. Note that commuting time cost is cancelled 
out in the equation (3.47). 
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(3. 47) 
<Export Value> 
E
N NHPEx ⋅=                                                 (3. 48) 
<Trade Restriction> 
The following trade restriction is imposed to close the model. 
KrjLjr
KrjLjNjrLrjtMjNEx
K
j
HL
K
j
D
HLCBDLN
j
⋅−⋅−
⋅+⋅⋅+⋅=⋅−
∑
∑∑
)()(
)()()()(cos)(
             (3. 49) 
Data  
The CGE models of this dissertation are developed with the standard mono-
centric city framework. The available data such as land rent, housing prices for the 
representative household is approximately average data in the Atlanta urban region. It is 
assumed that the benchmark data obtained represent those for the representative 
household who lives in the 5th ring of the present model.  
As mentioned in a previous section, the current study is for the Atlanta urban 
region in Georgia, which consists of ten counties, including Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, 
Dekalb, Douglas, Fayette, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, and Rockdale. This area covering the 
ten counties is close to the urbanized area of Georgia as defined in the U.S. Census. The 
Benchmark data and SAM reflect the basic features of the Atlanta urban area in Georgia. 
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The basic features include the number of households, land area, housing price, land price, 
wage rate, the level of property tax. Table 6 shows the distributions of the number of 
households and land area across the region. The total number of households in the urban 
area is 1,385,865. Some counties such as Fulton (340,342) and Dekalb (263,296) have 
conspicuously high numbers of households. Fulton (526.5 square miles) and Gwinnett 
(432.6 square miles) have relatively larger land areas. We also see that rural areas such as 
Cherokee have much sparser population density than other central areas such as Dekalb. 
Along with the land value data in Table 11, the density pattern in the table shows to some 
degree that the Atlanta region roughly fits in the mono-centric city framework. The whole 
urban land area is 2,981 square miles. Assuming that the shape of each ring is a circle, the 
radius is about 31 miles.  
According to data obtained from ARC (Atlanta Regional Commission), we get 
43.04 % (1,274 square miles) for residential use, 7.57 % (224 square miles) for CBD, and 
49.39 % (1,462 square miles) for the other uses such as parks and roads. Actually, there is 
a parcel of land for agricultural use (633 square miles). However, the current model 
covers only urban area, and so the land area for agricultural use is subtracted from the 
total land area, reducing to the total area of 2,960 square miles, which is the study area 
for this dissertation.  
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Table 6. Household and land area distribution of Atlanta region  
Name of county in   
Atlanta region 
Number of 
Households 
Land Area (square 
miles) 
Density (per square 
mile of land) 
*Density (per square 
mile of residential 
land) 
  Cherokee 60,634 423.6 0.22 0.55 
  Clayton 91,142 142.6 1.00 2.44 
  Cobb 240,490 339.4 1.11 2.71 
  DeKalb 263,696 268.2 1.54 3.76 
  Douglas 39,356 199.3 0.31 0.75 
  Fayette 34,711 195.3 0.28 0.68 
  Fulton 340,342 526.5 1.01 2.47 
  Gwinnett 234,210 432.6 0.85 2.07 
  Henry 55,030 322.7 0.27 0.65 
  Rockdale 26,254 130.3 0.31 0.77 
  Total 1,385,865 2,981.0 0.73 1.78 
Source: 2004 Atlanta Regional Commission, “Table A2 A. Housing Units, Occupancy, and Household Size, 
Counties, April 1, 2000 and 2004”, and “Table A1 A. Total Population, Race, and Density, Counties, April 
1, 2000 and 2004”. *Estimated values 
 
Table 7. Land use type of the Atlanta region (10 counties) 
Land Use Area (Square miles) Share (%) 
   CBD  223.98  7.57 
   Residence 1,274.22  43.04 
   Government 92.34  3.12 
The other uses (Park, Roads, etc) 1,369.91  46.27 
   Total 2,960.44  100.00 
Source: 2003 Atlanta Regional Commission, Land Use by type, internal data 
 
To construct a rectangular SAM for the current model, we first need to determine 
the money income for a representative household for the designated ten counties. 
Currently, the data for an average household income is available only until the year 2000. 
On the other hand, for the Atlanta MSA (twenty counties), the data for an average 
household income is available until the year 2003. Thus, the strategy is to estimate the 
average household income for the ten counties and for the year 2003, by reflecting the 
percentage difference between the average household income of the Atlanta MSA 
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(twenty counties) and the average household income of the ten counties for year 2000. 
However, although the average household income data is not available until year 2003, 
for the Atlanta MSA (twenty counties) the annual average expenditure data by a 
consumer unit is available until recently. Thus, the strategy is to estimate household 
income data for year 2003 (ten counties), by taking the following steps. First step is to 
update the average household income for the Atlanta MSA (twenty counties) from year 
2002 to year 2003, by reflecting the percentage difference between the two average 
expenditure data44 $60,529 (year 2003) and $53,936 (year 2000) in Table 8. Second step 
is to transform the estimated average household income data for the Atlanta MSA (year 
2003) to that for the ten county region (year 2003), by reflecting the percentage 
difference between the average household income data45 $67,535 for the Atlanta MSA 
and $69,490 for the ten counties (year 2000). After having taken these steps, the result is 
in Table 9.  
Table 8. Annual average expenditure for the Atlanta MSA  
Item 2002-2003 (dollars) 1999-2000 (dollars) 
Income before taxes 60,529 53,936 
Average annual expenditures 39,549 37,624 
Housing 14,548 13,663 
All others 25,001 23,961 
 Source: U.S. Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics), “Table 23. Selected southern metropolitan   
statistical: Average annual expenditures and characteristics (Consumer Expenditure Survey)”.  
                                                 
44 This survey was done for ‘consumer units’ according to the glossary in the website of consumer 
expenditure survey. There is no ‘household unit expenditure survey’, and so I will apply the shares of 
housing and non-housing expenditures to ‘average household income’ to estimate household expenditure 
share for housing and the other. 
 
45 Average household income data came from ‘America Facts Finder’ of the website, www.census.gov 
accessed in May 2004.  
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Table 9. Annual average household income and expenditure for the Atlanta region (10 
counties) (estimated) 
Item 2002-2003 (dollars)  
Household Income before taxes 77,988 
Average annual expenditure 50,957 
Housing 18,744 
All others 32,213 
 
Households may save or borrow money to spend. However the current model 
dose not consider ‘saving’ or ‘borrowing’. As mentioned in a previous section, it is 
assumed that households would spend the whole income inclusive of leisure value on 
housing, non-housing goods, leisure, and transportation. The current model considers 
property tax, and the property tax is already reflected in the ‘annual average expenditure’. 
The annual average expenditure ($50,957) is the benchmark household income.  
However, the $50,957 does not include leisure value. In the SAM, total income 
should be inclusive of leisure value. To include the leisure value, we need to know total 
leisure time and unit value of it for a representative household. The annual total workday 
is assumed to be 250. According to Table 10, among 24 hours, daily sleeping time is 8.58 
hours, so total daily amount of time available for work, leisure, and commuting is 
calculated as 24 – 8.58 = 15.42 hours. Among the 15.42 hours, at the benchmark, daily 
non-sleeping work-hour is 7.38, and annual work-hour is 7.38 × 250 = 1,845. And daily 
average commuting time is 30.5 × 2 = 61 minutes, according to ARC (2004). So, daily 
leisure time is 15.42 – 7.38 – 61/60 = 7.02 hours, and annual leisure time is 7.02 × 250 = 
1,755 hours. To calculate the value of the leisure time, we need to multiply 1,755 by an 
hourly value of leisure (or labor). In this model, labor income comes from the sector of 
non-housing good only. This assumption inevitably makes the value and portion of wage 
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income smaller than the actual values of wage income. The current model assumes that 
all households owned fixed amount of land and capital. This additional assumption 
allows the total amount of income to be maintained at the actual income in the study area 
by compensating the reduced wage value. Thus, the hourly rate we should apply to 
determine the value of leisure must be derived from the labor portion of non-housing 
good production. As you will see in one of the next discussions, the labor portion of non-
housing good is $20,294. So, the hourly rate for labor is calculated as $11.0 through 
dividing $20,294 by (250 × 7.38). Then, total annual leisure expenditure is 1,755 × 11.00  
= $19,305. Finally, total average income inclusive of leisure value is estimated to 
$19,305 + $50,957 = $70,262. 
Table 10. National surveys:  American time use 
Occupation Average Hours per day for each occupation 
Total work 7.38 
Work (main job) 7.54 
Work (other jobs) 7.50 
Sleeping time 8.58 
 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, America Time Use Survey, Summary Table 2-A. Number of              
persons and average hours per day by detailed activity classification, 2003 annual averages, unpublished 
 
The portion of housing expenditure is $18,744 for the representative household. 
The housing expenditure ($18,744) is inclusive of property tax. Thus, we need to separate 
the portion of property tax from the housing expenditure to construct SAM. For metro 
Atlanta, it is reported that statutory property tax rates range from 22.20 to 54.31 mills.46 
                                                 
46 The Property tax here is an Ad valorem tax. “Ad valorem taxes are stated in terms of mills, or the amount 
to be paid per each $1,000 of the real property’s assessed valuation. Mills are valued the same in each 
county and municipality for commercial land and buildings, equipment and inventory, as well as personal 
property. In most areas, the assessed valuation is 40 percent of what is judged as the property’s fair market 
value”. (Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce; Business Taxes and Related Regulations; 
www.metroatlatachamber.com, or http://www.echolsgroup.com/echolswriting/Corptaxes.pdf). 
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We need to calculate and apply the ‘effective’ property tax rate. The effective property 
tax rate is the product of statutory property tax rate and assessment ratio. The assessment 
rate is 40%. Then, effective property rate ranges from 8.88 to 21.72 mills. 16 mills is 
chosen as approximately average effective mills47 for the whole urban area and applied to 
the model. Note, however, that the property tax base is not the annual housing cost, but 
the market value of housing. Assuming that an interest rate is 7%, we can calculate a new 
effective property tax rate with the base of annual cost of housing (0.016 ÷ 0.07 = 0.229). 
Then, dividing $18,744 by 1.229, we can generate the housing cost net of the tax 
($15,251). Thus, the remaining part is the portion of annual property tax for housing 
($18,744 - $15,251 = $3,493).  
Next task is to divide the annual housing cost ($15,251) into two parts: land value 
and structure value. Table 11 provides average land value per acre and the portion of land 
value per residence for the Atlanta ten county region. The original raw data to calculate 
the information in the table could be obtained from the official website of Georgia 
Department of Revenue. According to the Table 11, average land value for residence is 
$127,299, that for commerce are $238,928, and that for agriculture are $23,318. We see 
that the land value and the portion of land value vary by distance from the CBD. The 
variances are consistent with our intuition for the mono-centric city framework. For 
instance, Atlanta midtown’s commercial land value is $7,127,073, which is very high, the 
city of Atlanta’s residential land value is $251,021, and Nelson in Cherokee county has 
$70,175 as an average land value. And also with the residence, the percentage portion of 
                                                 
47 We have not enough information to calculate a weighted average property tax rate accurately. 
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land value is relatively higher in Atlanta than in Nelson and Duluth. Duluth in Gwinnett 
county, which is located roughly at the middle of Atlanta metro, has $141,336 as an 
average land value. For the present study, we take the average lot size and the average 
land value for Duluth, since we will make 5th ring of ten rings in the model have the 
benchmark land value and lot size.48 
Table 11. Average lot size and land value for Atlanta metro (10 counties) 
Lot Type Average Land Value per acre ($) Ave. Portion of Land Value per Housing (%) 
 Residence 127,299 25.15 
      Nelson 70,175 19.70 
      Duluth 141,336 24.70 
      Atlanta 251,021 29.80 
 Commerce 238,928 19.19 
      Atlanta/Buckhead 5,928,895 26.81 
      Atlanta, Midtown, CID 7,127,072 22.96 
 Agriculture 23,318 25.57 
Source: Georgia Department of Revenue, calculated from raw data (2004). 
 
Since land price embodies expenditure for non-building capital invested in the 
land, we follow Muth’s49 practice of reducing it by one-half to obtain a price for raw 
land. The price of raw land per acre is estimated as $71,000. Since we have the 
information for the percentage portion of land value, we can successfully divide the 
annual expenditure for housing ($15,251) into the value of raw land (=$15,251 × 0.2470 
= $3,767) and that of structure ($15,251 - $3,767 = $11,484). When we assume that 100 
is the unit amount of capital, the rental price per unit of capital is $114.84.50 
                                                 
48 Here, for easier application, we take $142,000 as a land value for benchmark, after rounding $141,336. 
49 Richard F. Muth, Cities and Housing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, DiMasi,1987 
 
50 There is no standard measure to determine ‘unit capital’. Thus, in the current dissertation, I take ‘100’ as 
unit amount of capital. 
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Next, we need to divide the expenditure for non-housing good ($32,213) into 
three factors. The three factors consist of the portions of labor, land, and capital that are 
used to produce non-housing goods. From the input-output table for the Atlanta urban 
region,51 for all goods except housing, 63% ($20,294) of total value added belongs to 
labor, and 37% ($11,919) of it belongs to the other two factors. Note that the values of 
land and capital include the value of property tax. I mentioned that the new effective 
property tax rate with the base of annual cost in the Atlanta urban area is 22.9 mills. So, 
dividing $11,919 by $1.229 gives us the land and capital value net of tax, which is 
$9,698. We can also successfully divide the $9,698 into the two parts. According to the 
Table 11, for commerce, the average percentage of land value is 19.19 %. Hence, 
applying 20 %, we get the land portion ($9,698 × 0.2 = $1,940) and the capital portion 
($9,698 - $1,940 = $7,758).  
Turning to the issue of transportation cost, according to Table 12, an average total 
transportation cost per mile is 51.7 cents, and average daily commute mileage per capita 
is reported as 30.53 miles.52 According to the information from ARC (Atlanta Regional 
Commission),53 average household size is 2.65 and worker to population ratio is 0.536 
for year 2003. Thus, the monetary transportation cost for a representative household is 
30.53 × 2.65 × 0.517 × 0.536 = $22.42 per day, and annual average monetary commuting 
cost for a household is calculated to $22.42 × 250 = $5,605. We need to add the annual 
value of commuting time to this monetary cost ($5,605). The average one-way 
                                                 
51 For extracting this information, I referred to the following databases. 1) IMPLAN  2) U.S.Department of 
Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis); Input-Output Accounts Data  
 
52 ARC(Atlanta Regional Commission). "Atlanta Region Transportation Planning: Fact Book 2004." 2004. 
 
53 http://www.atlantaregional.com accessed in May 2004. 
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commuting time per day in the metro Atlanta is taken as 30.5 minutes, so round-trip 
commuting time per year is 2 × 30.5/60 × 250 = 254 hours.  Then the value of 
commuting time per year is 254 × $11 (wage rate per hour) = $2,794 dollars per year. 
Finally, total annual transportation cost per household is calculated as $5,605 + $2,794  = 
$8,399. 
Table 12. Transportation costs in America 
  2003 2000 
Average total cost per mile (current ¢) 51.7 49.1 
Gas and oil 7.2 6.9 
Gas and oil as a percent of total cost 13.9 14.1 
Maintenance 4.1 3.6 
Tires 1.8 1.7 
Average total cost per 15,000 miles (current $) 7,754 7,363 
Variable cost 1,965 1,829 
Fixed cost 5,789 5,534 
*Daily Vehicle mileage traveled per capita 
(staff/employee) in Atlanta area (miles) 30.53 - 
Source: www.bts.dot.gov/publications/national_     transportation_statistics/2004/excel/Table_03_14.xls 
accessed in May 2004, and *Atlanta Regional Commission 
 
Now, let us discuss choosing parameter values for setting up utility and 
production functions using specific functional forms such as CES (Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution) functions. Regarding the elasticity of substitution for the production of non-
housing good, according to a recent study, Pessoa and Rob (2005), the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor in aggregate is estimated as 0.7. We take this value 
for our production function of non-housing good. Regarding the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and land for housing production, according to Conder (1998), literature 
suggests that the value ranges between 0.6 and 0.8 for it. We assume a value of 0.7 for 
the current housing production function. 
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Regarding the elasticity of substitution in the nested utility function, the present 
dissertation reflected the possible differences of the elasticities of substitution among the 
choices to be more realistic than other studies, although there is still an arbitrary portion. 
At the first level, there are no published studies of the elasticity of substitution between 
leisure and non-leisure goods. Generally, studies adopt Cobb-Douglas function when they 
cannot find the elasticity of substitution for their studies. However, adopting Cobb-
Douglas function means that they arbitrary choose 1 as the elasticity of substitution for 
their studies. For this dissertation, instead of choosing 1, 0.7 is used. This is arbitrary, but 
existing studies such as DiMasi (1987) treated the elasticity of substitution among leisure, 
housing, and non-housing goods as the same, which is also arbitrary and less realistic 
than the present study. At the second level, for the elasticity of substitution between 
housing and non-housing goods of the utility function, according to Yang (2005), it is 
reported as 0.145 for the elasticity of substitution of utility function in his study. The 
number 0.145 is very inelastic. This paper uses a value of 0.2 for the present utility 
function.  
The data above generates the following rectangular SAM, Table 13. Note that the 
following tables work as a primary benchmark. The following tables do not provide all 
the information for all the rings of the Atlanta urban area, but provide a consistent data 
set for a representative household who lives in a given ring. The benchmark result that 
provides information for all the rings should be produced within the model using the 
primary benchmark. It is discussed in the next section. 
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Table 13. Rectangular SAM for the base model (per year) 
Markets H(r) NH(r) U(r) TTIME Household (r) 
PH(r) 18,744   -18,744     
PN   32,213 -32,213     
PU(r)     70,262   -70,262 
PL(r) -3,767       3,767 
PLN   -1,940     1,940 
PK -11,484 -7,758     19,242 
WS(r)   -20,294   20,294   
LEIS(r)     -19,305 -28,693 47,998 
Tax -3,493 -2,221     5,714 
Tracost(r)       8,399 -8,399 
 
Calibration 
We can calibrate function coefficients by inverting the factor demand or product 
demand functions using benchmark data. Note that in the benchmark data, the export of 
non-housing good (Ex) assumed to be zero, and the variable Ex is not shown in the 
following equations of calibration. 
Calibration of Utility Function 
From the product demand functions redefined above, divide (3.34) by  (3.33), to 
get 
ξ
ν
ν
)(
)()1(
)(
)(
PN
jPH
jH
jNH
⋅
−=                                              (3.50) 
By solving (3.50) for ν , we get 
)()()(
)()(
jHjPHPNjNH
jHjPH
⋅+⋅
⋅= ξξ
ξ
ν                                     (3.51) 
Next, dividing (3.34) by (3.35), we get 
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By solving (3.52) forα  and substituting (3.51) for ν , we get 
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Calibration of Housing Production Function 
Dividing (3. 36) by (3.39) yields 
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Then, by solving (3. 54) for β , we get 
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For the scale parameter of housing production function, we can get as follows by solving 
the equation (3.25) for ψ . 
)1(
)1)1
))()1()(()( )()( δ
δδδδδ ββψ −−− ⋅−+⋅⋅= jLjKjHS DHDH               (3. 56) 
Calibration of Non-housing Good Product Function 
Dividing (3.37) by (3.41) yields 
λ
π
ω
)
)1(
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K
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⋅+⋅
⋅+⋅=                                       (3. 57) 
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Using (3. 37) and (3.42), we get 
λ
πω
ω )
)1()1(
(
)( K
j
rts
W 
jWL
TKN
⋅+⋅−−
⋅=∑                            (3.58) 
Finally, using (3.38) and (3.42), we get 
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By solving (3.57), (3.58) and (3.59) for ω and π , we get the following. 
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And finally, by solving (3.26) for the scale parameter (μ ), we get 
)1(
)1)1()1(
))1(( ( λ
λλλλλλλ πϖπωμ −−−− ⋅−−+⋅+⋅⋅= WLLTKTNH         (3. 62) 
Table 14. Calibrated values for some parameters 
α  0.275, Intensity of leisure preference over the other goods 
β  0.831, Intensity of capital use over land in housing sector 
π  0.032, Intensity of land use in non-housing good sector 
μ  2.3, Scale parameter of non-housing good production function 
ψ  0.739, Scale parameter of housing production function 
ν  0.368, Intensity of housing good preference over non-housing good 
ω  0.23, Intensity of capital use over land and labor in non-housing good sector 
  
71 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR THE BASIC MODEL 
This chapter provides empirical results and their interpretation of the basic 
model 54 both for the case with fixed CBD (Central Business District) and urban 
boundaries and for the case with endogenous CBD and urban boundaries. For each case 
there are sub-analyses, the analysis of taxes on land rent only and the analysis of graded 
property taxes. In addition, the analyses for the case with LLZ (Large Lot Zoning) are 
also included and compared to the case without LLZ. All results are generated under the 
equal tax revenue setting.  
The tax reform of switching from the current property tax to LVT (Land Value 
Tax) only might be appeared as a politically difficult option to implement in the short 
term in which the urban boundary does not change, since more than 80% of the user cost 
of land must be taxed to meet the current benchmark tax revenue. However, in the long 
term in which the urban boundary does change, our results suggest that the pure LVT 
reform can be a possible option to adopt in the sense that the required land tax rate to 
meet the current benchmark tax revenue is greatly reduced.  
                                                 
54 The case of fixed CBD and urban boundaries can be considered as one of the short-term spatial features. 
As time passes, the boundaries of the CBD and urban area should change. In chapter 5, additional short-
term analyses with variable mobility of housing capital are conducted.  
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The variables provided in each table include the area of the CBD, the radius 
of the urban area, per capita annual tax revenue, annual average non-housing good 
production, the price of the non-housing good, the wage rate, the value of total domestic 
consumption, export value, total income for the economy, income per household, 
residential land rent, annual housing service price, capital-land ratio (housing capital 
density), and population density. The non-housing good, capital, and housing service are 
either composite goods or composite services, and so the choice of quantity unit for each 
of them was arbitrarily made.  
 
The Benchmark 
Table 15 contains the benchmark results obtained when the model was solved 
with the benchmark data (Table 13) and other demographic and geographic data for the 
Atlanta urban area. The Atlanta urban area is not strictly mono-centric in the sense that 
there are also scattered business districts in the suburban areas. However, the differences 
in land rent, housing service price, and population density by location show that the 
Atlanta urban area has the characteristics of the mono-centric city to a considerable 
degree. As we can recall from Table 6 and Table 11, the average land values and 
population densities by location are consistent with our intuition for the mono-centric city 
framework; areas closer to the center of the Atlanta urban region have the higher land 
values and housing prices and denser population. The 5th ring in Table 15 represents the 
land rent of a middle area such as Duluth ($4,970), 55 and annual housing service price 
paid by an average household ($15,251) of the Atlanta urban area (see Chapter 3). On 
                                                 
55 In Chapter 3, it turned out that an average raw land value was $71,000. The land rent $4,970 was 
obtained through multiplying $71,000 by the assumed interest rate of 7%.  
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one hand, the benchmark simulation was successful in reflecting the real area of 
CBD and the radius of urban area (Table 7); On the other hand, the benchmark does not 
closely reflect the land gradient.  
 
Table 15. Benchmark result: ‘tax on land  = 22.9%, tax on capital = 22.9%’  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate  
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
64,753.32 
323.31 30.58 4,510.75 198.78 100.00 11.00 47,975.61 1,146.05 (46,747.73) 
 
 
Ring56 Residential land rent per acre of land 
Annual Housing 
service price 
K/L ratio capital 
amount per acre of land 
Population density per 
acre of land 
1 8,807.75 17,132.80 19.68 1.42 
2 7,703.66 16,655.33 17.92 1.31 
3 6,699.65 16,177.86 16.25 1.21 
4 5,789.47 15,714.43 14.67 1.11 
5 4,970.00 15,251.00 13.19 1.01 
6 4,234.98 14,815.66 11.79 0.92 
7 3,578.15 14,366.27 10.48 0.83 
8 2,996.39 13,944.98 9.25 0.74 
9 2,483.44 13,523.68 8.11 0.66 
10 2,033.04 13,102.38 7.05 0.58 
 
                                                 
56 Note that ring 1 is one of the residential rings, not the CBD. 
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The Effects of Tax on Land Rent 
In this subsection, we investigate the effects of replacing the capital property tax 
with an equal yield LVT under both LLZ and no LLZ. The results are contained in Tables 
16 through 21. Tables 16 through 18 are for the fixed CBD and urban boundaries, while 
Tables 19 through 21 are for the endogenous CBD and urban boundaries. Tables 17, 18, 
20, 21 are the results when a binding LLZ is imposed on suburban rings. Regarding the 
imposition of LLZ, there are two sub-cases: (1) a binding LLZ on 6th and 7th rings, (2) a 
binding LLZ on 6th to 9th rings.  
Let’s first compare Table 15 with Table 16. Table 15 is the benchmark result with 
the taxes (22.9%) on both land and capital, while Table 16 is the result in which the tax 
rate on land is 409% and the tax rate on capital is zero, with fixed CBD and urban 
boundaries. Note that the land tax rates in the tables are calculated under the assumption 
that the liability of tax belongs to land users, and the land rents reported in the tables are 
net of taxes and the land rents that owners receive. In other words, for example, if land 
rent is $1.00 and the land tax rate is 400 percent, the land rent that users pay is $5.00 
($1.00 to the owner plus $4.00 in taxes). Note also here that if the liability of tax belongs 
to landowners, the land tax rate is calculated to 80%.  
The first observation is that since the land tax rate 409% means that more than 
80% of the user cost of land must be collected in the short term to meet the benchmark 
tax revenue ($4,510 per capita), the LVT reform seems to be close to the confiscation of 
land. Applying the information from Table 11 and Muth’s practice to get ‘raw’57 land 
value (see Chapter 3), the percentage portion of housing value that is land value lies 
                                                 
57 Here ‘raw’ refer to the state that there is not any improvement such as water irrigation in land itself. 
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between 10% and 15%;58 the remaining 85% to 90% is the value of capital (i.e. 
improvements). Hence, it is not surprising to get this observation. However, the tax 
revenue ($4,510 per capita) has a greater purchasing power for government to use, since 
the prices have decreased due to the tax reform, as can be seen from the tables. 
The land rent and the price of housing service for the benchmark (Table 15) are 
overall much greater than those of the case with the tax on land rent only (Table 16). For 
example, for the 1st ring, the land rent for the benchmark is $8,807.75 while that for the 
LVT simulation is only $2,814.98, and the housing service price for the benchmark is 
$17,132.80 compared to $14,478.62 in Table 16. The same tendency holds true for the 
other rings as well. Unlike other taxes, landowners bear the entire burden of the tax on 
land rent, since there is no way for landowners to avoid the tax when the boundaries of 
the CBD and urban area do not change. Thus, consistent with the theory, the tax on land 
rent is fully capitalized into land rents, and the capitalized land rents results in the lower 
housing service prices. 
The elimination of the tax on capital increases the housing capital density (the 
ratio of capital to land). For the 1st ring, the housing capital density of the benchmark 
(19.68) is smaller than the other case (20.52). The same holds true for the other rings as 
well. The tax reform (switching from the capital property tax to land tax) lowers the user 
cost of capital,59 but the user cost of land does not change due to the full capitalization of 
land tax, which provides an incentive to adopt more capital for the production of non-
                                                 
58 In Table 11, the percentage range of land value was reported between 20% and 30%. But this percentage 
range still includes improvements, so Muth’s practice suggests cutting the values in half. 
 
59 Note that although the rental price of capital ( Kr ) was fixed as a numeraire, the user cost of capital 
( )1( tsrK +⋅ ) is not constant because of the tax (ts). 
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housing good and housing. Furthermore, the lowered user cost of capital means a 
lower cost of production, and as a result the production (or efficiency) in the economy 
increases. The adoption of more capital can mean taller housing or any other improved 
housing service. Population density remained constant in both cases, since the boundaries 
of the CBD and urban area have been fixed as a short-term feature.  
Total income after the tax reform has also been reduced from $64,753.32 million 
(Table 15) to $56,416.68 million (Table 16), while the annual average non-housing good 
production to satisfy the demand per capita increased from 198.78 (Table 15) to 201.98 
(Table 16). The result suggests that switching from the benchmark property tax to a land 
tax lowered the overall price level and also enhanced an efficiency of the economy.  
Note that the wage rate has decreased from $11.00 (Table 15) to $9.72 (Table 16) 
because of the tax reform. We need to be careful in judging whether the real user cost of 
labor decreased or increased. Because of taxes, the relative user cost of labor in 
equilibrium can be different from the nominal wage rate. Assuming that the fixed rental 
price of capital is one, the user cost of capital is 1.22960 at the benchmark while the user 
cost of capital is one after the tax reform. Thus, the user cost of labor relative to capital 
cost before the tax reform is $11 ÷ 1.229 = $8.95, while the user cost of labor relative to 
capital cost after the tax reform is $9.72 ÷ 1 = $9.72. Hence, the user cost of labor relative 
to capital cost in equilibrium increased after the tax reform, although the nominal wage 
rate decreased.  
                                                 
60 The benchmark property tax rate (22.9%) is applied here. Although the rental price of capital is fixed as 
numeraire, the user cost of capital with the property tax is 1.229 since capital is perfectly elastically 
supplied. In other words, the tax on capital generates ‘inflation effect’. 
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Regarding the change of wage rate, there are two countervailing forces: the 
replacement effect and the efficiency effect. The replacement effect suggests that the 
reduced user cost of capital due to the tax reform would replace some labor with capital 
to the point that the elasticity of substitution allows. This decreases labor demand and 
wage rate. On the other hand, the efficiency effect suggests that the reduced cost of 
production due to the reduced user cost of capital increases demand for labor and wage 
rate. Depending on relative sizes of the two forces, the wage rate relative to capital cost 
can either increase or decrease as a result of the tax reform. Here, the efficiency effect 
applies to all production factors. All households in the current model are landowners and 
laborers, and the reduced land rents and wages resulted in a decrease in income. If the 
households were not landowners, the efficiency effect would have more greatly 
dominated.61 
Of course, the supply side of each factor must also be considered to determine 
change in the user costs of each factor. For land, the supply curve is vertical, so any 
increase in demand leads to an increase of land rent, while for capital, the supply curve is 
horizontal at an international price level, so the change in demand for capital does not 
affect the rental price of capital. The supply status of labor lies between land and capital. 
In our case, the efficiency effect dominated and led to the increase of wage rate relative 
to capital cost, although the nominal wage rate decreased.62  
                                                 
61 There is a big difference (even qualitatively) in the change of efficiency due to economic policy between 
resident landowners and absentee landowners. The details are described in Chapter 6. 
 
62 This is due to the elimination of ‘inflation effect’ that is from the elimination of the tax on capital. 
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Now, compare Table 16 to Table 17. Table 16 contains the results with LLZ 
on 6th and 7th rings under the fixed CBD and urban boundaries. Due to the LLZ, to meet 
the equal tax revenue condition, the required land tax rate with the LLZ (271%) is much 
lower than the case without the LLZ (409%). It is also observed that the increased land 
rent due to the LLZ contributes to the increase of total income from $51,416.68 million 
(Table 16) to $57,685.91 million (Table 17). This increased income would allow 
households to demand more housing and non-housing goods, and again allow firms to 
demand more factors. Let’s call this effect the ‘positive income effect’ of LLZ.  
The imposition of the LLZ increases the demand for land in all rings. For the 
rings with the LLZ, households consume housing services with the larger lot size,63 while 
for the rings without the LLZ, the immigrants from the rings with the LLZ add to the 
number of existing residents by increasing the aggregate demand for residential lots. As a 
result, the land rents in all rings increase due to the LLZ.64 Let’s call this ‘migration 
effect’. The positive income effect combined with this migration effect contributed to the 
increase in prices: the land rent of the 1st ring increased from $1,835.99 (Table 16) to 
$2,814.98 (Table 17); wage rate increased from $9.72 (Table 16) to $9.93 (Table 17); the 
price of non-housing good increased from $86.75 (Table 16) to $88.01 (Table 17). 
Another result is that the housing capital density (K/L ratio) in the rings with the LLZ 
decreased, but that in the rings without the LLZ increased, as would be expected. The 
housing capital densities of the 1st ring and (one of the rings without the LLZ) the 6th ring 
                                                 
63The migration does not reduce the land rent in the rings with the LLZ, since the remained households in 
the rings with the LLZ would demand a larger lot size. And also, in the current model, the markets between 
for house and apartment are not separated, so that the household competes for only single-family housing. 
 
64 This finding is consistent with Moss (1977).  
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(one of the rings without the LLZ) for the absence of the LLZ (Table 16) are 20.52 
and 12.26, while those for the presence of the LLZ (Table 17) are 22.19 and 8.13. The 
same pattern holds true for the other rings as well. This result is consistent with another 
result that the rings with LLZ have lower household (population) densities while the rings 
without the LLZ have higher household (population) densities, as compared to the case 
with the LLZ. Table 18 contains the results with the LLZ in 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th rings and 
LVT. The results are qualitatively the same as when the LLZ is imposed in just 6th and 7th 
rings. Since LLZ was imposed on a larger area, the migration effect and the positive 
income effect became strengthened.  
Now, let’s discuss the results of the same counterfactual cases but under 
endogenous CBD and urban boundaries (Tables 19 to 21). Note that the benchmark is 
still the same, and so all tables can be compared to Table 15. Unlike the cases of fixed 
CBD and urban boundaries, the tax on land rent is not neutral in the case of endogenous 
CBD and urban boundaries. The tax on land rents lowers land rents in all rings, and the 
areas near the urban boundary would shift to agricultural use.65 Due to the change of land 
area in the economy, the tax on land rent is not purely neutral. 
Comparing Table 15 (the benchmark) with Table 19, due to the increase in the tax 
on land and the elimination of the tax on capital (i.e. improvements), the urban boundary 
contracted from 30.58 miles to 25.69 miles. The tax reform reduces land rents in all 
location and thus land at the edge of the urban area shifts to agricultural use, contracting 
the CBD area and the urban boundary, as we have discussed. Brueckner (2003) found 
that there are two countervailing effects of the property tax regarding the urban size: the 
                                                 
65 This possibility was discussed in Chapter 2, when we reviewed Brueckner (2003). 
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improvement effect and the dwelling size effect. The improvement effect suggests 
that the property tax depresses improvements, reduces population density, and spurs the 
spatial expansion of the metropolitan area, while the dwelling size effect suggests that the 
property tax is partly shifted forward to consumers (households), leads to a higher price 
of housing service, decreases dwelling sizes in response, and contracts the urban size as a 
result. In this case, the improvement effect of the capital property tax dominated, so that 
switching from the capital property tax to the LVT contracts the CBD and the urban area. 
Consistent with the above, comparing the benchmark (the capital property tax) to 
the case with just a LVT, the land rent and the housing service price of the 1st ring, for 
example, decreased from $8,807.75 and $17,132.80 in Table 15 to $5,373.48 and 
$15,672.30 in Table 19, respectively. However, as mentioned, the tax on land rent is not 
neutral in the case of endogenous boundary, which makes consumers bear a slight portion 
of the land tax, and so the decrease in land rent and housing service price is not as great 
as in the case of the fixed boundary.66  
The required land tax rate to meet the equal tax revenue ($4,510.75 per capita) in 
the endogenous CBD and urban boundaries is 172%, which is much lower than the 409% 
in the fixed CBD and urban boundaries. We see here that the LVT reform can be adopted 
as a tax reform with less difficulty, since the 172% is about less than 60% of the user cost 
of land. Since the CBD and urban boundaries change, the revenue effect of land tax 
becomes improved.67 Due to the spatial contraction of the urban area and the replacement 
                                                 
66 In the fixed boundaries case, the land rent and housing service price in the 1st ring were $1,835.99 and 
$14,127.54, respectively.  
 
67 Note that although the current discussion involves something about tax revenue, the current dissertation 
and models were not designed to explore the revenue effects of land tax. 
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effect due to the elimination of the tax on capital, the housing capital density (28.09) 
of the 1st ring (Table 19) became greater than in Table 16 (20.52). The same holds true 
for the other rings. Consistent with the other results, the population density (1.81 in Table 
19) of the 1st ring also became greater than that (1.42 in Table 16) in the case of fixed 
CBD and urban boundaries.  
Let’s now compare Table 19 with Table 20. The latter is the result of the case 
with LLZ on 6th and 7th ring. The increase in income due to the residential landownership 
and LLZ increased the land rents in all locations: for example, the land rent of the 1st ring 
increased from $5,373.48 (Table 19) to $6,199.21 (Table 20). For the rings without the 
LLZ, the migration effect (emigrants from the rings with the LLZ) contributed to the 
increase in land rents. The increase of land rents increases production cost, and so the 
prices of housing service and the non-housing good also increased: the housing service 
price of the 1st ring increased from $15,672.30 (Table 19) to $15,742.51 (Table 20); the 
price of non-housing good increased from $93.44 (Table 19) to $95.26 (Table 20). The 
same holds true for the other rings as well.  
The positive income effect due to the LLZ (combined with the replacement 
effect68) also increased the wage rate from $10.50 (Table 19) to $10.76 (Table 20), and 
increased the production of non-housing good from 206.31 (Table 19) to 211.18 (Table 
20). Consistent with these results, the area of the CBD and the urban radius also 
increased from 256.46 square miles and 25.69 miles in Table 19 to 258.03 square miles 
and 27.28 miles in Table 20, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
68 The increase of land rent due to the LLZ makes firms to substitute labor and capital for land, to the point 
that the elasticity of substitution allows. This effect also contributes to the increase of wage rate.  
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Table 21 contains the results for the case with the LLZ in the 6th to 9th rings, 
which is a larger area than the 6th and 7th rings. The imposition of the LLZ on the larger 
area makes more people in the rings with the LLZ move to the rings without the LLZ, 
which further pushes up the land rents and the prices of housing service. The increased 
land rent due to the LLZ results in an increase of household income.69  
Regarding the changes in the CBD and urban boundaries, since the increase in 
land rents are larger due to the imposition of the LLZ on the larger area, the radius of the 
urban area increased from 27.28 miles (Table 20) to 28.57 miles (Table 21). However, 
the area of the CBD decreased from 258.03 square miles (Table 20) to 257.25 miles 
(Table 21). These results occur because the LLZ makes the residential area expand in 
both directions, i.e. into the CBD and the agricultural area. 
                                                 
69 Under the absentee landownership, LLZ made the welfare of all households be reduced. For details, refer 
to Chapter 6. 
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Table 16. Results for ‘tax on land  = 409%, tax on capital = 0%’ (fixed CBD and 
urban area) under the equal tax revenue 
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
56,416.68 
323.31 30.57 4,510.75 201.98 86.75 9.72 41,568.33 998.14 
(40,729.21) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 1,835.99 14,127.54 20.52 1.42 
2 1,604.54 13,720.28 18.68 1.31 
3 1,394.98 13,327.07 16.94 1.21 
4 1,204.19 12,933.86 15.28 1.11 
5 1,032.16 12,554.69 13.71 1.01 
6 878.90 12,175.52 12.26 0.92 
7 741.28 11,810.40 10.87 0.83 
8 619.30 11,445.27 9.59 0.74 
9 512.95 11,094.19 8.41 0.66 
10 419.12 10,743.11 7.30 0.58 
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Table 17. Results for ‘tax on land  = 271%, tax on capital = 0%’ (fixed CBD and 
urban area) under the equal tax revenue and LLZ on 6th and 7th rings  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
57,685.91 
323.31 30.57 4,510.75 204.97 88.01 9.93 42,340.94 1,474.67 
(41,645.51) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 2,814.98 14,478.62 22.19 1.51 
2 2,470.93 14,071.36 20.25 1.40 
3 2,158.15 13,664.11 18.43 1.29 
4 1,873.52 13,270.90 16.69 1.19 
5 1,613.92 12,877.69 15.03 1.09 
6 1,382.47 12,498.52 8.13 0.60 
7 1,176.04 12,119.35 8.01 0.60 
8 991.50 11,754.22 10.69 0.81 
9 825.73 11,389.10 9.40 0.72 
10 681.85 11,038.02 8.23 0.64 
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Table 18. Results for ‘tax on land  = 201%, tax on capital = 0%’ (fixed CBD and 
urban area) under the equal tax revenue and LLZ on 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th rings  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
59,076.68 
323.31 30.57 4,510.75 208.06 89.40 10.15 43,223.08 1,947.09 
(42,649.56) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 3,844.01 14,829.70 23.84 1.59 
2 3,387.36 14,408.40 21.82 1.48 
3 2,971.37 13,987.10 19.91 1.37 
4 2,589.78 13,579.85 18.08 1.26 
5 2,242.60 13,186.64 16.35 1.16 
6 1,932.95 12,793.43 8.29 0.60 
7 1,651.45 12,414.26 8.16 0.60 
8 1,398.11 12,035.09 8.02 0.60 
9 1,176.04 11,669.96 7.91 0.60 
10 978.99 11,318.88 9.15 0.70 
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Table 19. Results for ‘tax on land  = 172%, tax on capital = 0% ’ (endogenous CBD 
and urban area) under the equal tax revenue  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
62,217.52 
256.46 25.69 4,510.75 206.31 93.44 10.50 45,808.66 1,568.21 
(44,917.05) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 5,373.48 15,672.30 28.09 1.81 
2 4,885.55 15,321.22 26.27 1.71 
3 4,432.03 14,970.13 24.55 1.62 
4 4,009.78 14,633.10 22.89 1.53 
5 3,612.56 14,296.06 21.27 1.44 
6 3,246.61 13,959.02 19.74 1.35 
7 2,905.68 13,621.98 18.27 1.26 
8 2,589.78 13,313.03 16.85 1.18 
9 2,298.90 12,990.03 15.50 1.10 
10 2,033.04 12,681.08 14.22 1.02 
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Table 20. Results for ‘tax on land  = 140%, tax on capital = 0%’ (endogenous CBD 
and urban area) under the equal tax revenue and LLZ on 6th and 7th rings  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
63,285.74 
258.03 27.28 4,510.75 211.18 95.26 10.76 46,327.05 2,313.70 
(45,688.23) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 6,199.21 15,742.51 28.44 1.81 
2 5,570.53 15,349.30 26.38 1.70 
3 4,988.77 14,942.05 24.42 1.60 
4 4,453.92 14,562.88 22.56 1.49 
5 3,956.61 14,183.71 20.77 1.39 
6 3,499.96 13,804.54 8.77 0.60 
7 3,080.84 13,439.42 8.65 0.60 
8 2,699.25 13,074.29 15.89 1.11 
9 2,348.94 12,723.21 14.42 1.02 
10 2,033.04 12,372.13 13.03 0.94 
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Table 21. Results for ‘tax on land  = 119%, tax on capital = 0%’ (endogenous CBD 
and urban area) under the equal tax revenue and LLZ on 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th rings  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
64,456.57 
257.25 28.57 4,510.75 215.30 96.79 11.00 46,997.14 2,935.83 
(46,533.49) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 6,990.53 15,854.86 28.99 1.82 
2 6,224.23 15,405.48 26.73 1.71 
3 5,517.36 14,970.13 24.56 1.59 
4 4,869.91 14,548.84 22.51 1.48 
5 4,275.64 14,127.54 20.55 1.37 
6 3,734.54 13,720.28 8.81 0.60 
7 3,240.35 13,327.07 8.67 0.60 
8 2,796.21 12,933.86 8.55 0.60 
9 2,392.73 12,540.65 8.41 0.60 
10 2,033.04 12,161.48 12.21 0.88 
 89
 
 
 
The Effects of Graded Property Taxes 
In this section, we discuss the results with graded property taxes where land is 
more heavily taxed than capital, under endogenous CBD and urban boundaries. In this 
subsection, we discuss the tax reforms that can be highly practically adopted. First, 
compare Table 19 with Table 22. Table 19 is, as we already mentioned, the result of the 
case with the tax on land rent only (172%), while Table 22 is the result of the case with 
the graded property tax where land is taxed at 80%70 and capital is taxed at 10%.  Both 
cases collect the same tax revenue.  
The 10% increase in the tax on capital increases the nominal income of 
households from $62,217.52 million (Table 19) to $63,141.16 million (Table 22). I call it 
‘nominal income’, since the increase of the nominal income does not imply an increase of 
production (or efficiency). Due to the 10% tax on capital, the production of non-housing 
good decreased from 206.31 (Table 19) to 202.88 (Table 22). Note that the tax on capital 
carries an inflation effect. Because the rental price of capital is fixed, the tax on capital 
increases the user cost of capital by the amount of tax. As a result, the other prices in the 
economy are adjusted accordingly. Provided that the base rental price of capital (and the 
old user cost of capital) is one as an example, the new user cost of capital increased to 1.1 
due to the tax on capital. In this situation, for example, the old wage rate relative to 
capital cost is $10.50 ÷ 1 = $10.50 (Table 19), while the new wage rate relative to capital 
cost is $10.72 ÷ 1.1 = $9.75 (Table 22). For another example, the old price of non-
housing good relative to capital cost is $93.44 ÷ 1 = $93.44 (Table 19), but the new price 
of non-housing good relative to capital cost is $96.09 ÷ 1.1 = $87.35 (Table 22). We also 
                                                 
70 The 80% is about 40% of the user cost of land. 
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see that the housing service price in the 1st ring increased from $15,672.30 to 
$16,163.81, but the housing service price relative to capital cost in the 1st ring decreased 
from $15,672.30 ÷ 1 = $15,672.30 to $16,163.81 ÷ 1.1 = $14,694.37. The same pattern 
holds true for the other rings as well.  
Switching from the land tax to the revenue-preserving graded property tax where 
capital is taxed at 10% increases land rents in all locations. We can provide insight into 
this finding by first considering a reduction in land tax rate to zero, followed by an 
increase in the tax on capital to recover the lost revenue. Reducing land tax rate to zero 
pushes up the land rents in all locations. We recall that the imposition of a land tax in an 
urban economy makes landowners bear the whole burden of the tax in the short-term, or 
makes landowners bear most of the tax burden in the long term.71 Then, regarding the 
second step, Brueckner (2003) finds that the imposition of a property tax on a mono-
centric urban economy may depress land rents up to a certain distance from the center, 
and then increase land rents beyond that point, i.e., there is counter-clockwise rotation of 
the land rent curve. Here, that point is the distance at which the equality of net returns to 
the landowner hold.72 According to Brueckner (2003), it is complex to derive a full 
relationship between land rent and property tax. So, it is not straightforward to catch the 
reason for the relationship. Summing the two effects, for our case, the land rents in all 
locations increased. The depressive effect of the property tax on land rent did not exceed 
the positive effect of reducing the land tax.  
                                                 
71 Here, short term means the period of no change in the urban boundary, while long-term means the period 
that allows change in the urban boundary. 
 
72 Brueckner (2003) also finds that the result comes out when the improvement effect is greater than the 
dwelling size effect, in other words when the elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing 
good is very low.  Also refer to page 14 of his paper. 
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Furthermore, the tax on capital generates a larger burden on locations with 
large capital-land ratios (or higher housing capital densities), and so the gap between the 
pre-tax and the post-tax land rent curves increases as one approaches the rings near the 
CBD. The following numerical result confirms this finding. Compare the results in Table 
19 to those in Table 22. For the 1st ring, the land rent increased by 26.54% (($6,799.74 - 
$5,373.48) ÷ $5,373.48 × 100 = 26.54%), but for the 9th ring, the land rent increased by 
only 3.76% (($2,385.35 - $2,298.90)÷ $2,298.90 × 100 = 3.76%). The same pattern holds 
true for the other rings as well. Consistent with the result for the land rent increase, the 
radius of the urban area and the area of the CBD also increased from 25.69 miles and 
256.46 square miles in Table 19 to 28.32 miles and 294.57 square miles in Table 22, 
respectively.  
Now, assume that a LLZ is imposed on some suburban rings. First of all, when we 
imposed a LLZ on 6th and 7th rings, the required land tax rate to meet the equal tax 
revenue decreased from 80% (Table 22) to 69% (Table 23), while the capital tax rate was 
kept at 10%. The existence of the LLZ increased the land rents in all locations, thus 
allowing the tax on land rent to be reduced. When a LLZ is imposed on the larger area 
(6th ring to 9th ring), the required land tax rate further decreased to 62% to meet the equal 
tax revenue (Table 24). We see that the LLZ favors landowners. Compare Table 22 to 
Table 23. For the 1st ring, the land rent increased by 11.64% (from $6,799.74 in Table 22 
to $7,591.06 in Table 23), for the 6th ring, the land rent increased by 6.21% (from 
$3,675.11 in Table 22 to $3,903.44 in Table 23), and for the 9th ring, the land rent 
increased by 1.62% (from $2,385.35 in Table 22 to $2,424.01 in Table 23). So, we also 
see that the existence of the LLZ makes the gradient of land rent steeper. The emigrants 
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from the rings with the LLZ put upward pressures on the land rent in the rings 
without the LLZ, and even greater upward pressures in the land rent in the rings nearer 
the CBD. Note that the land rents of the rings with the LLZ also increased, since the land 
markets73 in the current economy are not distinguished and separated by characteristics 
and the LLZ does not diminish the demand for housing and land in the rings with the 
LLZ as well.74 As a result, the LLZ shifts up the land rent curve for residential land in all 
locations. The preference of households for housing size is not fixed, either, but depends 
on the income of households, which is endogenous. The household income increased due 
to the LLZ, which increased the demand for housing and non-housing good, which again 
increased the demand for land, raising land rents even higher. The imposition of the LLZ 
on the larger area (Table 24) strengthened the effects described above.  
In addition, the wage rate increased from $10.72 in Table 22 to $10.94 in Table 
23 to $11.11 in Table 24 and the price of non-housing good increased from $96.09 to 
$97.91 to $99.02, due to the increase in income. Consistent with the increase in land rents, 
the radius of the urban area increased from 28.22 miles in Table 22 to 29.29 miles in 
Table 23 to 30.03 miles in Table 24, but the area of the CBD decreased from 293.57 
square miles in Table 22 to 288.29 square miles in Table 23 to 284.24 square miles in 
Table 24, since the increased residential land rent of 1st ring outbid the extant land rent of 
the CBD. Note that for the cases in Table 23 and Table 24 the rings with the LLZ have 
                                                 
73 For example, land market for apartment, land market for single-family house, etc. 
 
74 If housing and land markets were separated, land value for single family home would decrease, but land 
value for apartment would increase. Hence, LLZ would make home residents gain but apartment residents 
lose. In the current model, although some residents are excluded from the rings with the LLZ, the minimum 
per-capita dwelling land size required by the LLZ did not diminish the demand for land in the rings with 
the LLZ as well. 
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lower housing capital density and population density while the rings without the 
LLZ have higher housing capital density and population density than reported in Table 22. 
Now, let the government raise the tax on capital to 20% from 10% that allowed 
the land tax rate to decrease to 32% from 80% to meet the equal tax revenue. The results 
are reported in Table 25. With the imposition of the LLZ on the 6th and 7th rings (Table 
26), the required land tax rate further decreased to 15%, and with the imposition of the 
LLZ in the larger area (6th ring to 9th ring), the required land tax rate again further 
decreased to 14% (Table 27). We see that at the 20% capital tax, the imposition of the 
LLZ in the current economy results in the land tax rate that is less than the tax rates on 
capital here. Hence, we draw the implication that the imposition of the LLZ in suburban 
rings makes a graded property tax more feasible in the sense that the government can 
further lower capital tax rate, without making land tax rate unreasonably high. Moreover, 
as we will see in Chapter 6, when the residents of an urban economy are landowners, the 
imposition of a LLZ may enhance the welfare of households. 75 Therefore, the combined 
policy of a graded property tax and a LLZ can be desirably pursued in some specific 
situations. 
 
 
                                                 
75 However, as can be seen in the Chapter 6, when the residents are renters of land, the imposition of the 
LLZ reduces the welfare of the households.  
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Table 22. Results for ‘tax on land  = 80%, tax on capital = 10%’ (endogenous CBD 
and urban area) under the equal tax revenue  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
63,141.16 
293.57 28.22 4,510.75 202.88 96.09 10.72 46,619.93 1,317.97 
(45,583.86) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 6,799.74 16,163.81 23.17 1.58 
2 6,064.71 15,742.51 21.39 1.48 
3 5,389.12 15,335.26 19.69 1.38 
4 4,766.70 14,942.05 18.07 1.28 
5 4,197.44 14,548.84 16.53 1.19 
6 3,675.11 14,169.67 15.06 1.10 
7 3,202.82 13,790.50 13.68 1.01 
8 2,771.19 13,425.37 12.36 0.93 
9 2,383.35 13,060.25 11.12 0.84 
10 2,033.04 12,695.12 9.95 0.77 
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Table 23. Results for ‘tax on land  = 69%, tax on capital = 10%’ (endogenous CBD 
and urban area) under the equal tax revenue and LLZ on 6th and 7th rings  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
64,222.21 
288.29 29.29 4,510.75 206.59 97.91 10.94 47,230.03 1,910.21 
(46,364.30) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 7,591.06 16,332.33 23.96 1.61 
2 6,715.29 15,882.95 21.99 1.50 
3 5,911.45 15,447.61 20.11 1.39 
4 5,176.43 15,012.26 18.33 1.29 
5 4,510.22 14,576.92 16.64 1.19 
6 3,903.44 14,155.62 8.25 0.60 
7 3,356.08 13,748.37 8.13 0.60 
8 2,865.02 13,355.16 12.12 0.90 
9 2,424.01 12,947.90 10.78 0.82 
10 2,033.04 12,568.73 9.53 0.73 
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Table 24. Results for ‘tax on land = 62%, tax on capital = 10%’ (endogenous CBD 
and urban area) under the equal tax revenue and LLZ on 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th rings  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
65,129.90 
284.24 30.03 4,510.75 209.19 99.02 11.11 47,789.37 2,315.10 
(47,019.59) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 8,191.59 16,472.77 24.57 1.64 
2 7,206.34 15,995.29 22.47 1.52 
3 6,302.42 15,531.87 20.45 1.41 
4 5,482.95 15,068.44 18.56 1.29 
5 4,741.67 14,605.01 16.76 1.19 
6 4,069.21 14,169.67 8.29 0.60 
7 3,468.68 13,734.33 8.16 0.60 
8 2,930.70 13,313.03 8.03 0.60 
9 2,455.29 12,891.73 7.91 0.60 
10 2,033.04 12,484.47 9.27 0.71 
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Table 25. Results for ‘tax on land  = 32%, tax on capital = 20% (endogenous CBD 
and urban area) under the equal tax revenue  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
64,361 
318.02 30.12 4,510.75 199.66 99.16 10.93 47,649.09 1,175.04 
(46,464.21) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 8,347.97 16,894.06 20.30 1.45 
2 7,331.45 16,430.64 18.53 1.34 
3 6,402.51 15,967.21 16.86 1.24 
4 5,558.02 15,517.82 15.27 1.14 
5 4,797.97 15,068.44 13.78 1.04 
6 4,109.87 14,647.14 12.36 0.95 
7 3,493.70 14,211.80 11.03 0.86 
8 2,946.34 13,804.54 9.79 0.77 
9 2,461.54 13,397.29 8.63 0.69 
10 2,033.04 12,990.03 7.55 0.62 
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Table 26. Results for ‘tax on land  = 15%, tax on capital = 20%’ (endogenous CBD 
and urban area) under the equal tax revenue and LLZ on 6th and 7th rings  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
65,369.16 
310.11 30.85 4,510.75 202.53 100.70 11.13 48,261.51 1,637.55 
(47,192.33) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 9,057.97 17,104.71 21.09 1.49 
2 7,906.96 16,599.15 19.17 1.37 
3 6,859.16 16,107.64 17.36 1.26 
4 5,914.58 15,630.17 15.65 1.15 
5 5,063.83 15,152.70 14.04 1.05 
6 4,300.66 14,689.27 7.84 0.60 
7 3,621.94 14,239.88 7.72 0.60 
8 3,021.41 13,790.50 9.78 0.77 
9 2,492.82 13,355.16 8.55 0.68 
10 2,033.04 12,933.86 7.41 0.60 
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Table 27. Results for ‘tax on land = 14%, tax on capital = 20%’ (endogenous CBD 
and urban area) under the equal tax revenue and LLZ on 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th rings  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$) (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
65,941.43 
306.28 31.21 4,510.75 203.96 101.39 11.22 48,631.51 1,859.54 
(47,605.47) 
 
Ring 
Residential land 
rent per acre of 
land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, 
per year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population density 
per acre of land 
1 9,430.18 17,203.02 21.49 1.51 
2 8,207.22 16,683.41 19.50 1.39 
3 7,100.00 16,177.86 17.62 1.27 
4 6,099.12 15,686.34 15.84 1.16 
5 5,201.45 15,194.83 14.17 1.06 
6 4,400.75 14,717.36 7.87 0.60 
7 3,687.62 14,253.93 7.74 0.60 
8 3,058.94 13,790.50 7.61 0.60 
9 2,511.59 13,355.16 7.49 0.60 
10 2,033.04 12,905.77 7.34 0.60 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EXTENSIONS TO THE BASIC MODEL 
This chapter provides two extensions for the basic model to further draw 
meaningful results. The extensions include the model with three income groups, and the 
model with immobile housing capital and only partially mobile housing capital. The 
former allows us to additionally capture the distributional effect of the LVT, while the 
latter allows us to capture the short-term effects.   
The Model with Three Income Groups 
The Model Description 
This extension involves three income groups - a high-income group, a middle-
income group and a low-income group - with the other features being the same as in the 
basic model. The resources that provide income to the households consist of time for 
work and leisure, land, and capital. The different income groups are associated with 
different wage rates, land holdings, and capital holdings. More specifically, it is assumed 
that the high-income group has one and half times of the endowment for the middle-
income group, the low-income group has half of the endowment for the middle-income 
group. The labor markets for each income group are distinguished so that the wage rate 
for each income group is separately determined. In this dissertation, it is assumed that the 
labor type 1 is from the high-income group; the labor type 2 is from the middle-income 
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group; the labor type 3 is from the low-income group. Regarding the size for each 
income group, the high-income group occupies 21 % of all households; the middle-
income group occupies 34 %; and the low-income group occupies 45 % of all households. 
This percentage share was determined at the level that best helps to make the benchmark 
(Table 29) close to the economic, demographic and physical data of the Atlanta urban 
economy. The determined percentage share for the size of each income group is 
consistent with the fact that there are fewer wealth people than poor people. The tax 
revenues are distributed to each income group according to the percentage share of the 
endowment of each income group, but are equally distributed to each household within 
each income group.76  
Table 28 is the numerical representation of the model with the three income 
groups, and expressed in the form of a SAM. The data used for building the SAM is from 
the same sources as in the basic model. The SAM is used to calibrate parameters to 
produce Table 29, which is the benchmark result for the model with the three income 
groups. In Table 28, the top row lists ‘quantity’ terms, the first column lists ‘price’ terms, 
and the numbers are monetary values, which are the ‘quantity’ term multiplied by ‘price’ 
term. In the SAM, ‘HOUS1’ represents a high-income household, ‘HOUS2’ represents a 
middle-income household, and ‘HOUS3’ represents a low-income household. The ‘UI’, 
‘U2’, ‘U3’ represent the utilities of each income group. The definitions of the other terms 
are included within the table.  
                                                 
76 The reason why the tax revenue has to be distributed in this way is to make the expenditure side of 
government neutral so that the effects of tax policy only are captured. If we distribute the tax revenue to 
each household equally ignoring income groups, it means that the expenditure of the tax revenue is 
performed on a pro-poor people basis, which does not make the expenditure side neutral. 
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This three-income group model can experiment in solving the model with the 
existence of LLZ more meaningfully in the sense that LLZ in some suburban rings is 
promulgated by preference of the higher income group that may have a greater political 
power. The extended model is also solved under the condition of endogenous CBD and 
urban boundaries and equal tax revenue setting.  
 
 103
 
 
 
Table 28. The benchmark SAM with three income groups (per year) 
Markets H(r) (Housing) 
NH 
(Non-
Housing) 
U1(r) 
(Utility) U2(r) U3 
WL1(r) 
(Labor 
supply) 
WL2(r) WL3(r) HOUS1(r) HOUS2(r) HOUS3(r) 
PH(r) 
(Housing 
price) 
56,232   -28,116 -18,744 -9,372             
PN 
(Price of 
non-
housing) 
  96,639 -48,320 -32,213 -16107              
PU1(r) 
(Utility 
price) 
    105,393           109,593     
PU2(r)       70,262           -70,262   
PU3(r)         35,131           -35,131 
PL(r) 
(Residential 
land price) 
-11,301               5,651 3,767 1,884 
PLN 
(Non-
residential 
land price) 
  -5,820             2,910 1,940 970 
PK 
(Capital 
price) 
-34,452 -23,274             28,863 19,242 9,621 
W1S 
(Wage for 
labor) 
  -30,441       30,441           
W1 
(Wage for 
leisure) 
    -28,958     -43,039.5     71,997      
W2S  -20,294         20,294         
W2       -19,305     -28,693     47,998   
W3S   -10,147           10,147        
W3         -9,653     -14,347     23999 
TAX(r) -10,479 -6,663             8,571 5,714 2,857 
Tracos(r) 
(Commuting 
cost) 
          12,599 8,399 4,200 -12,599 -8,399 -4,200 
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The Result 
Table 29 shows the newly constructed benchmark result for the three-income 
group model. As in the benchmark for the basic model, the 5th ring represents the land 
rent and housing service price from the primary benchmark data in Chapter 3, and the 
rings nearer the CBD show the higher land rents and housing service prices. The 
population is denser in the rings nearer the CBD compared to the other rings. In addition, 
the rich (the high income group) live in suburbs (6th to10th rings); the poor (the low 
income group) live in rings near the CBD (1st and 2nd rings), and the middle live between 
them (3rd to 5th rings). Regardless of the reasons, what the benchmark result suggests 
regarding the pattern of residence by income is broadly consistent with the fact that the 
poor live in the central cities while the rich live in suburbs, even though there is also 
some suburban poverty.77 Table 30 to Table 32 belong to the group of results with the 
absence of LLZ for the pure LVT reform, while Table 33 to Table 35 belong to the group 
of results with the presence of LLZ. With the sense that the hidden purpose of LLZ is to 
exclude lower income people, it is assumed that the government imposes a binding LLZ 
on the 2nd, 3rd and 6th rings - the rings having two of the three income groups mixed - 
while the others are the rings having the income groups segregated.78 For the benchmark 
result (Table 29), the middle and the poor in the 2nd ring are mixed, and the rich and the 
middle in the 6th ring are mixed.  
                                                 
77 Refer to Glaeser, Edward L., Matthew E. Kahn, and Jordan Rappaport. " Why Do the Poor Live in 
Cities?" Harvard University, 2000, Working Paper. 
 
78 In the benchmark result, the 3rd ring was not the area where the poor and the middle live together. But in 
the first counterfactual case, the 3rd ring became the area where the poor and the middle live together 
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The general finding for each tax reform policy is that as the tax on land rent 
under the revenue preserving condition increases, the level of each price decreases,79 the 
densities of housing capital (K to L ratio) and population become higher, the CBD and 
urban area contract, and the lower income households enjoy the larger benefit. The 
details and reasons for the finding are provided as follows. First compare Table 29 (the 
benchmark) with Table 30 (the first counterfactual case). Recall that the benchmark is the 
case with the tax rate of 22.9 % on both land and capital, while the first counterfactual 
case is the case with the tax on land rent only. Switching from the benchmark (capital 
property tax) to the first counterfactual case (tax on land rent only) depresses, for the 1st 
ring, the land rent exclusive of the tax and housing service price from $10,001 and 
$17,766 in Table 29 to $4,537 and $16,414 in Table 30 respectively. The same pattern 
holds for the other rings as well. The wage rates also decrease from $16.50 (Table 29) to 
$14.04 (Table 30) for the rich; from $11.00 (Table 29) to $10.14 (Table 30) for the 
middle; and from $5.50 (Table 29) to $5.27 (Table 30) for the poor. The decrease of land 
rent and wage rate is partly due to the elimination of ‘inflation effect’80 of removing the 
tax on capital (22.9%). The land tax itself also has the effect of decreasing land rent (and 
other prices) by making landowners bear the tax burden. Consistently, the price of the 
non-housing good due to the tax reform also decreases from $100 (Table 29) to $88.42 
(Table 30). 
Further look at the change of wage rates relative to capital cost for each income 
group. This analysis partly shows the incidence of the LVT reform. Regarding the more 
                                                 
79 However, the price level relative to capital cost increases, as the discussion is followed. 
 
80 In Chapter 4, I mentioned that since the rental price of capital is fixed as numeraire, the tax on it 
increases the user cost of it by the tax amount, raising all other price levels.  
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comprehensive incidence analysis among the three income groups, it is discussed in 
Chapter 6 (Welfare analyses). Assuming that the rental price of capital is $1, the user cost 
of capital before the tax reform is $1.229 and that after the tax reform is $1. Then the 
wage rate relative to capital cost for the rich increased by 4.5% (from $16.50 ÷ 1.229 = 
$13.43 in Table 29 to $14.04 ÷ 1 = $14.04 in Table 30); that for the middle increased by 
13.3% (from $11.00 ÷ 1.229 = $8.95 in Table 29 to $10.14 ÷ 1 = $10.14 in Table 30); 
and that for the poor increased by 17.8% (from $5.50 ÷ 1.229 = $4.475 in Table 29 to 
$5.27 ÷ 1 = $5.27 in Table 30). The efficiency effect, due to the switching from the 
capital property tax to the LVT, dominated, the demand for each labor as a result 
increased, and finally the wage rates relative to capital cost of each income group 
increased. In addition and notably, the LVT reform increased the wage rate relative to 
capital cost for the lower income laborer. Although the urban land area is endogenously 
determined, the required tax on land to meet the required tax revenue makes the 
landowners bear almost all of tax burden, also eliminating the excess burden of the tax on 
capital.  
Now examine the per capita income relative to capital cost by each income group. 
In the benchmark (Table 29), per capita incomes for each income group are $93,524.71 
for the rich, $50,685.18 for the middle, and $23,175.93 for the poor. Assuming that the 
rental price of capital is $1, the per capita incomes relative to capital cost for each income 
group in Table 29 are $93,524.71 ÷ 1.229 = $76,098.22 for the rich, $50,685.18 ÷ 1.229 
= $41,240.99 for the middle, and $23,175.93 ÷ 1.229 = $18,857.55 for the poor. On the 
other hand, after the tax reform, the per capita incomes relative to capital cost in Table 30 
are $82,578.20  ÷ 1=  $82,578.20 for the rich, $47,097.29  ÷ 1 = $47,097.29 for the 
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middle, and $22,071.56  ÷ 1 = $$22,071.56 for the poor, respectively. Who gained 
most because of the tax reform is determined by dividing each income relative to capital 
cost after the tax reform by that before the tax reform: $88,578.20 ÷ $76,098.22 = 1.09 
for the rich, $47,097.29  ÷ $41,240.99 = 1.14 for the middle, and $22,071.56  ÷ 
$18,857.55 = 1.17 for the poor, respectively. Again the LVT reform favored the poor and 
the middle more than did the rich.  
The LVT reform contracted the area of CBD and the radius of urban area from 
327.69 square miles and 30.95 miles in Table 29 to 250.08 square miles and 25.00 miles 
in Table 30 respectively. On the other hand, the distribution percent of households in the 
rings near the CBD goes down after the tax reform, it is because the contraction of the 
CBD and urban area reduces the residential area for each ring (due to the decrease of ring 
width) and makes the households in some rings near the CBD spread over the more 
rings.81 Consistent with this contraction of the CBD and urban area, the LVT reform 
contributed to the denser housing structures (or higher K (Capital) to L (Land) ratio) and 
the denser population for all income groups. In addition, the LVT reform allowed all 
income groups to be relocated to the more central rings. Particularly, some low-income 
households lived in the 3rd ring before the tax reform, but they moved to the 1st and 2nd 
rings after the tax reform. The land tax reduced land rents, made the edge land near the 
                                                 
81 Note that the poor did not live in the ring 3 before the LVT reform (Table 30), but live after the reform 
(Table 31). 
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urban boundary shift to agricultural uses, reduced the price of housing service 
accordingly,82 and provided an incentive to move to the rings closer to the CBD.  
Consider the effects of the graded property taxes in which the tax on capital 
increases by 11% points in Table 31 and 20% points in Table 32 under the equal tax 
revenue setting, while the required tax rates on land rent to meet the required tax revenue 
are 94% and 35% respectively. The land rent of the 1st ring increased from $4,537.29 
(Table 30) to $6,876.84 for the 11% tax on capital (Table 31) and $9,213.94 for the 20% 
tax on capital (Table 32). The same pattern holds true for the other rings as well. The 
increase of the tax on capital depresses land rents for some rings near the CBD,83 but the 
simultaneous decrease of the tax on land to meet the equal tax revenue ended up with 
increasing the land rents for all the rings. Because the land is a production factor for 
housing (and non-housing good), the increase of the land rent means an increase of 
production cost, which is the cause for the increased housing service price. For the 1st 
ring, the price of housing service increases from $16,414.89 (Table 30) to $16,762.72 
(Table 31) for the 11% tax on capital and $17,498.52 (Table 32) for the 20% tax on 
capital. The same pattern holds true for the other rings as well. The price of the non-
housing good also increases with the same reason. 
As the tax on capital increases under the equal tax revenue condition, the area of 
CBD and the radius of urban area expand from 250.08 square miles and 25.0 miles 
                                                 
82 Since housing capital density (K to L ratio) is denser in the rings nearer the CBD, the tax reform to 
eliminate the tax on capital reduces the prices of housing service in the rings nearer the CBD more than in 
other rings. 
 
83 Any distortionary tax can depress an economy. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Brueckner (2003) finds that 
the imposition of property tax may reduce land rents on some locations near the CBD but increase land 
rents on the other locations. Also mentioned in Chapter 4 that Brueckner noted that the simple statement 
about why this result is not available.  
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(Table 30) to 298.72 square miles and 28.47 miles (Table 31) for the 11% tax on 
capital, and to 322.07 square miles and 30.44 miles (Table 32) for the 20% tax on capital 
in respectively. This is because the increased land rents outbid the extant land rents near 
the CBD and urban boundaries. Consistent with this result, the population and housing 
capital have become sparser than before, as can be seen from the tables.  
Regarding the change of wage rate, we can further explain with the following 
effects: (in) efficiency effect, replacement effect, inflation effect, and income effect. The 
inefficiency effect suggests that as the tax on capital increases, the production cost 
increases, the production as a result decreases, the demand for factors decreases, and 
finally the wage rate also decreases accordingly. The replacement effect suggests that as 
the tax on capital increases, the user cost of capital relative to other costs increases, firms 
try to replace capital with labor (and land), and the wage rate increases accordingly. The 
inflation effect suggests that as the tax on capital increases, the user cost of capital 
increases by the size of tax rate since the rental price of capital is a numeraire and fixed, 
and the other prices in the economy are adjusted upwardly. In this economy, the nominal 
wage rates increased, due to the inflation effect and replacement effect, from $14.04 for 
the rich, $10.14 for the middle, and $5.27 for the poor in Table 30 to $15.05 for the rich, 
$10.51 for the middle, and $5.37 for the poor in Table 31, and $14.98 for the rich, $10.54 
for the middle, and $5.42 for the poor in Table 32. However, due to the inefficiency 
effect from the tax on capital, the wage rates relative to capital cost decreased from 
$14.04 ÷ 1 = $14.04 for the rich, $10.14 ÷ 1 = $10.14 for the middle and $5.27 ÷ 1 = 
$5.27 for the poor in Table 30 to $15.05 ÷ 1.1 = $13.68 for the rich, $10.51 ÷ 1.11  = 
$9.47 for the middle, and $5.37 ÷ 1.11  = $4.84 for the poor in Table 31, and $14.98 ÷ 1.2  
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= $12.48 for the rich, $10.54 ÷ 1.2  = $8.78 for the middle, and $5.42 ÷ 1.2  =  $4.52 
for the poor in Table 32. The incomes of each household also changed due to the change 
of the wage rates and land rents, but this positive income effect was not great enough to 
fully offset the other effects.  
Regarding the per capita income relative to capital cost for each income group, as 
the tax on capital increases, the income relative to capital cost for the rich decreases by 
5.5% from $82,578.20 ÷ 1 =  $82,578.20 (Table 30) to $86,600.20 ÷ 1.11 = $78.018.20 
(Table 31) for the 11% tax on capital, and decreases by 12.07% to $91,687.00 ÷ 1.2 = 
$76,405.83 (Table 32) for the 20% tax on capital; the income relative to capital cost for 
the middle decreases by 7.4% from $47,097.29 ÷ 1 = $47,097.29 to $48,408.63 ÷ 1.11 = 
$43,611.38  for the 11% tax on capital, and decreased by 4.3% to $50,078.18 ÷ 1.2 = 
$41,731.82 for the 20% tax on capital; and the income relative to capital cost for the poor 
decreases by 8.23% from $22,071.56 ÷ 1 = $22,071.56 to $22,483.82 ÷ 1.11 = 
$20,255.69 for the 11% tax on capital, and decreases by 5.4% to $22,994.12 ÷ 1.2 = 
$19,161.77 for the 20% tax on capital. Hence, we conclude that the increase of the tax on 
capital under the equal tax revenue condition hurts the poor and the middle more than 
does the rich. In other words, the decrease of the tax on capital favors the poor and the 
middle more than does the rich. 
The existence of the LLZ does not change the qualitative effects of the LVT and 
graded property tax. However, the imposition of the LLZ produces some special results. 
Tables 34 to 36 are the results with the LLZ on 2nd, 3rd and 6th rings for the same tax 
polices. Regarding the change of income due to the imposition of the LLZ, per capita 
income for the rich increases by 3.59% from $82,578.20 in Table 30 (no LLZ) to 
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$85,544.11 in Table 33 (LLZ); per capita income for the middle increases by 2.03% 
from $47,097.29 in Table 30 to $48,057.59 in Table 33; and per capita income for the 
poor increases by 2.63% from $22,071.56 in Table 30 to $22,651,45 in Table 33. Thus, 
the imposition of the LLZ increases the income of each household and favors the rich 
more than does the middle and the poor. 
Due to the imposition of the LLZ, the land rents of the 1st and 3rd rings increase 
from $4,537.29 and $3,686.55 in Table 31 to $6,715.49 and $5,121.57 in Table 34, 
respectively. The emigrants from the rings with the LLZ make the rings without the LLZ 
have more population and push up the land rents for the residential rings, which outbids 
the extant CBD and agricultural land rents. Here, the 1st ring is one of the rings without 
the LLZ, and the 3rd ring is one of the rings with the LLZ. The same pattern holds true for 
the other rings and tax policies as well. Remember that there is one type of housing 
market in the economy and the land rent of the rings with the LLZ also increases due to 
the LLZ. Even though the LLZ excludes some people from the rings with the LLZ, the 
increased per capita demand for land due to the LLZ and the increase in income are 
directly related to the higher land rents than before. 
Due to the increase of land rent in all locations, the residential area expands 
toward into both the CBD and agricultural area. For example, when the revenue 
preserving LVT is imposed, the area of the CBD decreases from 250.08 square miles 
(Table 30) to 247.18 square miles (Table 33), but the radius of urban area increases from 
25 miles (Table 30) to 28.60 miles (Table 33). The same pattern holds true for the other 
tax policies as well.  
The wage rates for each income group increase from $14.04 (Table 30) to $14.98 
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(Table 33) for the rich, from $10.14 (Table 30) to $10.54 (Table 33) for the middle, 
and from $5.27 (Table 30) to $5.42 (Table 33) for the poor. The increased land rent due 
to the LLZ makes firms replace some land with labor, which increases wage rates. The 
same holds true for the other tax policies as well.  
The rich live in the suburbs; the poor live in the areas near the CBD; and the 
middle live in-between. This means that the income elasticity of housing consumption (or 
land consumption) is greater than the income elasticity of commuting costs. Although a 
binding LLZ is, according to the preference of the higher income group, imposed on 2nd, 
3rd, and 6th rings where multiple income groups are mixed, the middle in the 3rd ring 
moved to the farther suburban rings after the imposition of the LLZ, instead of excluding 
the poor in the 3rd ring. This result implies that in the long-term, the imposition of LLZ 
would change an original situation comprised of some variables such as income of 
household, and the households would behave differently from the expectation with a 
myopic eye that the income of household would be constant.  
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Table 29. Benchmark of three-income group model with ‘tax on land  = 22.9%, tax 
on capital = 22.9%  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of 
urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual 
tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average 
non-housing 
goods 
production to 
satisfy the 
demand per 
capita 
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($)
Wage 
rate 1 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 2 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 3 
($/hour)
Value of total 
domestic 
consumption 
net of leisure 
(export value) 
(million $)  
Total income: 
group1 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 2 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 3(average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
35,268.52 27,188.91 23,835.82 14,465.94 
327.69 30.95 5,486.43 371.19 100.00 16.50 11.00 5.50 
(14,938.49) (93,524.71) (50,685.18) (23,175.93) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land  
Housing 
service prices 
per unit, per 
year 
Dist. of 
Household 
1(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
2(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
3(%) 
Population 
density per 
acre 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
1 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
2 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
3 
1 10,001.12 17,766.08 0.00 0.00 52.09 3.22 0.00 0.00 59.97 
2 8,526.98 17,123.93 0.00 2.99 47.91 2.78 0.00 17.87 53.63 
3 7,192.20 16,481.78 0.00 31.40 0.00 1.19 0.00 15.86 0.00 
4 6,008.98 15,853.01 0.00 30.88 0.00 1.07 0.00 13.99 0.00 
5 4,970.00 15,251.00 0.00 29.94 0.00 0.95 0.00 12.24 0.00 
6 4,060.59 14,662.36 20.40 4.79 0.00 0.51 10.63 10.63 0.00 
7 3,229.40 14,046.97 22.88 0.00 0.00 0.39 9.06 0.00 0.00 
8 2,522.89 13,444.96 21.02 0.00 0.00 0.33 7.62 0.00 0.00 
9 1,931.28 12,869.70 18.96 0.00 0.00 0.28 6.32 0.00 0.00 
10 1,442.35 12,307.82 16.75 0.00 0.00 0.24 5.15 0.00 0.00 
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Table 30. Results of three-income group model with ‘tax on land  = 266%, tax on 
capital = 0%’ under the equal tax revenue  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of 
urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual 
tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average 
non-housing 
goods 
production to 
satisfy the 
demand per 
capita 
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($)
Wage 
rate 1 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 2 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 3 
($/hour)
Value of total 
domestic 
consumption 
net of leisure 
(export value) 
(million $)  
Total income: 
group1 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 2 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 3(average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
32,322.23 24,006.61 22,148.54 13,776.61 
250.08 25.00 5,486.53 371.72 88.42 14.04 10.14 5.27 
(14,104.45) (82,578.20) (47,097.29) (22,071.56) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land  
Housing 
service prices 
per unit, per 
year 
Dist. of 
Household 
1(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
2(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
3(%) 
Population 
density per 
acre 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
1 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
2 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
3 
1 4,537.29 16,414.89 0.00 0.00 42.43 4.01 0.00 0.00 85.49 
2 4,097.26 15,986.79 0.00 0.00 44.05 3.79 0.00 0.00 79.61 
3 3,686.55 15,558.70 0.00 19.36 13.53 2.21 0.00 24.63 73.92 
4 3,295.41 15,130.60 0.00 28.05 0.00 1.54 0.00 22.76 0.00 
5 2,931.15 14,702.50 0.00 28.25 0.00 1.44 0.00 20.98 0.00 
6 2,598.68 14,287.78 3.52 24.34 0.00 1.26 19.29 19.28 0.00 
7 2,263.76 13,846.30 25.18 0.00 0.00 0.69 17.51 0.00 0.00 
8 1,963.06 13,404.83 24.59 0.00 0.00 0.64 15.84 0.00 0.00 
9 1,689.26 12,976.73 23.82 0.00 0.00 0.58 14.26 0.00 0.00 
10 1,442.35 12,562.01 22.90 0.00 0.00 0.53 12.77 0.00 0.00 
 115
 
 
 
Table 31. Results of three-income group model with ‘tax on land  = 94%, tax on 
capital = 11%’ under the equal tax revenue  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of 
urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual 
tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average 
non-housing 
goods 
production to 
satisfy the 
demand per 
capita 
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($)
Wage 
rate 1 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 2 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 3 
($/hour)
Value of total 
domestic 
consumption 
net of leisure 
(export value) 
(million $)  
Total income: 
group1 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 2 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 3(average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
33,347.31 25,175.86 22,765.23 14,033.93 
298.72 28.47 5,486.43 369.70 93.24 15.05 10.51 5.37 
(14,328.47) (86,600.20) (48,408.63) (22,483.82) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land  
Housing 
service prices 
per unit, per 
year 
Dist. of 
Household 
1(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
2(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
3(%) 
Population 
density per 
acre 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
1 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
2 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
3 
1 6,876.84 16,762.72 0.00 0.00 47.17 3.44 0.00 0.00 68.07 
2 6,018.76 16,227.60 0.00 0.00 48.39 3.18 0.00 0.00 62.03 
3 5,236.47 15,705.85 0.00 26.88 4.44 1.48 0.00 18.74 56.28 
4 4,512.85 15,184.11 0.00 29.51 0.00 1.22 0.00 16.89 0.00 
5 3,862.57 14,675.74 0.00 29.11 0.00 1.12 0.00 15.14 0.00 
6 3,278.29 14,167.38 12.31 14.50 0.00 0.79 13.51 13.51 0.00 
7 2,720.91 13,645.63 24.07 0.00 0.00 0.50 11.85 0.00 0.00 
8 2,231.98 13,137.26 22.76 0.00 0.00 0.44 10.32 0.00 0.00 
9 1,809.05 12,628.90 21.26 0.00 0.00 0.39 8.90 0.00 0.00 
10 1,442.35 12,147.29 19.59 0.00 0.00 0.34 7.60 0.00 0.00 
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Table 32. Results of three-income group model with ‘tax on land  = 35%, tax on 
capital = 20%’ under the equal tax revenue  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of 
urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual 
tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average 
non-housing 
goods 
production to 
satisfy the 
demand per 
capita 
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($)
Wage 
rate 1 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 2 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 3 
($/hour)
Value of total 
domestic 
consumption 
net of leisure 
(export value) 
(million $)  
Total income: 
group1 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 2 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 3(average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
34,728.14 26,654.66 23,549.90 14,352.45 
322.07 30.44 5,486.50 370.72 98.19 16.12 10.87 5.46 
(14,771.70) (91,687.00) (50,077.18) (22,994.12) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land  
Housing 
service prices 
per unit, per 
year 
Dist. of 
Household 
1(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
2(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
3(%) 
Population 
density per 
acre 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
1 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
2 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
3 
1 9,213.94 17,498.52 0.00 0.00 50.96 3.25 0.00 0.00 61.45 
2 7,901.15 16,869.75 0.00 1.71 49.04 2.88 0.00 18.39 55.18 
3 6,703.27 16,254.36 0.00 30.98 0.00 1.21 0.00 16.39 0.00 
4 5,639.84 15,665.72 0.00 30.57 0.00 1.10 0.00 14.52 0.00 
5 4,698.64 15,077.09 0.00 29.75 0.00 0.98 0.00 12.78 0.00 
6 3,872.35 14,501.83 18.62 7.00 0.00 0.57 11.16 11.16 0.00 
7 3,107.17 13,913.19 23.16 0.00 0.00 0.41 9.57 0.00 0.00 
8 2,454.44 13,337.94 21.41 0.00 0.00 0.35 8.11 0.00 0.00 
9 1,901.95 12,776.06 19.46 0.00 0.00 0.30 6.79 0.00 0.00 
10 1,442.35 12,227.56 17.36 0.00 0.00 0.26 5.59 0.00 0.00 
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Table 33. Results of three-income group model with ‘tax on land  = 159%, tax on 
capital = 0%’ under the equal tax revenue and LLZ on 2nd, 3rd, and 6th rings.  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of 
urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual 
tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average 
non-housing 
goods 
production to 
satisfy the 
demand per 
capita 
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($)
Wage 
rate 1 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 2 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 3 
($/hour)
Value of total 
domestic 
consumption 
net of leisure 
(export value) 
(million $)  
Total income: 
group1 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 2 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 3(average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
30,932.82 24,868.84 22,600.14 14,138.57 
247.18 28.60 5,486.43 385.88 92.28 14.98 10.54 5.42 
(16,213.05) (85,544.11) (48,057.59) (22,651.45) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land  
Housing 
service prices 
per unit, per 
year 
Dist. of 
Household 
1(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
2(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
3(%) 
Population 
density per 
acre 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
1 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
2 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
3 
1 6,715.49 16,628.94 0.00 0.00 56.26 4.10 0.00 0.00 88.45 
2 5,881.86 16,053.68 0.00 0.00 15.88 1.03 0.00 0.00 21.75 
3 5,121.57 15,491.81 0.00 0.00 17.68 1.03 0.00 0.00 21.36 
4 4,432.17 14,956.68 0.00 31.04 10.17 1.77 0.00 22.03 66.13 
5 3,794.12 14,408.18 0.00 37.15 0.00 1.35 0.00 19.76 0.00 
6 3,222.07 13,873.06 0.00 12.61 0.00 0.42 0.00 6.07 0.00 
7 2,713.58 13,351.31 14.68 19.20 0.00 0.88 15.63 15.62 0.00 
8 2,227.09 12,802.81 30.31 0.00 0.00 0.54 13.61 0.00 0.00 
9 1,806.61 12,267.69 28.53 0.00 0.00 0.48 11.75 0.00 0.00 
10 1,442.35 11,745.95 26.49 0.00 0.00 0.07 10.04 0.00 0.00 
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Table 34. Results of three-income group model with ‘tax on land  = 62%, tax on 
capital = 11%’ under the equal tax revenue and LLZ on 2nd, 3rd, and 6th rings.  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of 
urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual 
tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average 
non-housing 
goods 
production to 
satisfy the 
demand per 
capita 
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($)
Wage 
rate 1 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 2 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 3 
($/hour)
Value of total 
domestic 
consumption 
net of leisure 
(export value) 
(million $)  
Total income: 
group1 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 2 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 3(average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
32,819.35 26,716.05 23,590.56 14,578.29 
273.62 31.17 5,486.43 385.79 98.67 16.36 11.00 5.56 
(16,620.84) (91,898.18) (50,163.64) (23,355.94) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land  
Housing 
service prices 
per unit, per 
year 
Dist. of 
Household 
1(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
2(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
3(%) 
Population 
density per 
acre 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
1 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
2 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
3 
1 9,768.87 17,525.27 0.00 0.00 61.53 3.80 0.00 0.00 76.91 
2 8,336.30 16,829.61 0.00 0.00 18.87 1.03 0.00 0.00 20.36 
3 7,055.30 16,160.71 0.00 2.00 19.60 1.03 0.00 14.77 19.94 
4 5,898.97 15,505.18 0.00 38.60 0.00 1.28 0.00 18.00 0.00 
5 4,881.99 14,863.04 0.00 37.86 0.00 1.14 0.00 15.77 0.00 
6 3,992.13 14,234.27 0.00 15.22 0.00 0.42 0.00 5.70 0.00 
7 3,219.62 13,618.88 24.52 6.32 0.00 0.55 11.78 11.78 0.00 
8 2,518.00 12,990.11 27.76 0.00 0.00 0.41 9.92 0.00 0.00 
9 1,928.84 12,388.09 25.24 0.00 0.00 0.35 8.23 0.00 0.00 
10 1,442.35 11,786.08 22.48 0.00 0.00 0.05 6.72 0.00 0.00 
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Table 35. Results of three-income group model with ‘tax on land  = 24%, tax on 
capital = 20%’ under the equal tax revenue and LLZ on 2nd, 3rd, and 6th rings.  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of 
urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual 
tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average 
non-housing 
goods 
production to 
satisfy the 
demand per 
capita 
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($)
Wage 
rate 1 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 2 
($/hour)
Wage 
rate 3 
($/hour)
Value of total 
domestic 
consumption 
net of leisure 
(export value) 
(million $)  
Total income: 
group1 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 2 (average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
Total income: 
group 3(average 
income per 
household), 
million $ ($) net 
of transport cost 
34,778.80 28,462.47 24,504.02 14,938.02 
289.18 32.40 5,486.46 386.09 104.22 17.56 11.40 5.65 
(16,917.60) (97,905.52) (52,106.05) (23,932.26) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land  
Housing 
service prices 
per unit, per 
year 
Dist. of 
Household 
1(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
2(%) 
Dist. of 
Household 
3(%) 
Population 
density per 
acre 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
1 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
2 
K/L ratio 
for 
Household 
3 
1 12,284.43 18,408.22 0.00 0.00 64.10 3.67 0.00 0.00 71.04 
2 10,333.59 17,632.30 0.00 0.00 20.38 1.03 0.00 0.00 19.43 
3 8,607.66 16,896.50 0.00 9.72 15.52 1.03 0.00 14.24 19.01 
4 7,074.85 16,160.71 0.00 38.79 0.00 1.18 0.00 16.08 0.00 
5 5,744.96 15,451.67 0.00 37.63 0.00 1.05 0.00 13.90 0.00 
6 4,595.97 14,769.39 4.30 13.86 0.00 0.42 10.55 5.48 0.00 
7 3,571.65 14,060.35 27.98 0.00 0.00 0.41 9.97 0.00 0.00 
8 2,713.58 13,378.07 25.46 0.00 0.00 0.35 8.22 0.00 0.00 
9 2,009.51 12,722.54 22.64 0.00 0.00 0.29 6.67 0.00 0.00 
10 1,442.35 12,080.40 19.62 0.00 0.00 0.23 5.28 0.00 0.00 
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Immobile Housing Capital and Partially Mobile Housing Capital Adjustment  
This section considers the model with immobile housing capital and only partially 
mobile housing capital. This extension assumes that in the short-term, the amount of 
housing capital, the boundary of CBD, and the boundary of urban area do not change. To 
reflect the features and get the results for the model with the features, the following 
procedure is followed. Note that the non-housing good capital is still perfectly elastically 
supplied to the economy. 
1. Solve the basic model with the fixed boundaries of CBD and urban area for the 
benchmark property tax (22.9 % on both land rent and the rental price of capital). 
2.  Find the quantity of the housing capital for each ring, referring to it as K1(r).   
3.  Revise the model to fix the housing capital stock available in each ring at 
K1(r) and allow the rental price of housing capital in each ring to vary until the demand 
for the housing capital is equal to K1(r) in each ring.  This version considers and assumes 
no adjustment and no mobility for housing capital.   
4. Solve the revised model for 0% tax on capital under the equal tax revenue.   
5. Solve again the original model for 0% tax on capital under the equal tax 
revenue, and find the quantities for the housing capital in each ring, referring to it as 
K2(r).   
6.  Redo the steps 3 and 4, but set K(r) = K1(r) + 0.5 × (K2(r) - K1(r)) for each 
ring.  This is the case with partially mobile housing capital. 
7. Repeat the step 4 through step 6 but with LLZ, and compare results. 
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In this version, the housing capital is immobile or only partially mobile, and 
so the rental price of housing capital is not fixed and not the same across all the rings, but 
varies with the distance from CBD.  
See Tables 36 to 39 that include the results for the model with immobile and only 
partially mobile housing capital under the fixed CBD and urban boundaries, and then 
compare them with Tables 16 to 18 that include the benchmark and the results for the 
basic model having perfectly mobile housing capital under the fixed CBD and urban 
boundaries. In the LVT reform, in which the land is more heavily taxed than before and 
the tax on capital is eliminated under the equal tax revenue setting, the land rent of the 1st 
ring decreases from $8,807.75 for the benchmark (Table 15) to $2,226.96 for the model 
with immobile housing capital (Table 36) to $2,020.53 for the model with partially 
mobile housing capital (Table 37) to $1,835.99 for the model with perfectly mobile 
housing capital (Table 16). Thus, the more mobile the housing capital is, the lower the 
land rent is. The same pattern holds true for the other rings as well. It is because the more 
mobile housing capital allows firms to use more capital when the rental price of capital 
decreases due to the tax reform. It has already been established that the decrease of land 
rent decreases the price of housing service.  
Consistent with the result, the housing capital density becomes lower, as the 
housing capital becomes less mobile. For example, the housing capital density of the 1st 
ring for the model with perfectly mobile housing capital is 20.52 (Table 16); that for the 
model with partially mobile housing capital is 20.08 (Table 37); and that for the model 
with immobile housing capital is 19.64 (Table 36). The same pattern holds true for the 
other rings as well. Since the land area for each ring is fixed, the sparser housing capital 
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means the less housing service. We conclude that the longer time span (the more 
mobile housing capital) allows households to enjoy more housing services at a lower 
housing service price.  
The wage rate increases from $9.72 for the model with perfectly mobile housing 
capital (Table 16) to $9.74 for the model with partially mobile housing capital (Table 37) 
and to $9.78 for the model with immobile housing capital (Table 36). This result holds 
because the relatively higher land rent makes firms to replace some land with labor, 
which makes the wage rate higher. Consistent with the higher land rent and wage rate for 
the model with the less mobile housing capital, total income of household increases from 
$56,416.68 million for the model with perfectly mobile housing capital (Table 16) to 
$57,142.41 million for the model with partially mobile housing capital (Table 37) and to 
$57,959.53 million for the model with immobile housing capital (Table 36).  
Note that the higher income in the model with the less mobile housing capital 
does not imply the higher production (or higher efficiency) in the model. Instead, the per 
capita production for the non-housing good is 201.98 for the model with perfectly mobile 
housing capital, 200.92 for the model with partially mobile housing capital, and 199.84 
for the model with immobile housing capital. Thus, the production decreases as the 
housing capital becomes less mobile. The reason is that the higher user cost of factors for 
the model with the less mobile housing capital causes production to shrink, which is great 
enough to offset the positive effect of the increased income. 
The same model was solved for the presence of LLZ as well, but could not find a 
qualitatively different result (Compare Table 17, Table 38 and Table 49). 
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Table 36. Results of immobile housing capital model with ‘tax on land  = 343%, tax 
on capital = 0%’  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income 
(average income per 
household), million $ 
($) net of transport 
cost 
57,959.53 321.31 30.57 4,510.75 194.82 87.03 9.78 42,867.46 970.73 
(41,843.05) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, per 
year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population 
density per acre 
of land 
1 2,226.96 15,644.21 19.64 1.42 
2 1,948.59 15,208.87 17.88 1.31 
3 1,698.37 14,787.57 16.23 1.20 
4 1,470.04 14,366.27 14.68 1.10 
5 1,263.61 13,973.06 13.19 1.01 
6 1,079.07 13,565.81 11.80 0.92 
7 913.30 13,172.59 10.50 0.83 
8 766.30 12,793.43 9.28 0.74 
9 638.06 12,414.26 8.17 0.66 
10 522.33 12,049.13 7.08 0.59 
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Table 37. Results of partially mobile housing capital model with ‘tax on land  = 
375%, tax on capital = 0%’  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income 
(average income per 
household), million $ 
($) net of transport 
cost 
57,142.41 323.31 30.57 4,510.75 195.82 86.75 9.74 43,163.36 984.79 
(41,253.14) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, per 
year 
K/L ratio capital 
amount per acre 
of land 
Population 
density per acre 
of land 
1 2,020.53 14,843.74 20.08 1.42 
2 1,767.18 14,436.49 18.27 1.31 
3 1,538.85 14,029.23 16.59 1.21 
4 1,329.30 13,621.98 14.97 1.11 
5 1,141.63 13,228.77 13.44 1.01 
6 972.73 12,835.56 12.02 0.92 
7 822.60 12,456.39 10.69 0.83 
8 688.11 12,091.26 9.42 0.74 
9 572.38 11,726.14 8.29 0.66 
10 469.16 11,375.06 7.22 0.58 
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Table 38. Results of immobile housing capital model with ‘tax on land  = 220%, tax 
on capital = 0%’ under the existence of LLZ on 6th and 7th rings 
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income 
(average income per 
household), million $ 
($) net of transport 
cost 
60,215.37 323.31 30.57 4,510.75 194.40 88.70 10.04 45,932.17 1,482.82 
(43,471.62) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, per 
year 
K/L ratio 
capital amount 
per acre of land 
Population 
density per acre 
of land 
1 3,562.51 16,880.02 20.89 1.51 
2 3,134.01 16,430.64 19.08 1.40 
3 2,739.91 15,981.25 17.34 1.29 
4 2,383.35 15,545.91 15.72 1.19 
5 2,061.19 15,110.57 14.20 1.09 
6 1,770.31 14,703.31 7.68 0.60 
7 1,510.70 14,282.01 7.57 0.60 
8 1,276.12 13,888.80 10.13 0.81 
9 1,069.69 13,481.55 8.94 0.73 
10 885.15 13,102.38 7.82 0.65 
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Table 39. Results of partially mobile housing capital model with ‘tax on land  = 
245%, tax on capital = 0%’ under the existence of LLZ on 6th and 7th rings 
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income 
(average income per 
household), million $ 
($) net of transport 
cost 
58,839.16 323.31 30.57 4,510.75 195.88 88.28 9.96 44,785.41 1,478.17 
(42,478.09) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land  
Housing service 
prices per unit, per 
year 
K/L ratio capital 
amount per acre 
of land 
Population 
density per acre 
of land 
1 3,162.16 15,602.08 21.53 1.51 
2 2,777.44 15,166.74 19.67 1.40 
3 2,427.14 14,745.44 17.88 1.29 
4 2,111.23 14,324.14 16.23 1.19 
5 1,820.35 13,916.89 14.61 1.09 
6 1,563.88 13,523.68 7.91 0.60 
7 1,329.30 13,130.47 7.79 0.60 
8 1,122.86 12,751.30 10.41 0.81 
9 938.33 12,372.13 9.17 0.72 
10 775.68 11,992.96 8.03 0.64 
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CHAPTER SIX 
WELFARE AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
This chapter includes the welfare results calculated in the form of a money-metric 
measure of utility for the various tax policies in the basic model and the two extensions, 
and includes the sensitivity analyses for examining the robustness for the results in the 
Chapter 4. 
Welfare Analyses 
Basic Methodology 
The arithmetic sum of each (identical) individual’s money-metric utility is used in 
calculating total welfare of the economy. The money-metric utility, ),;( mpqμ measures 
how much income the consumer would need at prices q to be as well off as he or she 
would be facing prices p and having income m.84 The utility measure is used to calculate 
either EV (Equivalent Variation) or CV (Compensation Variation) to see the change in 
welfare. The former (EV) is the change in expenditure for the household to reach from an 
old utility level to a new utility level (or welfare) at old prices, while the latter (CV) is the 
change in expenditure for the household to keep the old utility level at new prices. Since 
the benchmark result (and the benchmark price) can be compared to the results for 
                                                 
84 I followed the following textbook for the definitions of the money-metric utility function and EV in the 
equations (6.1) and (6.2). Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis. 3rd Ed.: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1993. 
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various policy options, it is more appropriate to calculate and use EV. Hence, EV is 
adopted for the current welfare analyses. 
The algebraic definition of EV is as follows. 
0''0000''0 ),;(),;(),;( mmppmppmppEV −=−= μμμ                     (6.1) 
where  
0p       Old prices  
'p  New prices 
0m        Old income 
'm        New income 
Then, the EV is expressed using the algebra in the current model. Taking 
orPU )(  as the benchmark utility price level and nrPU )(  as the current utility price 
level,  
oOon rPUrUrPUrUEV )()()()( ⋅−⋅=                                  (6.2) 
In Chapter 3, )()( rPUrU ⋅  is defined as )(rM (income) to achieve the utility 
( )(rU ) in ring r. Hence, on rPUrU )()( ⋅  is the expenditure necessary to achieve the new 
utility level at the benchmark price level, while oo rPUrU )()( ⋅ is the benchmark 
expenditure.85 
 
Welfare Analysis for the Basic Model 
This section discusses the welfare effects of LVT and graded property taxes. 
Table 40 is the money-metric welfare results for the basic model. In Table 40, when the 
                                                 
85 So, the numbers in the Tables 41 to 44 are generated, through the application of the definitions.  
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government switched from the capital property tax to the LVT, the money-metric welfare 
increased by 1.7% (from $64,753 million to $65,857 million) for the fixed boundary case, 
and increased by 2.14% (from $64,753 million to $66,139 million) for the endogenous 
boundary case. The increase in the money-metric welfare is expected, since switching 
from the avoidable tax base (capital) to the unavoidable or hard-to-avoid tax base (land) 
increases the efficiency of the economy. The increase in the money-metric welfare was 
larger for the case with the endogenous boundary than for the case with the fixed 
boundary. In understanding the result for the case with the endogenous boundary, there 
are two countervailing factors to be considered. Recall that for the case with the 
endogenous boundary, the land tax is not purely neutral. As a countervailing effect 
against the non-neutrality, the LVT contracts the urban size and allows households to 
save commuting costs due to the contraction. In this case, it turns out that the saved 
amount of commuting costs is greater than the burden of the tax. Hence, the endogenous 
boundary case generates a larger money-metric welfare improvement than the fixed 
boundary case did. The percents (1.7% and 2.14%) appear to be small. However, the 
monetary values of the changes for the money-metric welfare ($1,104 million and $1,386 
million) are not negligible but record 17.7% and 22.2% of the tax revenue respectively in 
the economy.  
As the tax on capital under the equal tax revenue setting increases, the welfare 
improvement from the benchmark weakens. When the tax on capital is 10% and the tax 
on land is 80%, the money-metric welfare is improved by 1.29% from the benchmark. 
When the tax on capital is 20% and the required tax on land is 32%, the money-metric 
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welfare improvement from the benchmark is as low as 0.3%. This indirectly reconfirms 
that the heavier tax on land entails the greater efficiency.  
The imposition of LLZ increases land rents and the income of household as a 
landowner, although the LLZ distorts the housing consumption of households. In the 
economy where the residents are landowners, there exist the two countervailing effects: 
the increase in income and the distortion in the choice of housing consumption. Table 41 
shows that the positive income effect of the LLZ is greater than the distortive effect of the 
LLZ, so that the existence of the LLZ makes the welfare of households (as a landowner) 
further improved than the absence of the LLZ does. From the Table 40, for example, the 
money-metric welfare is improved by 3.43% from the benchmark under the existence of 
the LLZ on 6th to 9th rings for the LVT reform. In this case, the money-metric welfare 
change ($66,974.73 - $64,753.32 = $2,221.4 million) is 35.6% of the tax revenue in the 
economy. The same tendency holds true for the other tax policies as well.  
Table 40. Welfare comparisons for the basic model  
Expenditure 
(evaluated at the 
benchmark price) Policy Options 
Land Tax 
Rate (%) 
Capital 
Tax Rate 
(%) 
 ($ million) 
EV 
($ million) 
% Change from 
Benchmark 
Benchmark 22.9 22.9 64,753.32 - - 
Fixed Bou. 409 0 65,856.93 1,103.61 1.7 
No LLZ 
Endo. Bound. 172 0 66,138.70 1,385.38 2.14 
Fixed Bou. 271 0 66,016.56 1,263.24 1.95 LLZ on 6th 
and 7th 
rings Endo. Bound. 140 0 66,518.60 1,765.28 2.73 
Fixed Bou. 201 0 66,267.54 1,514.22 2.34 
LVT 
LLZ on 6th, 
7th, 8th and 
9th rings Endo. Bound. 119 0 66,974.73 2,221.41 3.43 
80 10 65,587.10 833.78 1.29 
No LLZ 
32 20 64,945.12 191.80 0.3 
69 10 65,849.34 1,096.02 1.69 LLZ on 6th 
and 7th 
rings 62 20 65,142.19 388.87 0.6 
29 10 66,129.72 1,376.40 2.13 
Graded 
Property 
Tax 
LLZ on 6th, 
7th, 8th and 
9th rings 
Endogenous 
Boundaries 
27 20 65,294.51 541.19 0.84 
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Welfare Analysis for the Three-Income Group Model 
This section discusses the welfare in the model with three income groups (Table 
41). A notable result is that switching to the LVT and graded property taxes reduces the 
money-metric welfare of the rich, but improves those of the middle and the poor. This 
result suggests that although the LVT reform (or switching to graded property tax) can 
increase the money-metric welfare of landowners as well, the LVT reform may hurt the 
welfare of people with large-scale landholdings.  
Numerically, the money-metric welfare of the rich decreases by 2.79% from the 
benchmark for the pure LVT reform, decreases by 1.44% for the 10% tax on capital, and 
decreases by 0.35% for the 20% tax on capital. On the other hand, the money-metric 
welfare of the middle increases by 1.21% from the benchmark for the pure LVT reform, 
increases by 0.91% for the 10% tax on capital, and increases by 0.25% for the 20% tax on 
capital. Furthermore, the money-metric welfare of the poor increases by 3.80% from the 
benchmark for the pure LVT reform, increase by 2.35% for the 10% tax on capital, and 
increase by 0.56% for the 20% tax on capital. The tax reforms improved the money-
metric welfare of the poor most.  In the current model, a household from the rich owns 
the largest land area, a household from the poor owns the smallest land area, and a 
household from the middle owns the level between them. Thus, the result suggests that 
the LVT discourages the large landholding.   
However, the imposition of LLZ entails the reverse result pattern to what the LVT 
reform policy does. The LLZ makes the rich gain, but the middle and the poor lose for 
each tax policy. In other words, even under the existence of LLZ, switching to the LVT 
and graded property taxes increases the money-metric welfare of the economy, but the 
LLZ mitigates the decreasing tendency of the money-metric welfare of the rich and 
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weakens the increasing tendency of the money-metric welfares of the middle and the 
poor. Numerically, due to the existence of the LLZ, the money-metric welfare decrease of 
the rich for the pure LVT reform is mitigated by 1.48% points (-2.79 – (-1.31) = 1.48); 
the money-metric welfare increase of the middle for the pure LVT reform weakens by 
0.19% points (1.21-1.02 = 0.19); the money-metric welfare increase of the poor for the 
pure LVT reform weakens by 0.11% points (3.80-3.69 = 0.11). The same pattern holds 
true for the graded property taxes as well. The LLZ makes land rents increase by the 
migration effect, and the LLZ in itself favors the rich by excluding lower income groups. 
Hence, it is not surprising to get the result that the rich as a large-scale landowner get 
benefit from the LLZ, but the others lose. 
 
Table 41. Welfare analyses for the three-income group model  
  Benchmark (tl=ts=22.9%)
tl=266%, 
ts=0% 
tl=94%%, 
ts=11% 
tl=35%, 
ts=20% 
tl=159%,tl= 
0% with LLZ  
tl=62%,tl= 
11% with 
LLZ  
tl=24%,tl= 
20% with 
LLZ  
The Rich 27,188.91 26,430.87 26,796.07 27,093.68 26,832.34 27,223.96 27,528.56 
The Middle 23,835.82 24,124.71 24,052.43 23,895.35 24,078.58 23,912.14 23,737.74 
The Poor 
Expenditure 
(evaluated at the 
benchmark price) 
14,431.78 14,980.36 14,770.89 14,512.11 14,964.44 14,658.97 14,388.38 
The Rich - -758.04 365.20 297.61 -261.34 391.62 304.60 
The Middle - 288.89 -72.28 -157.08 183.23 -166.44 -174.40 
The Poor 
EV ($ million) 
- 548.58 -209.47 -258.78 452.33 -305.47 -270.59 
The Rich - -2.79 -1.44 -0.35 -1.31 0.13 1.25 
The Middle - 1.21 0.91 0.25 1.02 0.32 -0.41 
The Poor 
% Change from 
the Benchmark 
- 3.8 2.35 0.56 3.69 1.57 -0.3 
Total ($ million) 65,456.51 65,535.94 65,619.40 65,501.14 65,875.37 65,795.07 65,654.67 
% Change from the Benchmark - 0.12 0.25 0.07 0.64 0.52 0.3 
 
133  
 
 
 
Welfare Analysis for the Model with the Immobile and Partially Mobile Housing Capital 
This section discusses the welfare result (Table 42) in the model with immobile 
and only partially housing capital, and compares the results for each to the result in the 
model with the perfectly mobile housing capital. The benchmark welfare for the model 
here is also $64,753.32 million, which is the same as that in Table 42. The result of the 
model with perfectly mobile housing capital is from the Table 40.  
The LVT reform improves the money-metric welfare of households even when 
the housing capital is immobile and only partially immobile. The more mobile the 
housing capital is, the greater the welfare is: the money-metric welfare under the 
immobile housing capital version is $65,108.28 million; that under the only partially 
mobile housing capital version is $65,490.72 million; that under the perfectly mobile 
housing capital version is $65,856.93 million. In other words, in the absence of LLZ, the 
money-metric welfare for the immobile housing capital version increases by 0.55%, that 
for the partially mobile housing capital version increases by 1.14%, and that for the 
perfectly mobile housing capital version increases by 1.70%. The same pattern holds true 
in the presence of LLZ as well. Given that the land area for each ring is fixed as a short-
term feature, it turns out that the higher mobility of the housing capital provides the more 
flexibility to use the amount of capital in establishing housing services, which causes the 
increase of economic efficiency. In other words, when the housing capital as well is fixed 
due to the immobility, the immobility of housing capital works as a restriction, which 
causes inefficiency. 
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Table 42. Welfare analyses for the model with immobile and partially mobile housing                
capital  
Policy Options Land Tax Rate (%) 
Capital Tax 
Rate (%) 
Expenditure 
(evaluated at 
benchmark price) 
$ million 
EV ($ million) % Change from Benchmark 
Benchmark 22.9 22.9 64,753.32 - - 
No LLZ 343.0 0 65,108.28 354.96 0.55 Immobile 
Housing 
Capital LLZ on 6th and 
7th rings 220.0 0 64,896.03 142.71 0.22 
No LLZ 375.0 0 65,490.72 737.40 1.14 Partially 
Mobile 
Housing 
Capital 
LLZ on 6th and 
7th rings 245.0 0 65,446.42 693.10 1.07 
No LLZ 409.0 0 65,856.93 1,103.61 1.7 Perfectly 
Mobile 
Housing 
Capital 
LLZ on 6th and 
7th rings 271.0 0 66,016.56 1,263.24 1.95 
 
 Sensitivity Analyses 
In this section, the sensitivity analyses for the basic model are performed by 
varying a key assumption and some key parameters such as the elasticity of substitution 
between factors and that between goods. The purpose of the analyses is to see whether 
any change of an assumption or a parameter would change some qualitative results for 
the LVT or graded property taxes. The focus is on discussing the differences among 
scenarios. 
First, change the assumption that all households are landowners into the new 
assumption that the residents are not landowners. Households under the assumption of 
the absentee landownership do not make an income from land. Table 43 reports the result 
under the absentee landownership condition. The first notable result is that the change 
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(increase) of the money-metric welfare for each tax reform is more significantly greater 
than that with the resident landownership. For example, switching to the LVT under no 
LLZ improves the money-metric welfare of households by 5.30%, which is 45.3% of the 
tax revenue in the economy and great enough to note. Another notable result is that the 
imposition of LLZ no longer improves the money-metric welfare of households, but 
decreases the money-metric welfare. For example, for the LVT reform, the money-metric 
welfare improvement weakens by 0.08 percentage points (from 5.30% to 5.22%) due to 
the presence of LLZ on 6th and 7th rings, and weakens by 0.32 percentage points (from 
5.30% to 4.98%) due to the presence of LLZ on 6th to 9th rings. The same holds true for 
the graded property taxes as well. 
 
Table 43. Welfare comparisons for the basic model with the absentee landownership 
Policy Options Land Tax Rate (%) 
Capital 
Tax Rate 
(%) 
Expenditure 
(evaluated at 
benchmark price) 
$ million 
EV ($ 
million) 
% Change 
from 
Benchmar
k 
Benchmark 22.9 22.9 53,422.21 - - 
No LLZ 152 0 56,251.48 2,829.27 5.3 
LLZ on 6th and 7th rings 128 0 56,211.05 2,788.84 5.22 LVT 
LLZ on 6th to 9th rings 110 0 56,080.66 2,658.45 4.98 
73 10 55,054.73 1,632.52 3.06 
No LLZ 
31 20 53,810.06 387.85 0.73 
65 10 54,982.19 1,559.98 2.92 
LLZ on 6thand 7th rings 
29 20 54,965.12 1,542.91 2.89 
60 10 53,677.97 255.76 0.48 
Graded 
Property 
Tax 
LLZ on 6th to 9th rings 
28 20 53,627.59 205.38 0.38 
 
Next, we varied the elasticity of substitution (λ ) between factors for the 
production of non-housing good, that (δ ) for the production of housing, and that (ξ ) 
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between housing and non-housing good for the utility function. Note that the original 
elasticity of substitution between factors is 0.7, and that between housing and non-
housing good is 0.2. The experimented scenarios are:  
(1) λ =δ =0.1, LVT reform (Table 44),  
(2) λ =δ =0.1, the revenue preserving tax on capital = 20% (Table 45),  
(3) λ =δ =0.1, LVT reform with LLZ on 6th and 7th rings (Table 46),  
(4) λ =δ =0.1, the revenue preserving tax on capital = 20% with LLZ on 6th and 
7th rings (Table 47),  
(5) ξ = 1.2, LVT reform (Table 48),  
(6) ξ = 1.2, the revenue preserving tax on capital = 20% (Table 49).  
Note that for each scenario, the other features are the same as in the basic model. 
Note also that the change of the elasticity of substitution between production factors 
means the change of technology, while the change of the elasticity of substitution 
between goods means the change of taste. Because of the smaller λ  andδ , the CBD area 
(734.88 square miles) and the radius of urban area (35.76 miles) in Table 44 for the 
scenario (1) are greater than 256.46 square miles and 25.68 miles in Table 19 at the 
higher (original) elasticity of substitution (0.7). As mentioned before, the tax on land rent 
in endogenous city is not totally neutral but makes households bear a slight burden of the 
tax. So, under the land tax being imposed, the land does not well substitute the other 
factors at a low elasticity of substitution. With this background in mind, it turns out that 
the CBD and urban area at λ =δ =0.1 is larger than those at λ =δ =0.7. Along with the 
larger CBD and urban area, it turn out that land rent, the price of housing service, the 
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price of non-housing good, and wage rate at λ =δ =0.1 are lower than those at λ =δ =0.7, 
as can be seen from Tables 44 and 19.  
On the other hand, the production of non-housing good at λ =δ =0.1 is 227.69 
(Table 44), while that at λ =δ =0.7 is 206.31 (Table 19), which is lower than the other. 
But, the money-metric welfare ($64,762.92 million in Table 44) at λ =δ =0.1 is smaller 
than that ($66,138.70 million in Table 19) at λ =δ =0.7. Note that the production of non-
housing good includes the export of non-housing good as well, but the welfare is for the 
residents only in the urban economy. Thus, the larger CBD and urban area at the lower 
elasticity of substitution (0.1) means the more export of non-housing good which results 
in the higher production in non-housing good. When taste (the elasticity of substitution) 
changes, the higher production level is not necessarily equal to the higher efficiency. For 
the money-metric welfare comparison, it makes sense that the higher flexibility in factor 
combination due to the higher elasticity of substitution can lead to the efficiency 
(welfare) gain. The result pattern described above holds true for the other scenarios (2), 
(3), and (4) as well.  
From now on, differences only among the scenarios (1), (2), (3), and (4) are 
discussed. A notable result is found between the scenarios (1) and (2). As the revenue 
preserving tax on capital increases to 20% from zero while the tax on land rent decreases 
accordingly, the CBD and urban area contract from 734.88 square miles and 35.76 miles 
in Table 44 to 726.09 square miles and 35.61 miles in Table 45. The same holds true for 
the relationship between Table 46 (scenario 3) and Table 47 (scenario 4) as well. This 
result pattern is opposite to that at the original case ofλ =δ =0.7. Recall that there are 
dwelling size effect and improvement effect in relation to the capital property tax. Due to 
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the capital property tax, the former has the force that reduces the dwelling size and urban 
area, while the latter has the force that reduces the level of improvements per dwelling 
size. Regarding the improvement effect, to accommodate a fixed population in an urban 
area, the reduced improvement due to the property tax means the larger space per 
housing, which causes the spatial expansion of urban area.86  In the scenario (2), the 
dwelling size effect dominates so that switching from the land tax to the graded property 
tax contracts the urban radius. Hence, our result adds the finding that at a low elasticity of 
substitution between factors (0.1), switching from land tax to graded property tax makes 
the urban area contract, instead of making it expand. Note that this result is strong in the 
sense that the dwelling size effect outweighed not only the improvement effect but also 
the expansion effect due to the elimination of the tax on land. In addition, since the 
elasticity of substitution between factors (0.1) is very low and the replacement effect87 is 
very weak, even the nominal wage rate decreases from $8.86 (Table 44) to $8.63 (Table 
45) although the tax on capital increases. The same holds true for the relationship 
between Table 46 (scenario 3) and Table 47 (scenario 4) as well. The scenarios (3) and 
(4) are the results with LLZ added to the scenarios (1) and (2). There are no different 
qualitative result for the scenarios (3) and (4) from the discussion we have done. The 
LLZ raises all price levels, expands the CBD and urban area, and does not reduce welfare. 
                                                 
86 Brueckner (2003) found that at a low elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing good in 
a utility function, the improvement effect dominated, so that the capital property tax encouraged the urban 
expansion. However, Brueckner’s analytical model does not have full production features and the tax was 
imposed on residential land and improvement only. On the other hand, in this case, taxes are imposed on all 
land types (but agricultural land) and improvements.  
 
87 As the tax on capital increases, the user cost of capital increases by the capital tax amount (20%). Then 
firms would replace some capital with labor and land.  
 
139  
 
 
 
Now, consider the scenarios (5) and (6) (See Tables 48 and 49). The production of 
non-housing good (230.28 in Table 48) at ξ = 1.2 is greater than that (206.31 in Table 19) 
at ξ = 0.2. The higher production of non-housing good represents the higher demand for 
non-housing good relative to the demand for housing. This means that at ξ =0.2, 
households wanted to enjoy the more housing service relative to the non-housing good 
than at ξ =1.2, but at ξ =1.2, households substituted the non-housing good for some of 
the housing service due to the change of taste. Consistent with this result, the CBD area 
(294.01 square miles in Table 48) at ξ  =1.2 is greater than that (256.46 square miles in 
Table 19) at ξ =0.2, while the radius of urban area (24.38 miles in Table 48) at ξ = 1.2 is 
smaller than that (25.69 miles in Table 19) at ξ =0.2.88 Due to the higher demand for 
non-housing good relative to the demand for housing at ξ = 1.2, the demand for factors to 
produce the non-housing good at ξ = 1.2 should also be greater than for the other case 
(ξ = 0.2). As a result, the wage rate ($16.14 in Table 48) at ξ =1.2 is also greater than 
that ($10.50 in Table 19) at ξ =0.2. In addition, at ξ = 1.2, the land rent of the 1st ring 
($6,145.09 in Table 48) is also greater than that ($5,373.48 in Table 19) at ξ = 0.2. 89  
Regarding the relationship between the scenarios (5) and (6), there are no 
different qualitative results from the effects of switching from LVT to a graded property 
tax for the original benchmark elasticity (0.2).  
                                                 
88 The larger CBD area indirectly implies that the labor demand increased. 
 
89 Note that the land rent of 1st ring is the same as the CBD land rent. 
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Table 44. Results with ‘tax on land  = 93%, tax on capital = 0%’ at λ =δ =0.1 
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Welfare, 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$,  (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
64,767.92 55,046.58 734.88 35.76 4,510.75 227.67 84.94 8.86 39,623.13 
4,176.69 (39,740.09) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land ($) 
Housing service 
prices per unit, per 
year ($) 
K/L ratio capital 
amount per acre 
of land 
Population 
density per acre 
of land 
1 4,579.03 14,801.62 10.58 0.86 
2 4,272.51 14,450.53 10.51 0.85 
3 3,969.12 14,113.49 10.43 0.84 
4 3,671.98 13,790.50 10.35 0.84 
5 3,384.23 13,467.50 10.27 0.83 
6 3,099.60 13,144.51 10.17 0.82 
7 2,824.36 12,835.56 10.08 0.81 
8 2,552.25 12,526.60 9.97 0.80 
9 2,289.52 12,217.65 9.87 0.79 
10 2,033.04 11,922.74 9.76 0.78 
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Table 45. Results with ‘tax on land  = 27%, tax on capital = 20%’ at λ =δ =0.1  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Welfare, 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$, (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
63,445.23 55,735.34 726.09 35.61 4,510.75 214.64 87.31 8.63 40,752.69 
3,398.93 (40,237.33) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land ($) 
Housing service 
prices per unit, per 
year ($) 
K/L ratio capital 
amount per acre 
of land 
Population 
density per acre 
of land 
1 5,989.65 16,023.38 10.24 0.87 
2 5,504.85 15,658.26 10.15 0.87 
3 5,029.43 15,307.17 10.06 0.86 
4 4,569.65 14,956.09 9.96 0.85 
5 4,116.12 14,619.05 9.85 0.84 
6 3,678.24 14,282.01 9.75 0.82 
7 3,249.74 13,944.98 9.63 0.81 
8 2,830.62 13,621.98 9.49 0.80 
9 2,427.14 13,298.98 9.35 0.79 
10 2,033.04 12,975.99 9.19 0.77 
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Table 46. Results with ‘tax on land  = 86%, tax on capital = 0%’ at λ =δ =0.1 with LLZ 
on 6th and 7th rings  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Welfare, 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$, (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
64,890.54 55,656.23 736.43 36.51 4,510.75 231.37 85.91 9.02 39,911.84 
4,606.78 (40,180.21) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land ($) 
Housing service 
prices per unit, per 
year ($) 
K/L ratio capital 
amount per acre 
of land 
Population 
density per acre 
of land 
1 4,823.00 14,871.83 10.59 0.86 
2 4,482.07 14,520.75 10.52 0.85 
3 4,150.53 14,155.62 10.44 0.84 
4 3,825.24 13,804.54 10.35 0.83 
5 3,509.34 13,467.50 10.27 0.82 
6 3,199.69 13,130.47 7.46 0.60 
7 2,896.30 12,793.43 7.47 0.60 
8 2,599.16 12,470.43 9.96 0.79 
9 2,314.54 12,147.44 9.85 0.78 
10 2,033.04 11,824.44 9.72 0.77 
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Table 47. Results with ‘tax on land  = 25%, tax on capital = 20%’ at λ =δ =0.1 with LLZ 
on 6th and 7th rings  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Welfare, 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$, (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
63,544.86 56,450.50 726.01 36.34 4,510.75 218.05 88.56 8.78 41,138.06 
3,821.15 (40,753.63) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land ($) 
Housing service 
prices per unit, per 
year ($) 
K/L ratio capital 
amount per acre 
of land 
Population 
density per acre 
of land 
1 6,299.30 16,177.86 10.27 0.87 
2 5,773.83 15,798.69 10.18 0.87 
3 5,264.01 15,419.52 10.09 0.86 
4 4,763.57 15,040.35 9.99 0.85 
5 4,275.64 14,675.23 9.88 0.83 
6 3,800.22 14,324.14 7.08 0.60 
7 3,340.44 13,973.06 7.10 0.60 
8 2,890.04 13,621.98 9.50 0.80 
9 2,455.29 13,284.94 9.35 0.78 
10 2,033.04 12,947.90 9.17 0.77 
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Table 48. Results with ‘tax on land  = 176%, tax on capital = 0%’ at ξ = 1.2  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Welfare, 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$), (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
65,605.81 68,036.22 294.01 24.38 4,510.75 230.28 106.69 12.59 49,854.77 
1,603.90 (49,117.77) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land ($) 
Housing service 
prices per unit, per 
year ($) 
K/L ratio capital 
amount per acre 
of land 
Population 
density per acre 
of land 
1 6,145.09 16,174.01 31.68 2.39 
2 5,522.59 15,762.21 29.40 2.21 
3 4,956.68 15,350.40 27.26 2.04 
4 4,434.05 14,967.00 25.21 1.88 
5 3,961.35 14,583.59 23.30 1.73 
6 3,528.60 14,214.39 21.49 1.59 
7 3,135.79 13,859.38 19.78 1.46 
8 2,779.60 13,504.38 18.18 1.34 
9 2,456.70 13,177.77 16.68 1.22 
10 2,163.76 12,851.17 15.26 1.12 
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Table 49. Results with ‘tax on land  = 33%, tax on capital = 20%’ at ξ = 1.2  
Area of 
CBD 
(square 
miles) 
Radius 
of urban 
area 
(miles) 
Per capita 
annual tax 
revenue 
($) 
Annual average non-
housing goods 
production to satisfy 
the demand per capita
Price of 
non-
housing 
good ($) 
Wage rate   
($/hour) 
Value of total 
annual domestic 
consumption 
(million $) leisure 
(excluded) 
Welfare, 
Export 
(million $) 
Total income million 
$, (average income 
per household, $) net 
of transport cost 
64,548.38 70,621.65 360.12 28.38 4,510.75 222.59 113.39 13.14 51,977.95 
1,255.10 (50,984.29) 
 
Ring 
Residential 
land rent per 
acre of land ($) 
Housing service 
prices per unit, per 
year ($) 
K/L ratio capital 
amount per acre 
of land 
Population 
density per acre 
of land 
1 9,806.85 17,480.43 23.24 1.96 
2 8,465.31 16,926.62 20.96 1.76 
3 7,276.91 16,387.01 18.86 1.57 
4 6,224.98 15,861.61 16.90 1.40 
5 5,299.56 15,364.60 15.10 1.25 
6 4,487.31 14,896.00 13.44 1.11 
7 3,778.27 14,427.39 11.92 0.98 
8 3,162.42 13,987.18 10.52 0.86 
9 2,626.48 13,561.18 9.24 0.75 
10 2,163.76 13,149.37 8.07 0.65 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
CONCLUSIONS 
The following models and their results for LVT and graded property tax reforms 
have been discussed: the static model with one income group, the static model with three 
income groups, the model with immobile housing capital, and the model with only 
partially mobile housing capital. In addition, chapter 6 discussed the welfare effects of 
LVT and conducted sensitivity analyses by varying an assumption or key parameters 
such as the elasticity of substitution. This chapter provides the summary of the findings 
and suggests future extensions. 
Summary of Findings 
The pure LVT reform is feasible although the high land tax rate to meet the 
current tax revenue needs to be imposed in the short-term during which the CBD and 
urban boundary do not change. However, the LVT reform in the long-term can become a 
more practical tax reform option for an urban economy to adopt in the sense that the 
government does not need to make the tax on land rent unreasonably high, while taking 
the advantages that the LVT provides. Moreover, when most of the residents are 
landowners, the combined policy with a LLZ would make the LVT reform even more 
practical and desirable.  
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Regarding the effects of LVT, unlike other taxes, landowners bear the whole 
burden of the tax on land rent, since there is no way for landowners to avoid the tax when 
the boundaries of the CBD and urban area do not change. Thus, the results under the 
fixed boundary case show that the tax on land rent is fully capitalized into land rents, and 
the capitalized land rents results in the lower housing service prices. Consistently, the 
elimination of the tax on capital increases the housing capital density (the ratio of ‘capital 
to land’). Switching from the benchmark property tax to LVT lowers the overall price 
level including wage rate and the price of housing service. The tax on capital entails 
‘inflation effect’, because the rental price of capital is fixed as numeraire and the user 
cost of capital increases by the tax amount. Hence, the elimination of the tax on capital 
lowers the overall price level. For example, in calculating the wage rate relative to capital 
cost, the LVT reform increases the wage rate relative to capital cost (and income relative 
to capital cost as well) due to the increase in economic efficiency. There are two 
countervailing forces regarding the price change such as wage rate relative to capital cost: 
replacement effect and efficiency effect. The replacement effect suggests that the reduced 
user cost of capital due to the tax reform would replace some labor with capital to the 
point that the elasticity of substitution allows. This decreases labor demand and wage rate 
accordingly. On the other hand, the efficiency effect suggests that the reduced cost of 
production due to the reduced user cost of capital increases the demand for labor and so 
wage rate. Depending on the relative sizes of the two forces, the wage rate relative to 
capital cost can either increase or decrease as a result of the tax reform. In our case, the 
efficiency effect dominated. 
The imposition of LLZ increases the demand for land in all rings. For the rings 
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with the LLZ, households consume housing services with a larger lot size, while for the 
rings without the LLZ, the immigrants from the rings with the LLZ add to the number of 
extant residents by increasing the total demand for residential lots. As a result, the land 
rents in all rings increase due to the LLZ. The positive income effect due to the increased 
land rent combined with the migration effect is directly related to the increase in prices as 
a result of the LLZ. Consistent with intuition and other results, the rings with the LLZ 
have lower household (population) densities while the rings without the LLZ have higher 
household (population) densities as compared to the case with the LLZ. Unlike the cases 
with fixed CBD and urban boundaries, the tax on land rent is not neutral in the case of 
endogenous CBD and urban boundaries. The tax on land rent lowers the land rents in all 
rings, and the areas near the urban boundary would shift to agricultural use. Brueckner 
(2003) found that there are two countervailing effects of the property tax regarding the 
urban size: improvement effect and dwelling size effect. In this case, the improvement 
effect of the capital property tax dominated, so that switching from the capital property 
tax to the LVT contracted the CBD and the urban area. The same qualitative results can 
be applied to the switching from the capital property tax to the graded property tax as 
well.  
The model with three income groups as well generates the same qualitative results 
as in the basic model, but the following results. The rich live in the suburban areas, the 
poor live in the areas near the CBD, and the middle live in-between. This means that the 
income elasticity of housing consumption (or land consumption) is greater than the 
income elasticity of commuting costs. With respect to the wage rates and incomes 
relative to capital cost, the LVT reform and graded property taxes favor the poor and the 
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middle more than do the rich, but the imposition of LLZ favors the rich more than does 
the middle and the poor. In the present model, the rich have the largest landholding.  
The model with immobile housing capital and only partially mobile housing 
capital was considered with the recognition and assumption that in the short-term, the 
amount of housing capital, the boundary of CBD, and the boundary of urban area do not 
change. For any same tax policy, the more mobile the housing capital is, the lower the 
land rent is. It is because the more mobile housing capital allows firms to use more 
capital when the user cost of capital decreases due to the tax reform. Since the land area 
of each ring is fixed, the more use of capital means the more housing services. The longer 
time span (the more mobile housing capital) allows households to enjoy greater housing 
service at a lower housing service price. Consistently, the production decreases more as 
the housing capital becomes less mobile. Due to the immobility of housing capital, the 
user cost of factors increases, which causes the production to shrink. 
When the government switched from the capital property tax to the LVT reform, 
the welfare increased by 1.7% (from $64,753 million to $65,857 million) for the fixed 
boundary case, and increased by 2.14% (from $64,753 million to $66,139 million) for the 
endogenous boundary case. The increase in welfare was larger for the case with the 
endogenous boundary than for the case with the fixed boundary. The percents (1.7% and 
2.14%) appear to be small. However, the monetary values for the changes for the welfare 
($1,104 million and $1,386 million) are not negligible but record 17.7% and 22.2% of the 
tax revenue, respectively in the economy. As the revenue preserving tax on capital 
increases (while the tax on land decreases accordingly), the welfare improvement from 
the benchmark weakens. When the tax on capital is 10% and the tax on land is 80%, the 
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welfare is improved by 1.29% from the benchmark. When the tax on capital is 20% and 
the tax on land is 32%, the welfare improvement is as low as 0.3%. The existence of LLZ 
makes the welfare of households (as a landowner) further improved than the absence of 
the LLZ does, when the residents are landowners.  
A notable result is that switching to the LVT and graded property taxes reduces 
the welfare of the rich, but improves the welfares of the middle and the poor. 
Numerically, the welfare of the rich decrease by 2.79% for the pure LVT reform, 
decrease by 1.44% for 10% on capital, and decrease by 0.35% for 20% on capital. The 
welfare of the middle increase by 1.21% for the pure LVT reform, increase by 0.91% for 
the 10% on capital, and increase by 0.25% for the case with the 20% on capital. The 
welfare of the poor increase by 3.80% for the pure LVT reform, increase by 2.35% for 
the 10% on capital, and increase by 0.56% for the 20% on capital. In the current model, a 
household from the rich owns the largest land area, a household from the poor owns the 
smallest land area, and a household from the middle owns the level between them. Thus, 
the result suggests that the LVT discourages a large landholding. However, the 
imposition of LLZ suggests a reverse result pattern. The LLZ makes the rich gain, but the 
middle and the poor lose. In other words, even under the existence of LLZ, switching to 
the LVT and graded property taxes increases the welfare of the rich, but reduces the 
welfares of the middle and the poor.  
The LVT reform improves the welfare of households even when the housing 
capital is immobile and only partially immobile. The more mobile the housing capital is, 
the greater the welfare is. Under the absence of LLZ, the welfare for the model with 
immobile housing capital version increases by 0.55%, that for the partially mobile 
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housing capital version increases by 1.14%, and that for the perfectly mobile housing 
capital version increases by 1.70%. The same pattern holds true for the presence of LLZ 
as well. Given that the land area for each ring is fixed as a short-term feature, the higher 
mobility of the housing capital provides the more flexibility to use the amount of capital 
in establishing housing services, which causes the increase in economic efficiency. 
However, when considering the cases with immobile and only partially mobile housing 
capital, the presence of LLZ did not cause the welfare to increase for the same LVT 
reform policy. By this result, in the short-term period during which housing capital is 
immobile or only partially mobile, the positive income effect of the LLZ90 is not great 
enough to offset the distortive effect of the LLZ.  
The following are the summary of the sensitivity analyses. First, assuming that the 
urban residents are not landowners but there is only absentee landowner in the economy, 
the change (increase) of welfare for each tax reform is more significantly greater than 
before. For example, switching from the capital property tax to the LVT improved the 
welfare of households by 5.30%, which covers 45.3% of the tax revenue in the economy. 
Another finding is that the imposition of LLZ no longer improves the welfare of 
households. For example, for the LVT reform, the welfare improvement weakens by -
0.08 percentage points (from 5.30% to 5.22%) with the LLZ on 6th and 7th rings, and 
weakens by -0.32 percentage points (from 5.30% to 4.98%) with the LLZ on 6th to 9th 
rings. Second, at a very low elasticity of substitution between factors (λ =δ =0.1), 
switching from the capital property tax to LVT or graded property tax expands the CBD 
and the urban area This result pattern is opposite to the result at the case ofλ =δ =0.7. 
                                                 
90 LLZ increases land rents and as a result increases incomes. 
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Third, with the higher elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing good, 
there were no changes in the qualitative results for switching from the capital property tax 
to the LVT and graded property tax. 
Future Research 
The current model can be extended for either policy application or pursuing 
academic issues. For the policy application, the current model can have more sectors, 
more tax options such as sales tax and income tax, more regions, diverse land use 
regulations, various types of housing markets, and the other. On the other hand, one can 
pursue the following academic issues by extending the current model.  
First, the current model can be transformed into dynamic models. There are 
various ways to transform the current model to a dynamic model. Capital can be divided 
into the three factors of production (land, equipment capital, and structural capital) that 
are differentiated from each other with respect to durability and mobility, and model the 
characteristics in a dynamic setting. According to Plassmann and Tideman,  
Structures (immobile capital) are almost as immobile as land, but they are 
reproducible and depreciate over time. In the short-run a tax on structures will not 
affect the availability of structures in a region, while a policy that reduces the 
incentive to erect new structures will lead to a reduction in the number of available 
structures in the region over a longer span of time. Machines (mobile capital) are 
very mobile, reproducible, and depreciate faster than structures, partly because they 
become obsolete faster. A regional policy that reduces the incentive to use 
machines will lead to a rapid reduction in the number of available machines, 
because they will move to other regions. If a policy reduces the overall return to 
machines in all regions, it will lead, somewhat more slowly, to a decrease in the 
total number of machines by discouraging their production. A model that combines 
land and structures into a single inelastically supplied factor ignores the fact that 
structures need to be constructed, and it will therefore underestimate the negative 
long-run effect of taxing this hybrid factor--- (Plassmann and Tideman, 1999, 5).   
 
Another way of transforming the current model to a dynamic model is that as 
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some authors such as Alex Anas did, we incorporate durable housing features such as 
construction costs and demolition costs in a perfect foresight framework to address LVT 
and other local tax issues.  
Second, the urban literature has changed its focus on from mono-centric city to 
polycentric city. So, the modeled urban structure can have suburban business districts and 
internal residential districts additionally, which would be a more realistic urban structure.  
Third, the basic model assumes the exogenous transportation cost function. But 
according to Brueckner (1987), the fact that urban traffic congestion (and hence the cost 
of travel) is endogenous has been stressed in a number of studies. The existence of the 
transportation cost is critical in the developed model. So, varying the assumption about it 
would change the quantitative results and may change some qualitative results.
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
SOLUTION METHODOLOGY 
Complementary Problem91   
To introduce the solution methodology, consider a very simple economy as an 
example. Assume that there are two sectors (or products) (X and Y), two factors (L and 
K), and one representative consumer with utility function (U). L and K have inelastic 
(fixed) supply, but can move freely between sectors. Let xp , yp , lp , and kp  be the 
prices of X, Y, L, and K, respectively. And let  I  be consumer’s income. We specify the 
model as follows. 
(1) Production function for X, ),( XX KL XX =  
(2) Production function for Y, ),( YY KL YY =  
(3) Labor market equilibrium, YX L LL +=  
(4) Capital market equilibrium, YX K KK +=  
(5) Utility function, ),( YX UU =  
(6) Budget constraint, YpXpKpL pI yxkl ⋅+⋅=⋅+= ⋅  
There are two general ways to formulate the problem above.  
The first is to model the economy as an optimization problem. From this approach, 
a general equilibrium would be the solution to a big linear or non-linear programming 
                                                 
91 For this and next subsections, I mostly followed the materials from the GAMS/MPSGE workshop held in the 
University of Colorado during Oct. 18-22, 2004 (Instructors: Dr. James R. Markusen, Dr. Thomas F. Rutherford) 
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problem in which some objective function is maximized or minimized subject to a set of 
constraints. In other words, an objective function must be chosen for the entire model, 
and each agent’s problem such as the household’s utility maximization problem and 
firm’s profit maximization problem becomes one of the constraints to be met (or 
optimized) for the chosen objective function. However, in many cases, formulating a 
model as an optimization problem makes us face the difficulty of choosing an objective 
function for the entire model. Especially, for example, when there are multiple household 
types with different preferences and different factor endowments in a model, the 
difficulty of choosing a representative objective function becomes clearer.  
The second way of formulating and solving the problem is the following. The 
present dissertation also takes the approach. In this approach, there is no need to choose 
an objective function to formulate and solve the problem. Instead, individual optimizing 
behavior and decisions of consumers and firms are embedded in functions describing the 
agents’ choices in response to the values of variables facing them. Individual 
optimization is used to derive demand and supply functions that describe how consumers 
and firms will react to prices and other variables. And then finding general equilibrium 
becomes a matter of finding the solution to a square system of ‘n’ equations in ‘n’ 
unknowns. Instead of thinking about how to optimize, finding the values of the ‘n’ 
unknown variables in ‘n’ equations is a lot easier and simpler concept.  
Furthermore, the general equilibrium is formulated as a system of weak 
inequalities, with each inequality associated with a particular non-negative variable such 
as price or quantity. If a particular weak inequality holds as an equation, then the 
associated variable is strictly positive. If it holds as a strict inequality, then the value of 
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the associated variable is zero. This approach is referred to as a complementarity problem 
in mathematics, and the associated variables are referred to as complementary variables. 
Now, turn to the specific example above. Assuming that all markets are perfectly 
competitive, a minimum average cost is taken to be unit price. The procedure to derive 
the equilibrium system is as follows. First, solve the underlying cost and expenditure 
minimization problems for producers and consumers respectively, so that individual 
firm’s (or household’s) optimizing behavior is embedded in the derived functions of the 
model. In the present example, we want to solve for the cost function for each sector 
where the cost functions embody cost minimizing behavior. Regarding the welfare (U), 
from the point of the household, the same optimization as the firm’s cost minimization 
problem confronts him/her. In other words, the household satisfies a given level of utility 
by minimizing expenditure on goods (X and Y). The minimum average expenditure is 
considered as unit price of welfare, assuming that the expenditure function is the function 
with the characteristics of the first degree of homogeneity. Thus, although the welfare is 
actually not a production sector, we can treat the welfare as a sector in solving the 
problem, using the analogy. More specifically expressing, 
‘unit’ cost functions for X and Y are ),( kplpx Ccx = , ),( kplpy Ccy = , 
‘unit’ expenditure function for U is ),( ypxp ee = .  
And, according to Shepard’s lemma,  
X producer’s demand for labor to produce unit of output X is plcx
lp
Cx =∂
∂
,  
X producer’s demand for capital to produce unit of output Y is pkcx
kp
Cx =∂
∂
,  
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consumer’s compensated demand for X to provide unit of utility is pxe
xp
e =∂
∂ . 
Now, specify the general equilibrium as the solution to a square system of nine 
weak inequalities in nine unknowns (X, Y, U, xp , yp , lp , and kp , up  and I). Here, 
define up  as income needed for satisfying unit utility, and call it ‘utility price’. 
The derived or defined equations to solve the problem are as follows: 
(1) Non-positive profits for X     xpkplpxC ≥),(   
(2) Non-positive profits for Y    ypkplpyC ≥),(  
(3) Non-positive surplus for U   upypxpe ≥),(  
(4) Supply - Demand for X      UypxppxeX ⋅≥ ),(  
(5) Supply - Demand for Y     UypxppyeY ⋅≥ ),(  
(6) Supply - Demand for U     
up
IU ≥  
(7) Supply - Demand for L     YplcyXplcxL ⋅+⋅≥
*  
(8) Supply - Demand for K     YpkcyXpkcxK ⋅+⋅≥
*  
(9) Income balance      ** KkpLl pI +=  
Here, since welfare or utility (U) is not a product, do not necessarily name the 
inequality (6) as supply-demand inequality. However, the inequality condition (6) plays a 
role to solve the system. These weak inequalities can be solved for the nine unknowns: X, 
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Y, U, xp , yp , lp , and kp , up  and I. Note that these inequalities are of three types: 1) 
zero-profit inequalities (1)-(3), 2) market clearing inequalities (4)-(8), and 3) income 
balance equation (9).  
If zero profit condition holds as a strict inequality, profits for that activity are 
negative, that activity will not be used, while if zero profit condition holds as an equality, 
that activity will be determined with a positive number and used. Here, the 
complementary variable to a zero-profit condition is mathematically defined as a 
quantity, the activity level. The activity level (quantity) is determined according to how 
the zero profit condition holds. Regarding the inequality (3) above, we consider that if 
unit expenditure is greater than up (utility price), no utility is provided to households, 
while expenditure is equal to up , a certain level of utility is provided to households.   
If market-clearing condition holds as strict inequality, supply exceeds demand for 
that good or factor, so its price must be zero, while if the market-clearing condition holds 
as equality, so its price must be a positive number. Here, the complementary variable to 
the market clearing inequality is mathematically defined as the price of the goods or the 
factor. The price of the goods is determined according to how the market clearing 
condition holds. Regarding the inequality (6) above, we consider that if unit utility level 
provided to households is greater than households’ demand for utility, up (utility price) 
is zero, while if unit utility level provided to households is equal to households’ demand 
for utility, up  is a positive number.  The complementary variable to income balance 
equation is just defined as the income of the agent. The correct association of inequalities 
and unknowns in the square system is thus as follows:  
159  
  
 
 
 
Inequality                                                                      Complementary Variable 
(1) Non-positive profits for X                                                           X 
(2) Non-positive profits for Y                                                           Y 
(3) Non-positive profits for U                                                           U 
(4) Supply - Demand for X                                                              xp  
 (5) Supply - Demand for Y                                                             yp  
 (6) Supply - Demand for U                                                            up  
(7) Supply - Demand for L                                                               lp  
(8) Supply - Demand for K                                                              kp  
(9) Income balance                                                                             I 
 
Constructing Micro-Consistent Data and SAM (Social Accounting Matrix)  
To calibrate parameters for specified functions and to get a solution for an 
economy, not only do we need data but also the data should be micro-consistent. 
Constructing Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) helps us to develop micro-consistent data.  
SAM is a comprehensive, and economy-wide data framework, which typically 
represents the economy of a country, elaborating the linkages between the supply and use 
table (commonly known as the Input-Output table) and institutional sector accounts. Here, 
the Input-Output table shows inter-industrial linkages of the various industries in an 
economy, and provides a detailed analysis of the process of production and the use of 
goods and services (products) and the income generated from the production 
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process. More technically, SAM is a square matrix in which each account is represented 
by a row and a column. Each cell shows the payment from the account of its column to 
the account of its row – the incomes of an account appear along its row, its expenditures 
along its column. SAM consists of ‘double-entry’ accounting, which requires that, for each 
account in the SAM, total revenue (row total) equals total expenditure (column total). 
Table A1 is a small SAM that is constructed for the example economy of the 
previous section. The system of equations can be thought of as consisting of three 
activities (or commodities), X and Y, and U, and four markets, X, Y, L, and K. Here, 
although U is not a production sector, we treat it as an activity, using the analogy between 
U and production sector. The analogy is that as X and Y are produced using factors L and 
K, U is also generated using X and Y. The U can be considered as the commodity that 
households consume, as U is satisfied by consuming on X and Y. Note that all the 
numbers in SAM are dollar values, quantities times prices.  
Reading rows as receipts, we see from the first row of the SAM in Table A1 that 
100 is spent on good X in sector U. Likewise, reading across row we see that 40 units of 
labor enter sector X and 60 units enter sector Y. And we also see that household’s income 
is 200, which consist of his/her endowments of L (100) plus K (100). SAM can be quite 
detailed in their representation of an economy, and they are also quite flexible.  
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Table A1. Traditional SAM (social accounting matrix)  
 PX PY PU PL PK X Y U HOUSE- HOLDS 
PX               100  
PY               100  
PU                200 
PL           40 60    
PK           60 40    
X 100                
Y   100              
U     200            
HOUSEHOLDS       100 100        
 
It is often convenient to use a rectangular92 SAM format (Table A2). In the 
rectangular SAM, we have one row for every market. There are two types of columns in 
the rectangular SAM, corresponding to production sectors and consumers. A rectangular 
SAM is balanced or micro-consistent when row and column sums are zeros. Positive 
numbers represent the value of commodity flows into the economy (sales or factor 
supplies), while negative numbers represent the value of commodity flows out of the 
economy (factor demands or final demands). A row sum is zero if the total amount of 
commodity flowing into the economy equals the total amount of commodity flowing out 
of the economy. This is market clearance, and one such condition applies for each 
commodity in the model. Columns in this matrix correspond to production sectors or 
consumers. A production sector column sum is zero if the value of outputs equals the cost 
of inputs. A consumer column is balanced if the sum of primary factor sales equals the 
value of final demands. Zero column sums indicate zero profits or product exhaustion in 
                                                 
92 Both types of SAM Table are rectangular. However, as can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, the reason why 
the new SAM is called as a ‘rectangular SAM’ may be that the new SAM is not a square. 
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an alternative terminology. Prices can be chosen as one, and representative quantities for 
activities can be chosen such that activity levels are also equal to one (e.g., activity X at 
level one produces 100 units of good X). 
The numbers in the SAM are used as a benchmark. Using the benchmark numbers, 
we can generate values for most parameters of the specific forms of utility and production 
functions. Substituting the parameter values into the functions, we can conduct 
counterfactual analyses by running the program and comparing new results with the 
benchmark. 
 
   Table A2. Transformed ‘Rectangular’ SAM 
Markets X Y U HOUSEHOLDS 
PX 100   -100   
PY   100 -100   
PU     200 -200 
PL -40 -60   100 
PK -60 -40   100 
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APPENDIX 2 
DERIVATION OF THE EQUATION (3.15)  
The budget and time constraints of a household in ring j is follows.  
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The above budget constraint can be summed for the whole population and all 
rings and expressed as follows. 
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Since the ∑ ⋅⋅
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On the other hand, the zero profit conditions are given below,  
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In equilibrium, supply for each good is equal to demand for each good, and so  
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Substituting (5) and (6) into (7), 
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Rearranging (8), 
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From (9), if there is no monetary commuting cost (∑ ⋅⋅
j
jDcn j ), then, 
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The above condition means that when there is no monetary commuting cost, the 
sum of values of land demand and capital demand must equal the sum of values of land 
endowment and capital endowment. If the value of land demand 
( ∑ ⋅⋅+⋅
j
j
H
j
L
j
NL LrnLr
11 ) is greater than the value of land endowment ( ∑⋅
j
j
N
LN )( ), the 
value of capital demand ( ∑ ⋅⋅+⋅
j
j
H
j
KNK knrKr ) must be smaller than the value of 
capital endowment ( KrK ⋅ ), by the difference ( ∑ ⋅⋅+⋅
j
j
H
j
L
j
NL LrnLr
11  - ∑⋅
j
j
N
LN )( ). 
On the other hand, if the value of land demand is smaller than the value of land 
endowment, the value of capital demand must be greater than the value of capital 
endowment by the difference. Otherwise, the budget constraint can’t be met and the 
model is not closed and not solved.93 
However, under the situation that there is the monetary commuting cost,  
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must hold. 
We here assume that there is the export of non-housing good  ( Ex ). Further 
assume that the export of non-housing good ( Ex ) is greater than the monetary 
commuting cost (∑ ⋅⋅
j
jDcn j ) and call the difference ( Ex  -∑ ⋅⋅
j
jDcn j ) ‘net export 
                                                 
93 Note here, the condition that money inflow into the economy equals money outflow from the economy 
has been derived from the budget constraint. 
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value’. Here, because of the existence of the net export value, trade balance is not 
required to meet the budget constraint and close the model.  
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See notations below: note that ring 1 is CBD. 
j
Nx  Per capita consumption of non-housing good in ring j = 2,3,4, ---, 11 
j
Hx  Per capita consumption of housing services in ring j = 2, 3,4, ---, 11 
jl  Per capita consumption of leisure in ring j = 2, 3,4, ---, 11 
NP  Price of a unit of the non-housing good 
j
HP  Price of a unit of housing services per year in ring j = 2, 3,4, ---, 11 
WP       Hourly wage rate 
j
Lr  Rental rate of land for ring j = 1,2,3,4, ---, 11 
Kr  Fixed rental rate of capital  
jW  Hours supplied by a worker in ring j = 2, 3,4, ---, 11 
c  The fixed roundtrip money cost per mile and per capita 
N
L
j
j∑
   Per capita land endowment (fixed and averaged for all locations)    
K   Total capital endowment (fixed) summed for all uses and for all population   
Γ    Per capita round trip time for work per mile 
jD    Distance in miles from the midpoint of ring j to the city center 
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T            Per capita time endowment for leisure, work, and commuting  
Ex          Export value for all population 
N            Total number of households 
jn          Number of households in ring j = 2, 3,4, ---, 11 
j
HL          Per capita land demand in ring j = 2, 3,4, ---, 11 
j
Hk           Per capita capital demand in ring j = 2, 3,4, ---, 11 
j
HS           Per capita supply of housing in ring j = 2, 3,4, ---, 11 
j
NS           Per capita supply of non-housing in ring j = 2, 3,4, ---, 11 
Hπ           Profit in housing sector 
Nπ           Profit in non-housing good sector 
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